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I. INTRODUCTION
The natural objects of a decedent's bounty are traditionally
thought to be his spouse and children t While the statutory protec-
tion afforded the disinherited2 surviving spouse has increased sig-
nificantly in recent decades, the protection afforded the disinherited
child has diminished steadily.' In the United States, only one juris-
diction currently provides direct, systematic protection to a child
intentionally disinherited by a parent.4 In all other states, the testa-
1. Legislatures apparently believe this is still true, for the intestacy schemes of most
states provide first for the decedent's spouse and children, then for other of the decedent's
relatives by consanguinity. But see infra note 300 (describing intestacy provision in tradi-
tional nuclear family under 1990 Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which provides that the
surviving spouse takes the entire estate to the exclusion of the intestate's children).
2. Except when otherwise indicated, the discussion of disinheritance in this article
contemplates the scenario in which the testator attempts to minimize estate transfers to
spouses (or cohabiting lovers) and children who have not been provided for through the
testator's non-probate transfers.
3. The laws regarding disinheritance of children have not changed substantially in re-
cent decades, but family structures have changed dramatically. Regrettably, the plight of
disinherited children has worsened in light of the serial polygamy and single parenthood
characteristic of the late 20th century. See infra notes 257-81 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 111-23 and accompanying text (discussing legitime under Louisiana
law). See generally THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 138-46
(2d ed. 1953) (discussing lack of protection for children disinherited by a parent). Legis-
latures have done little under the law of wills to ameliorate this unprotected status in the
four decades since the 1953 edition of Atkinson's work.
Scholars have sporadically focused their attention on the disinherited American child.
Indeed, one of the leading writers on inheritance law indicated in 1940 that a move was
unmistakably under way to limit the unfettered freedom of American testators to disinherit
children. Joseph Dainow, Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in England, 25 CORNELL
L.Q. 337, 338 (1940). Describing then-recent changes in English law, Dainow commented
that "[tihe detailed legislative history of the new English reform will serve to orient the
unmistakably growing tendency in this country to limit a testator's power of disinheriting
the surviving members of his immediate family." Id. That move unfortunately bore no
fruit in the form of remedial legislation for disinherited children.
Dainow was not the first scholar to express concern over an American testator's
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tor is free to disinherit even needy, minor children, regardless of
the size of the estate.
One rationale asserted for this lack of protection to the disin-
herited child is the American belief in testamentary freedom.
Commitment to testamentary freedom, however, has not prevented
most state legislatures from enacting substantial statutory protection
for disinherited spouses.6 Moreover, the American public has his-
ability to disinherit members of his immediate family. In 1928, Professor Laube of Cor-
nell examined the problem of the disinherited child and reviewed case law pertaining to
the subject. See Herbert D. Laube, The Right of a Testator to Pauperize His Helpless
Dependents, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 559, 594 (1928) (concluding that any judicial interpretation
of statutory law that enables a father to disinherit his child is contrary to humanity, social
interest, and policy, and that the legislature must act to nullify such an interpretation).
5. On the concept of testamentary freedom, see generally MARVIN B. SUSSMAN Er
AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 4-8 (1970) (discussing the functions, purposes, histo-
ry, and limits of testamentary freedom in American society). For a study of American
philosophy towards inheritance, see generally RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH,
AND SOcIETY 34-90 (1982) (tracing the historical evolution of and influences on American
philosophy towards the right of inheritance). See also Edmond N. Cahn, Restraints on
Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 139, 145 (1936) (listing various historical theories of
inheritance).
But see infra note 287 (questioning whether "testamentary freedom" is simply an
easily asserted platitude masking legislative inertia). See also Dainow, supra note 4, at
338 (discussing the "well-nigh universal conviction" that testamentary freedom is ingrained
in the English and Americans, but surmising that such freedom might one day be regard-
ed as an "historical accident").
6. Cf. John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced
Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 304-05 (1987) (noting that although "America
is uniquely the land of testamentary freedom," restrictions on spousal disinheritance are
imposed because of the lack of protection spouses receive in marital r operty ownership
in non-community property states). See infra notes 17-35, 51-101 and accompanying text
(discussing dower and the elective share in common law jurisdictions); infra notes 36-50
and accompanying text (discussing community property).
Importantly, in most states there is no inherent right of a decedent to dispose of his
assets by will, nor is there an inherent right of family members to succeed to his
property. In Estate of Eisenberg, 280 N.W.2d 359, 362 (Wis. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed,
444 U.S. 976 (1979), the male plaintiff failed to convince the court that Wisconsin's
then-existing elective share statute was unreasonable based on societal changes in the
decade preceding the case. In response to the plaintiff's claims that the statute violated his
rights to equal protection and due process under the Constitution, the court noted that "it
seems irrefutable that no federal right to dispose of property by will exists under the
federal constitution." Id. at 363. Indeed, "[nfights to succession by will are created by the
state and may be limited, conditioned, or abolished by it." Id. (quoting Demorest v. City
Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 48 (1944)).
The court noted, however, that unlike most states, which view the right to make a
will as statutory, Wisconsin views the right to make a will as an inherent right. Id. Nev-
ertheless, the statute withstood an equal protection challenge under the state constitution.
The statute served to promote compelling governmental interests, including the following:
encouragement of the marital relationship; protection of each spouse from destitution;
institution of a uniform and objective method for determining a standard minimum share
1994]
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torically accepted other forms of testamentary restrictions, direct
and indirect, ranging from mortmain to estate tax.7 Commitment to
testamentary freedom alone is not a satisfactory explanation for
permitting the disinheritance of children. When the child the testa-
tor seeks to exclude is a minor, the state should be reluctant to
uphold the disinheritance absent compelling reasons.
A comparison of the substantially different protections afforded
to disinherited spouses and minor children reveals a particularly
cruel paradox. The testator's minor child is largely incapable of
acquiring, earning, managing, and protecting significant property
interests during minority, yet almost no state intervenes to prevent
his or her disinheritance.8 The testator's surviving spouse is capa-
ble of acquiring, earning, managing, and protecting her property
interests during and beyond the marriage, yet most states intervene
to prevent spousal disinheritance.' In light of our emerging empha-
sis in family law on societal and parental responsibility to
children," the impropriety of America's focus on direct protection
solely of the surviving spouse is becoming clear.
for the surviving spouse; and protection for the surviving husband as well as for the
surviving wife. Id. at 363-64. The court stated the following: "Whether the state legisla-
ture could constitutionally provide similar protection by statute for surviving children is
questionable, and a problem we are not called upon to resolve." Id. at 364.
7. See Paul G. Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform, 52 GEO.
L.J. 499, 501 (1964) (noting restraints regarding dispositions to charity, for immoral or
unworthy purposes, as well as restraints in the form of income, estate, and gift taxes); see
also Mary L. Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and
Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 321, 335-36
(discussing the results of 1977 telephone survey in which 89% of respondents initially
stated there should be no testamentary restrictions; only 43% of respondents maintained
that stance after being asked whether a testator should be allowed to leave his estate to
an animal).
8. Indeed, it is these very limitations that have often caused attorneys to advise that a
testator not leave property directly to his minor children, but rather to the surviving
spouse. See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 325 (noting that "attorneys frequently caution
against bequeathing property directly to a minor child, because such a bequest requires
appointment of a guardian to the estate of the child"). Increasingly, however, the surviv-
ing spouse of the testator is not the parent of the testator's minor children and bequests
to the surviving spouse will not benefit the testator's minor children. In light of changing
family structures, the burdens associated with direct bequests to minors may be out-
weighed by the child's need to be provided for after the testator's death.
9. Cf. infra notes 198-207 and accompanying text (discussing measures spouse may
take to protect herself from disinheritance).
10. See, e.g., Fred Strasser, Searching for a Middle Ground, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3, 1992,
at 1, 28 (discussing view of the nascent communitarian movement "that society's responsi-
bility in family law and policy is first to children, not to the rights of parents, business
or anyone else").
[Vol. 45:83
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Laws regarding inheritance must change as the family itself
evolves. In the past three decades, many rivals have emerged to
challenge the once preeminent nuclear family, the foundation on
which most disinheritance provisions continue to be implicitly
structured. Serial polygamy," straight and gay cohabitation, and
parenting outside of marriage 3 are all common alternatives to the
traditional family comprised of undivorced, heterosexual, married
parents and their children. 4 A study of existing laws protecting
the spouse from disinheritance reveals that many older statutes are
unwarranted relics" and that even newer ones have failed to ac-
11. See generally Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 310-12 (discussing the inad-
equacy of forced share law in dealing with the phenomenon of serial polygamy and not-
ing that it is now "increasingly common for people to have more than one spouse-alas,
not simultaneously as in the good old days, but in a series"). Preliminary statistics for
1990 indicated that 2,448,000 marriages occurred in that year while 1,175,000 couples
divorced. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
1992, at 93 (112th ed. 1992) [hereinafter 1992 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT); see also id. at
92 (noting that of 11,577,000 living women whose first marriage ended by death or di-
vorce, over half have remarried). Preliminary statistics for 1991 indicated that 2,371,000
marriages occurred in that year while 1,187,000 couples divorced. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1993, at 103 (113th ed. 1993)
[hereinafter 1993 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
12. As of March 1991, there were 3,039,000 unrelated couples of the opposite sex
sharing the same household. 1992 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 11, at 45. In
962,000 of those households, children under the age of 15 were present. Id. Of the more
than three million households of unmarried couples, 1,858,000 cohabiting couples were be-
tween the ages of 25 and 44. Id.; see also infra note 254 and accompanying text (provid-
ing statistics on gay and lesbian parenting).
13. Twenty-four percent of single American women between the ages of 18 and 44
have given birth. Sam Fulwood II, Out-of-Wedlock Births Rise Sharply Among Most
Groups, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1993, at Al (citing a July 1993 Census Bureau release
entitled "Fertility of American Women: June 1992"). A recent study of 60,000 households
indicates the largest percentage increases of out-of-wedlock childbirth are now occurring
among white, employed, and college-educated women. Id. In Los Angeles, two in five
live births in 1991 were to unwed mothers. Id. In Memphis, Tennessee and the surround-
ing county, more than one-half of all births in 1992 were to unmarried women. Sam
Fulwood III & Mary Powers, Census Finds Surge in Births Out of Wedlock, COM. AP-
PEAL (Memphis), July 14, 1993, at Al. In 1960, the out-of-wedlock birth rate in the
United States was five percent. Elizabeth Mehren, American Family Steadily Eroding,
Researchers Find, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 1988, at View, pt. 5, p.l.
14. Although the traditional family may not be relegated to memory yet, its rivals are
growing stronger. See, e.g., Fulwood, supra note 13, at Al, A16 (noting that "the tradi-
tional family in which the husband works while the wife remains at home with children
declined from 43% in 1976 to 24% in 1992") (citation omitted).
15. In a society where divorce and remarriage occur rarely and the family exists al-
most exclusively in its "nuclear" form, the spousal elective share is somewhat justifiable.
Under such a scenario, the forced inheritance to the spouse also trickles down to the mi-
nor children of the marriage, whom the surviving spouse has a continuing duty to sup-
port. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the spousal
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count adequately for recent changes in family structure. 6
This Article examines methods by which spouses and children
are and are not protected from disinheritance in the United States
(with a glance or two abroad for comparative purposes). It suggests
that the elective share, even in its modem form, is today an unsat-
isfactory solution to the problem of spousal disinheritance. If a
state views marriage as an economic partnership, then community
property principles should be adopted to acknowledge the contribu-
tions of both spouses during the marriage. Alternatively, if the
state views marriage solely as a contract between competent adults,
then neither the arbitrary elective share nor community property is
necessary because the spouses may protect themselves before and
during the marriage without state intrusion. Concerning children,
the Article suggests that the law permitting their disinheritance
historically was not as oppressive as might initially be thought.
When minor children are born and reared within the traditional
family, they also benefit, albeit indirectly, from the spousal share
or community property principles. Today, however, millions of
American minors spend some or all of their childhood outside the
elective share to cope with a changing society). Ironically, some states did not begin to
enact elective share statutes until the divorce rate had multiplied exponentially and more
and more couples had begun cohabiting and parenting without marriage. Moreover, as
women increasingly left the home to become wage earners, the need for the elective share
provision lessened for many widows. See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing belated enactment of forced share statutes).
16. South Dakota, for example, abolished dower in 1893 and did not enact spousal
protection until the mid-1970s. It is doubtful that the plight of disinherited widows in the
1970s was as bleak as that of widows in 1893. Compare In re Estate of Smith, 401
N.W.2d 736, 737 (S.D. 1987) (noting that elective share provisions were first enacted in
South Dakota in 1974, were repealed in 1976, and new elective share provisions were
enacted in 1980) with Kressly v. Kressly, 87 N.W.2d 601, 604-05 (S.D. 1958) (noting
that use of dower by analogy to determine divorce settlement was improper, since dower
was abolished in South Dakota in 1893) and In re Estate of Vetter, 66 N.W.2d 519, 520
(S.D. 1954) (holding that testator's will leaving entire estate to mother was not fraud
because it did not invade the widow's marital rights). For the current elective share
scheme, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 30-5A-1 to -8 (1984 & Supp. 1993).
North Dakota similarly has moved in recent years from a system of no spousal pro-
tection to the elective share. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-05-01 to -05-07 (1976
& Supp. 1993) (adopting UPC elective share provisions) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05
(1976) (noting in the general comment to § 30.1-05 that all common law states except
the Dakotas appeared at that time to impose some restriction on the power of a spouse to
disinherit the other). See also W.S. MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES § 2:25, at n.7 (1982) (noting that shortly after being admitted to the
Union, North Dakota and South Dakota not only abolished dower and curtesy, but also
apparently adopted the separate property concept from California's community property
scheme without enacting counterbalancing provisions for the surviving spouse).
[Vol. 45:83
DISINHERITANCE AND THE MODERN FAMILY
traditional family. Legislatures have yet to realize the serious con-
sequence of permitting the total disinheritance of these children.
This Article suggests that imposing upon the testator's estate a
posthumous duty of support for minor children would be one plau-
sible way in which to address this problem.
II. CURRENT LAWS CONCERNING DISINHERITANCE OF
SPOUSES AND CHILDREN
The following discussion provides an overview of various laws
regarding the disinheritance of spouses and children. Much of the
discussion focuses on general approaches to disinheritance em-
ployed by groups of states. The disinheritance provisions of two
states, however, are unique and so important that they merit specif-
ic analysis. Also, the modem scheme of testator's family mainte-
nance that has been adopted in several commonwealth countries is
examined to see how other countries that have traditionally valued
testamentary freedom currently treat disinheritance problems.
A. Dower and Curtesy
The common law recognized the marital life estate of dower
to protect a widow from disinheritance by her husband. In most
instances, the life estate of curtesy protected the widower from
disinheritance by his wife. 7 The lifetime protection afforded a
widow typically extended to an interest in only one-third 8 of the
estatest9 of which her husband was legally seised during the mar-
17. See 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 185-97 (5th ed. 1942)
(discussing curtesy and dower). For other valuable discussions of the marital life estates,
see generally 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW 399-436 (2d ed. 1923), and George L. Haskins, Estates Arising from the Mar-
riage Relationship and Their Characteristics, in 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.1-
5.74 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
18. Holdsworth states that the one-third interest probably became fixed during the early
15th century. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 193. The arbitrary allocation of a fixed
fractional interest is one of the characteristics of dower that was carried over in many
conventional forced-share provisions and the elective share under the 1969 UPC. See infra
notes 72-74 and accompanying text (discussing problems that result from imposition of a
fixed fractional interest).
19. During the reign of Henry IV, dower of chattels was pronounced a legal impossi-
bility. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 190 (discussing rationale). In fact, the wife's
personalty, including her chattels real, such as leasehold interests, became the absolute
property of the husband at the time of the marriage. George L. Haskins, The Estate by
the Marital Right, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 345, 345 n.l, 349 (1949). If he predeceased her,
however, her chattels real that he had not alienated would again become hers. Id. at 345
n.l.
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riage. The lifetime protection afforded the widower, however, cov-
ered all of his wife's inheritable freehold estates of which she was
actually seised in possession during coverture." Borrowed from
England, these estates represent the earliest form of protection from
spousal disinheritance established in the United States.2'
The extreme subordination of the wife at common law22 re-
quired that some form of protection from disinheritance be given to
her' upon the death of her husband, for often she was deemed
20. Upon entering into a legally cognizable marriage, the husband acquired a marital
tenancy in his wife's inheritable freehold estates known as iure uxoris for the joint lives
of the couple. He acquired his curtesy interest only upon the birth of issue capable of
inheriting, at which time his interest was converted into an estate for his life known as
curtesy initiate. Upon the wife's death, the husband's life estate was known as curtesy
consummate. 2 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 210, at 15-93 (Pat-
rick J. Rohan rev. ed. 1993). Because curtesy was limited to a life estate in the wife's
interests of which she was seised in possession at the time of her death, the husband
could not enjoy curtesy as to reversionary or remainder interests she owned at the time of
her death.
The wife's expectant or contingent interest in the lands of which her husband was
seised in fee simple and fee tail at any time during the marriage was known as dower
inchoate. If the dower right had not been barred and the contingency of survival had
been fulfilled, her inchoate right became dower consummate upon her husband's death.
Until her dower was actually assigned, however, she had no right to enter upon the lands
except under her right of quarantine. See generally Haskins, supra note 17, at §§ 5.31-
5.49 (discussing inchoate dower, consummate dower, assignment of dower, and barring of
dower).
21. In America, dower rights varied greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See gen-
erally MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA
141-84 (1986) (discussing the historical divergence among American jurisdictions regarding
married women's inheritance rights). For instance, studies of early inheritance law in
America indicate that Virginia and Maryland granted a widow dower rights in realty and
personalty. Id. at 149-56; cf. infra note 35 (demonstrating differences in current dower
statutes in America). See also Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-
1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1393-95 (1983) (noting that American reception of dower itself
varied from colony to colony and state to state).
22. As Professors Cribbet and Johnson have noted, "[t]he common law regarded the
husband and wife as one and the husband as the one." JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W.
JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 89 (3d ed. 1989). But cf. 2 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 405-07 (preferring view that a husband's rights resulted
from his guardianship over the wife); Haskins, supra note 19, at 346 (discussing
husband's iure uxoris and noting that "unity of person" is a hackneyed fiction which
ignores that "in many situations the law treated the wife as a person"). Haskins readily
acknowledges, however, that the "incapacities of a married woman became proverbial in
English law." Id. at 350; see also 2 POWELL, supra note 20, 210 (stating that "[t]hese
interests [iure uxoris, curtesy initiate, and curtesy consummate] grew in a soil permeated
by male dominance").
23. The unmarried mother was at a disadvantage. To obtain dower to protect herself
and her children from disinheritance, a woman had to be married. The cohabitant's
palimony suit was unknown at common law. See infra note 231 and accompanying text
[Vol. 45:83
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unable or unqualified to venture from the home into a world run
almost exclusively by men." Dower as it developed, however, did
not function solely for the protection of the surviving wife. At least
in part, dower also served to ensure the support and education of
the young children of the married couple.' Neither the testator's
will nor his inter vivos transactions could unilaterally defeat the
dower right once the required elements were met.
As long as society was agrarian and wealth was reflected
primarily in ownership of real property, men deemed the dower
third to be a satisfactory provision for widows and children. 6
Why the widower should be afforded the entire interest in his
deceased wife's realty holdings cannot be totally explained apart
from gender dominance. 7 To obtain curtesy rights, however, the
(discussing modem actions available to disinherited cohabitant).
24. Marylynn Salmon paints the following picture of dower in early America:
[O]ne characteristic remained constant, the enforced dependency of widows.
Provisions governing the transfer of family property . . . assumed that econom-
ic dependency for widows was a norm to be enforced. Lawmakers apparently
saw nothing inconsistent in their principles governing wives and widows. They
made wives economically dependent on husbands during marriage, arguing
under the principle of unity of person that this action was fair because the
husband had the legal obligation to support them both. Once the husband had
died, the courts did make his estate liable for the continued support of his
widow, but only at a level far below the standard of living enjoyed by the two
of them during marriage.
Early American society envisioned a dependent, subservient
position for women of all ages, but not for men at any point in their adult
lives.
SALMON, supra note 21, at 183.
25. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130 ("[T]he reason, which our law
gives for adopting [dower], is a very plain and a sensible one; for the sustenance of the
wife, and the nurture and education of the younger children."); cf. Linda E. Speth, More
Than Her "Thirds": Wives and Widows in Colonial Virginia, in LINDA E. SPETT &
ALISON D. HIRSCH, WOMEN, FAMILY, AND COMMUNITY IN COLONIAL AMERICA: Two
PERSPECTIVES 5, 10 (1983) (noting that Burgesses in colonial Virginia felt dower provided
basic minimum necessary for support of widow and her children). Although dower was an
important source of indirect protection from disinheritance for the testator's children, the
right originated solely to benefit the widow. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 17,
at 419-22 (noting that dower was not awarded to a widow as to a mother who would
keep a home for her husband's heirs).
26. See, e.g., Speth, supra note 25, at 10 (discussing the legal status of women in
eighteenth-century Virginia).
27. See supra note 22 (discussing the common law subordination of the wife to the
husband); George L. Haskins, Curtesy at Common Law: Historical Development, 29 B.U.
L. REV. 228, 230 (1949) (noting difficulty of explaining with assurance the origins of
"the liberality or 'courteousness' of English law" and discussing theories put forth by
1994]
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widower must have fathered a child2 8 by his wife.29 The widow's
dower right, although fractionally smaller than that of curtesy, was
not dependent upon birth of a child to the couple.
30
Maitland and Blackstone). Professor Haskins suggests that curtesy had its origins in the
concept of guardianship, in promoting stability of the family group, and in the anti-feudal
bias of early judges. Id. at 230-32; cf. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 414-
21 (noting that widower's guardianship of his children was a prominent early aspect of
curtesy, although inclusion of entire estate cannot be easily explained). But cf.
3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 186-87 (modem rule covering entire estate developed
in interest of simplicity).
Professor Haskins dates the widespread recognition of the husband's right of curtesy
to "at least as early as the end of the twelfth century." Haskins, supra, at 228. The right
was enlarged over the course of the thirteenth century. Id. at 228-29. Concerning the
origin of the term, early lawyers referred to the husband's marital life estate as a tenant
"by the curtesy of England," to emphasize the liberality of the law as opposed to its
Norman counterpart. Id. at 230 (emphasis in original). See also Paul G. Haskell, Re-
straints Upon the Disinheritance of Family Members, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY
PROPERTY 105, 106 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) ("Curtesy was a form of sexist
aggrandizement. ... ).
28. The child must have been alive at the time of birth and the mother must not have
died in childbirth before the living child was delivered. See generally 2 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 25, at *126-28 (discussing the requirements ander the common law to create a
tenancy by the curtesy). The husband's fight of curtesy could also depend upon the sex
of the child. For instance, if the wife was a tenant in tail male and the only child born
to the couple was female, the husband would obtain no curtesy. Id at *127-28. Moreover,
if the property had been conveyed to the wife in special tail during a former marriage,
the present husband had no curtesy.
29. Commentators have noted that the prerequisites for obtaining curtesy fights may
help to explain "the eagerness with which the first heir was awaited, even by men with
few of the normal fatherly characteristics." CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 90.
30. The principal differences between dower and curtesy have been summarized as fol-
lows:
(1) curtesy entitled the husband to an estate in all the wife's inheritable
freeholds, whereas dower entitled the widow to an interest in only
one-third of the husband's;
(2) actual seisin on the part of the wife was required for curtesy, where-
as seisin in law was sufficient for dower;
(3) curtesy attached to the wife's equitable as well as to her legal in-
terests, whereas dower was confined to the husband's legal estates;
(4) a requirement for curtesy was the birth of issue, whereas there was
no such requirement for dower;
(5) before the wife's death curtesy was a present estate, whereas dower
was only a protected expectancy before the husband's death;
(6) since curtesy attached to all the wife's lands, rather than to a frac-
tional share, there was no necessity for assignment, as in the case of
dower.
George L. Haskins, Curtesy in the United States, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 196, 197 (1951).
Even considering the limitations on curtesy described in paragraphs two and four of
the list above, it is undeniable that curtesy was on the whole more generous than dower.
Moreover, the curtesy restrictions regarding actual seisin and birth of issue were relaxed
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In the United States, the marital life estates were often modi-
fied in the last half of the nineteenth century when jurisdictions
enacted Married Women's Property Acts.3 As personalty began to
supplement or supplant realty as a source of wealth in the estates
of many men, twentieth-century legislators gradually acknowledged
that the realty interests afforded by dower were often unsatisfactory
to protect the widow and children.32 Beginning with New York in
1930, common law states33 gradually turned from a system of
dower and curtesy to a system of protection based on the
decedent's entire estate.' Nonetheless, even today a few states
recognize dower by statute, although a survivor's rights under such
statutes are frequently quite different from those found at common
law. 35
in some American jurisdictions in the nineteenth century. Id.; see infra note 35 (indicating
that today curtesy has generally been replaced by dower statutes available to surviving
spouse of either sex).
31. See Haskins, supra note 30, at 197-98 (describing modification of common law
curtesy, particularly in light of Married Women's Acts). For a discussion of Married
Women's Acts, see generally Chused, supra note 21, at 1397-425 (concluding that Mar-
ried Women's Acts were a result of women's increased role within the family, although
not within the political and economic culture at large).
32. Dower inchoate was also considered to be an unnecessary burden upon the alien-
ation of property. See Pilone v. Blanda, 544 A.2d 439, 440 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1988) (noting that UPC commissioners viewed dower and curtesy as anachronistic burdens
on alienation of property); In re Estate of Riefberg, 446 N.E.2d 424, 427 (N.Y. 1983)
(discussing recommendation of Foley Commission in 1928 to abolish dower and curtesy);
3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 197 (noting the seventeenth-century chancellors' belief
that the wife's dower rights "inconveniently restricted" freedom of alienation). See general-
ly 2 POWELL, supra note 20, 1 209[2] (discussing the common law characteristics of
inchoate dower).
33. The term "common law states" is used in this article to distinguish the majority of
American jurisdictions from the nine states that apply the community of acquests system
of ownership to marital assets. Concepts of dower, curtesy, and forced or elective shares
are largely superfluous in community property states. See infra notes 44-48 and accompa-
nying text.
34. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing the elective share system).
35. Although dower rights created today are at least nominally akin to those found at
common law, the differences may be greater than the similarities. The provisions vary
greatly among the states that still recognize dower. For instance, in some jurisdictions
dower may extend to personalty, the fractional interest may be increased from one-third to
one-half, or the realty interest may be a fee rather than a life estate upon the spouse's
death. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-11-101 to -404 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993)
(extending dower and curtesy to personalty where decedent is survived by spouse and a
child or children; terminating spouse's inchoate right of dower where other spouse has
been barred from title to personalty or realty, evidenced by a recorded instrument of
conveyance, for at least seven years; allowing survivor a one-half fee interest in certain
non-ancestral realty where decedent dies without children); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 19-102 to
-103 (1981) (providing surviving spouse with "dower and its incidents as the rights there-
1994]
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B. Community Property
Nine American states apply community property principles to
certain assets acquired during the marriage.36 Community property
to were known at common law with respect to widows"; estate may be forfeited by de-
sertion and adultery); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.010-.140 (Baldwin 1984 & Supp.
1993) (extending dower concept to personalty; abandonment combined with adultery bars
spouse's right to dower or curtesy; discussing effect of bigamy on dower and curtesy
rights); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 558.1-.92 (West 1988) (encompassing general dower provi-
sions); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2103.01-.09 (Anderson 1994) (explaining the circum-
stances under which surviving spouse is entitled to life estate in one-third of the inher-
itable estates of which the consort was seized during coverture).
Some jurisdictions that formerly allowed the creation of dower rights have abolished
dower prospectively, resulting in a phasing out of dower in those states. Such states con-
tinue to recognize dower rights which vested prior to a specified date. See, e.g., TENN.
CODE ANN. § 31-2-102 (1984) (abolishing dower and curtesy prospectively in 1976, but
neither abridging nor affecting such rights which vested prior to April 1, 1977).
The most recent departure from dower occurred in 1992 when West Virginia became
the first state to adopt the 1990 revisions to the UPC. See W. VA. CODE § 43-1-1 (Supp.
1994) (abolishing dower and curtesy in 1992); id. §§ 42-3-1 to -2 (adopting accrual-type
elective share). See generally Patricia J. Roberts, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code's Elec-
tive-Share Provisions-West Virginia's Enactment Paves the Way, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 55,
57 (1992) (discussing West Virginia's enactment of the 1990 UPC elective share provi-
sions, concluding that such an enactment was a major step forward).
It appears that no state allows the creation of common law curtesy any longer.
Those states that have abolished dower have also abolished curtesy. Of those states retain-
ing dower, several extend dower protection to the surviving husband. See, e.g., D.C. CODE
ANN. § 19-102 (1981) (abolishing curtesy; widow or widower entitled to "dower"); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2103.02, 2103.09 (Anderson 1994) (same). Other jurisdictions retain
the term "curtesy," but treat it as the equivalent of dower. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 28-11-101 to -404 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993) (treating dower and curtesy as equiva-
lents); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 392.010-.020 (Baldwin 1984 & Supp. 1993) (providing
for the equal treatment of husband and wife). See generally 2 POWELL, supra note 20,
213 (discussing statutory modifications to dower and curtesy). Michigan affords a sur-
viving spouse of either sex a right to a modem elective share. See MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 700.281-.282 (West Supp. 1994). It also permits a widow to select dower in its
traditional form as an alternative to the modem elective share. See id. §§ 700.282, 558.1-
.29 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); cf Rockwell v. Estate of Rockwell, 180 N.W.2d 498,
501 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (noting that curtesy is a right not recognized by Michigan
law).
36. The community property jurisdictions in the United States are Arizona, California,
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Wisconsin may also now
be considered a community property jurisdiction as a result of its enactment of communi-
ty property principles effective 1986. See WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.001-766.97 (West 1993
& Supp. 1994) ("It is the intent of the legislature that marital property is a form of com-
munity property.").
The degree to which community property affects family life in the United States is
sometimes overlooked. Significantly, the combined population of the community property
states represents more than 27% of the United States population. In light of the itinerant
family commonly found in the late twentieth century, community property may play an
important role in the lives of millions of other Americans as well. See 1993 STATISTICAL
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is owned equally by the spouses; all other property is separate
property and is owned by the husband or wife in severalty. The
community property principles applied in America37 are borrowed
primarily from the civil law of Spain38 and govern much more
ABSTRACT, supra note 11, at 33 (113th ed. 1993) (indicating that more than 70 million
of 255 million citizens live in nine community property states).
37. See generally WILLIAM 0. DEFUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 1-53.1 (2d ed. 1971) (discussing the origins of community
property and its establishment in United States); MCCLANAHAN, supra note 16, §§ 2:10-
2:39 (1982 & Supp. 1989) (comparing marital property in common law and community
property states); Anthony J. Pagano, The Characterization and Division of Community
Property, in VALUATION AND DISTRmBUTION OF MARrrAL PROPERTY §§ 20.01, 20.05[2]
(Grace G. Blumberg, rev.) (John P. McCahey, ed. '1988) (discussing the nature, origin,
and adoption of community property in the United States and the disposition of communi-
ty property by will).
38. The Spanish system of community property is based on the community of acquests
and must be distinguished from the universal community of Germanic origin used in
Roman-Dutch law. Under the universal system, all property owned by either spouse at the
time of the marriage becomes community property when the marriage is entered into. Any
property acquired after the marriage is also community property, regardless of the source.
No American jurisdiction uses the universal community approach. But see infra note 92
and accompanying text (discussing the 1990 UPC elective share provision which employs
universal community approach at death of spouse).
Under the community of acquests approach, only property acquired during the mar-
riage may be community property. Of this property acquired during the marriage, only
that acquired by "onerous title" or by gift to both spouses becomes community property.
Onerous title refers roughly to property acquired or earned through the efforts of either
spouse during the marriage. Other property acquired during the marriage-for instance by
devise, bequest, or inheritance-is acquired by "lucrative" title and does not become com-
munity property. See generally MCCLANAHAN, supra note 16, §§ 2.28-2.29 (distinguishing
onerous and lucrative title in a general discussion of civil law terminology and theory);
Pagano, supra note 37, at § 20.01 [1] (discussing the nature of community property). Prop-
erty acquired with community property is treated as community property. Property ac-
quired during the marriage with separate property is typically separate property. Thus, in
most community property states, property received as rent, issues, or profits from separate
property is also treated as separate property. See Harry M. Cross, Classification of Proper-
ty as Separate or Community, in MCCLANAHAN, supra note 16, at 329, §§ 6.10-6.13
(discussing how various states treat property received as rent, issues, or profits from sepa-
rate property). In the remaining community property states, however, such rents, issues, or
profits are treated as community property. See id. § 6:12 (listing jurisdictions following
the "Spanish" rule).
A determination that marital property is community property is based on timing and
method of acquisition. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 578 (1979). In community
property states, title to property is therefore not controlling as to its status. Property
placed in the name of one spouse may nonetheless be community property with an equal
ownership interest recognized in the other spouse. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hurd, 848
P.2d 185, 194 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that the name under which property is held
does not determine whether property is community or separate). In contrast, in common
law states ownership of property depends upon title for most purposes. But cf. Hisquierdo,
439 U.S. at 578 n.11 (noting that in divorce proceedings title does not necessarily deter-
mine distribution in common law states); infra note 82 (discussing divorce and the con-
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than devolution of property upon a spouse's death.
Upon completion of the nuptial vows, spouses in community
property states become equal partners39 throughout the existence of
their marital "community."'  This approach differs significantly
from the historical common law view of marriage as a merger
through which a wife's property interests were legally usurped by
the husband.41 In day-to-day affairs, however, wives and husbands
traditionally were not equals even in community property jurisdic-
tions. Until the 1960s, the husband was the sole manager of the
community property. Since the enactment of statutes providing
cept of equitable distribution, which does not focus entirely on title).
39. The spouses are considered equal partners irrespective of their actual contributions
toward property acquisition during the marriage. See, e.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S.
210, 216 (1981) (stating that under the law of California and other community property
jurisdictions, each spouse is deemed to make an equal contribution to the "marital enter-
prise" and thus shares equally in community property); Meyer v. Kinzer, 12 Cal. 248, 252
(1859) (Terry, C.J., & Baldwin, J., concurring) ("[M]arriage, in respect to property ac-
quired during its existence, is a community of which each spouse is a member, equally
contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to
succeed to the property after dissolution, in case of surviving the other.").
A wife could be expected to fare better in community property states than in com-
mon law jurisdictions, where she ceased to exist for many purposes upon marriage. See
MCCLANAHAN, supra note 16, § 2:20 (noting statement of historian Charles Beard equat-
ing marriage with civil death for the wife at common law). Although in everyday life
male dominance was as pervasive in community property states as in common law states,
a wife in a community property jurisdiction received explicit legal recognition that her
contributions to marital life were as important as those of her husband. She could not be
deprived of her right to the community assets. See id. §§ 2:30-:31 (discussing the extent
and nature of the wife's interest in community property). Moreover, a wife in a communi-
ty property state frequently retained management and control rights over her separate
property. Cf. supra note 19 (discussing the treatment of a bride's personalty at common
law). The more equitable treatment of wives under community property principles is prob-
ably the reason that Washington and Idaho rejected the common law approach even
though neither state possessed a Spanish heritage. Pagano, supra note 37, § 20.01[3][e].
With the enactment of Married Women's Property Acts beginning in the mid-1800s, com-
mon law states reduced the disparity in treatment of wives under the two systems. Even
so, the widow in a community property state retained a one-half interest in the commu-
nity property both during the marriage and upon her husband's death; the widow in a
common law jurisdiction received only a one-third interest in her husband's realty upon
his death.
40. Cf infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (noting that although the 1990 UPC
elective share purports to recognize the economic partnership of marriage, its attempt to
do so applies only when the marriage is terminated by death of a spouse).
41. But see supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting that some scholars prefer the
guardianship theory over the usurpation theory).
42. For a discussion of the husband's historically exclusive "administrative duties" over
community property (and, in some instances, even over the wife's separate property), see
Pagano, supra note 37, § 20.061].
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the wife with equal management powers over community property,
the legal equality espoused by community property jurisdictions is
more of a reality today than in the not too distant past.43
Because equal ownership of all community property is recog-
nized prior to the death of either spouse, the need for a forced or
elective share is eliminated." The survivor retains her separate
property45 and her one-half interest in the community property,46
while the decedent's separate property47 and his one-half interest
43. Although courts today agree that the wife in a community property jurisdiction has
a true, present, and equal interest in community property, historically the stated equality
of the partners' interests was somewhat misleading in view of the husband's management
and control rights over the community property. It is only since the late 1960s that most
of the community property states have enacted legislation to assure a wife equal rights of
management and control in the community property. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2346 (West 1985) (providing that each spouse alone may manage, control, or dispose of
community property unless otherwise provide by law); id. art. 2347 (stating that concur-
rence of both spouses is required for alienation, encumbrance, or lease of immovables);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1994) (providing that either spouse acting alone may
manage and control community property, but community realty cannot be bought, sold,
conveyed, or encumbered without both spouses joining in execution). As a result of these
modem statutes recognizing equal management rights in the spouses, wives in the commu-
nity property jurisdictions have substantial protections not afforded to their counterparts in
common law jurisdictions, where ownership by title often means the husband alone con-
trols the bundle of sticks.
44. See LAwRENCE W. WAGGONER Er AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 467-68 (1991)
(noting that protection against inheritance is not deemed necessary in community property
states).
45. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-214 (1991) (each spouse has sole manage-
ment, control and disposition rights of his or her separate property); IDAHO CODE § 32-
903 (1983) (property owned before marriage or acquired by gift, bequest, devise or de-
scent after marriage, or acquired with proceeds of separate property, remains separate
property); id. § 32-904 (wife has management, control, and absolute power of disposition
of her separate property as does a married man); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2341 (West
1985) (separate property of a spouse is his or hers exclusively); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 123.130 (1990) (separate property, including rents, issues, and profits thereof, belongs to
individual spouse); id. § 123.170 (1989) (either spouse may convey, charge, encumber or
otherwise in any manner dispose of his separate property without consent of other
spouse); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8(A) (Michie 1994) (separate property defined with
reference to either spouse); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a) (West 1993) (separate prop-
erty defined); id. § 5.21 (each spouse has sole management, control, and disposition of
his or her separate property); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.010, 26.16.020 (1994) (provid-
ing that the husband and wife may each manage, lease, sell, convey, encumber, or devise
by will their respective separate property as though each were unmarried); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 766.31 (West 1993) (distinguishing "individual" from "marital" property); id.
§ 766.51 (providing that spouse acting alone may manage and control his or her property
that is not marital property).
46. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 861.01 (West 1993) (providing that upon the death
of one spouse, survivor retains his or her one-half interest in each item of marital proper-
ty).
47. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 6101 (West 1991) (providing that a will may dis-
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in the community property pass pursuant to his will or through
intestacy.48
Legal scholars generally perceive the community property
system of equal ownership during the marriage to be fairer than
the common law system of ownership by title.49 Nevertheless,
with one exception, traditional common law jurisdictions in the
United States have yet to convert permanently to community prop-
erty principles."
pose of the testator's separate property); cf. supra note 43 (discussing statutes concerning
management and control of separate property).
48. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-3101 (1975 & 1993 Supp.) (decedent
spouse's separate property and share of community property devolve pursuant to will);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6101 (West 1991) (testator may dispose of separate property, one-
half of community property, and one-half of quasi-community property); IDAHO CODE
§ 15-3-101 (1979) (separate property and one-half of community property subject to testa-
mentary disposition); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.030 (1987) (wife may dispose of entire
separate estate by will); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-805 (Michie 1978) (one-half of commu-
nity property is subject to testamentary disposition of surviving spouse); TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 58 (West Supp. 1994) (person competent to make will may devise all property
owned at death and may disinherit an heir); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.070 (1987) (con-
firming one-half share of community property in surviving spouse upon death of decedent
and permitting other half to pass by testamentary disposition); id. § 11.12.230 (intent of
testator controls); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 861.01(1) (West 1993) (surviving spouse's one-half
interest in marital property not subject to administration). Only one community property
state substantially deviates from this general scheme of testamentary freedom. Alone in
fact among all the states (community property or common law), Louisiana imposes testa-
mentary restrictions in favor of forced heirs. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying
text (discussing forced heirship in Louisiana). In the absence of forced heirs, however, a
Louisiana testator may leave all of his property as he wishes. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
1496 (West Supp. 1994).
Because of the absence of the elective share in community property states, some
community property jurisdictions have adopted statutes to protect the surviving spouse
when the married couple has moved there from a common law state. These community
property states have recognized the survivor's right to a portion of "quasi-community"
property-i.e., property acquired by the decedent during the marriage while domiciled in a
common law jurisdiction which would have been community property had the couple been
domiciled in a community property jurisdiction at the time of acquisition. In Idaho, for
example, the survivor is entitled to one-half of the quasi-community property of the dece-
dent. See IDAHO CODE § 15-2-201 (1979) (defining quasi-community property and provid-
ing for disposition). Moreover, Idaho allows the use of the UPC augmented estate and
elective share concepts to protect the survivor where the decedent has made transfers of
quasi-community property without adequate consideration and without the survivor's con-
sent. Id. §§ 15-2-201 to -202; see also Wts. STAT. ANN. §§ 861.02-.03 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1993) (election of deferred marital property and augmented marital property estate).
49. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 305-06. See also ATKINSON, supra note 4,
at 26-27 ("The community property system gave to the surviving spouse the protection
which the common law supplied inadequately through dower.").
50. See supra note 36 (noting Wisconsin's adoption of community property principles
in 1986 and listing the states which are community property jurisdictions). Several com-
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C. The Elective Share
1. The Conventional Elective Share
To remedy the inadequate protection afforded by dower and to
prevent disinherited widows and young children from becoming
public charges, legislators in common law states enacted elective
share statutes as a replacement or substitute for the surviving
spouse's legal life estate.51 If the testator's bequest to the widow
mon law states experimented briefly with the community property concept during the
1930s and 1940s, but not from a belief in the superiority of community property. Rather,
these states sought to lower family income taxes by splitting income between spouses,
since the joint marital return was not then allowed. Once the joint return was established,
however, these states quickly reverted to the common law system, thereby implicitly re-
committing themselves to traditional male dominance and power over the family. See
Carolyn C. Jones, Split-Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in the
1940s, 6 LAw & HIST. REv. 259, 266-74 (1988) (discussing temporary spread of commu-
nity property laws between 1939 and 1947 so that state citizens would be taxed less).
Attorneys in common law states are often uncomfortable with community property
concepts, perhaps largely because they have not been exposed to such concepts during the
course of their legal education or practice. Detractors also note, however, that determining
the status of property as separate or community can involve an arduous task of tracing
back to the source of the property. See Cross, supra note 38, at 329-44 (discussing the
classification of property acquired during marriage). Moreover, there are differences in the
categorization of property among the various community property states themselves. See
supra note 38 (discussing rents, issues, and profits). Although community property is
theoretically the better of the two systems if marriage is viewed as an equal partnership,
attorneys and legislators in common law jurisdictions are unlikely to support converting to
community property principles. But see infra note 96 (citing articles in favor of conver-
sion).
51. See, e.g., Spencer v. Williams, 569 A.2d 1194, 1197 (D.C. 1990) (statutory share
derives from common law dower and originally was intended to prevent widow from
becoming public charge and to protect her from disinheritance); In re Estate of Anderson,
394 So. 2d 1146. 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (elective share is a substitute for dower
and curtesy); In re Estate of Shapiro, 380 N.W.2d 796, 801 (Minn. 1986) (noting state's
"strong interest" in protecting surviving spouses and in maintaining elective share scheme);
Arnold v. Anvil Realty Inv., Inc., 559 A.2d 444, 446 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)
(right of spouse to a share in deceased spouse's estate and in principal matrimonial resi-
dence replaced dower and curtesy and is intended to assure support for the survivor in
some circumstances); McKay v. Estate of McKay, 501 A.2d 610, 614 (NJ. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1984) (dower and curtesy became unsatisfactory with change in social and
economic conditions and where most wealth is now held as personalty); In re Will of
Henken, 526 N.Y.S.2d 334, 337 (Sur. Ct. 1988) (statutory share designed to provide for
support of wife after death of husband and should be liberally construed), affd, 540
N.Y.S.2d 886 (App. Div. 1989); Bialczak v. Moniak, 540 A.2d 962, 965 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988) (elective share system supplanted dower and was intended to provide "measure of
economic security" to surviving spouse). See also infra notes 270-72 (discussing effect of
elective share on children).
The transition from dower to the elective share was accomplished state by state,
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is less than that required by the statute, she can forego the bequest
and instead take her statutory share. The elective share, unlike
common law dower, extends not only to the testator's realty, but
also to his personalty.52 The elective share is also often called a
forced share, 53 because the surviving spouse can force the estate
to provide her with the prescribed statutory minimum despite the
testator's contrary wishes clearly expressed in his otherwise binding
will.54 Today, most of the common law jurisdictions in the United
States afford some form of forced share to the surviving spouse.
These provisions are now equally available to widows and widow-
ers,5 5 although as a class widows still derive greater benefits from
beginning with New York, over a period of several decades. For a brief but illuminating
view of how the New York legislature made the transition in the late 1920s and early
1930s, see In re Estate of Riefberg, 459 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (1983) (discussing efforts of
Foley Commission and Bennett Commission concerning elective shares). When enacted,
the new statute contained loopholes through which a spouse could reduce or defeat the
survivor's share by inter vivos gratuitous transfers. New York courts consequently devel-
oped the somewhat nebulous concept of the "illusory transfer" to rectify improper transfers
until further legislation was enacted to close or at least narrow the gap. See In re Estate
of Agioritis, 357 N.E.2d 979, 980-81 (N.Y. 1976) (noting transition to elective share in
1930 and discussing approaches to fraudulent transfers); In re Estate of Crystal, 352
N.E.2d 885, 886-87 (N.Y. 1976) (discussing illusory transfers and noting that purpose of
elective share was to enlarge and protect widow's rights and to ensure freer alienability of
land). See also infra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing fraudulent transfers in the
law of elective shares).
52. Cf. supra notes 18-19 (discussing common law dower).
53. Some commentators have stated that the term "elective" is technically preferable,
since the surviving spouse may elect whether to receive this amount. See, e.g.,
WAGGONER E' AL., supra note 44, at 473 (discussing how the term "elective" is more
descriptive than "forced"). If the survivor does not so elect, the estate will not be
"forced" to pay this amount. Nonetheless, the terms are used interchangeably in practice.
The UPC uses the term elective share.
54. See, e.g., In re Estate of Kueber, 390 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that survivor could elect statutory share from deceased husband's estate even
though she had not seen him for 20 years prior to his death and had in fact remarried
under the mistaken belief that she was divorced from him); Fogo v. Griffin, 551 S.W.2d
677, 679 (Tenn. 1977) (noting that widow's abandonment of husband or other misconduct
does not affect her right to elective share); see also infra note 74 and accompanying text
(discussing the arbitrary results of forced share).
55. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-203 (1991 & Supp. 1993) (surviv-
ing spouse may elect one-third of testator's net estate if testator leaves surviving issue;
surviving spouse may take one-half if testator leaves no surviving issue); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 91-5-25 (1972) (unsatisfactory provision to surviving spouse entitles survivor to
intestate share of up to one-half of decedent's estate); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2203
(Supp. 1994) (surviving spouse electing against will may take one-third of assets to which
decedent retained the right or power to enjoy during his lifetime); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-
2-201 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1993) (surviving spouse has right to elective share of
one-third of decedent's probate estate); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-4-101 (1984 & Supp.
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their application. 6
The conventional forced share allows the surviving spouse to
receive a fixed fractional portion (often one-third"7 ) of the value
of the testator's probate estate" irrespective of the size of the es-
tate, the survivor's need,59 her earning capacity or independent
1994) (surviving spouse has right to elect one-third of decedent's net estate); VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-16 (Michie 1950) (surviving spouse may elect one-third of testator's aug-
mented estate if testator died leaving surviving children or their issue; in other circum-
stances, surviving spouse receives one-half of testator's augmented estate); cf. MASS. GEN.
L., ch. 191, § 15 (1990 & Supp. 1994) (survivor may waive will provision and claim
one-third of realty and personalty if decedent left issue; $25,000 plus one-half of realty
and personalty if decedent left kindred but no issue; $25,000 plus one-half absolutely if
no issue or kindred survive decedent; the first two scenarios may involve trust or life
estate limitations where realty and personalty exceed $25,000).
56. Cf. 1992 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 11, at 77 (table showing longer life
expectancies for females); id. at 412 (table showing greater numbers of male workers in
labor force and higher median weekly earnings than those of females).
57. See supra note 55 (listing the forced share provisions of several common law ju-
risdictions).
58. For purposes of determining the size of the elective share, the decedent's estate is
generally calculated to include at least the assets owned upon death. To prevent the tes-
tator from depleting his estate shortly before death in an effort to defeat or reduce the
surviving spouse's award, many states have enacted statutes to allow such fraudulent con-
veyances or gifts to be set aside. When such conveyances occur, the assets may often be
brought back into the estate for inclusion in determining the spouse's forced share. Fraud-
ulent conveyance problems occur frequently in the reported case law and are the subject
of many scholarly works. States have developed varying approaches to deal with the
subject. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-105 (1984) ("Any conveyances made fraudu-
lently to children or others, with an intent to defeat the surviving spouse of his distribu-
tive or elective share, is voidable at the election of the surviving spouse."); Young v.
Hudgens, No. 89-19-I1, 1989 WL 71041, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 1989) (setting
aside decedent's conveyance to her daughter made with intent to defeat husband's elective
share). See also infra note 67 (discussing attempts to prevent fraudulent conveyances
under the 1969 UPC).
Even when the assets constituting the estate against which the surviving spouse may
elect are determined, their valuatiorn may often remain a difficult question. See, e.g., In re
Estate of Kirkman, 273 S.E.2d 712, 714 (N.C. 1981) (noting the difficulty of valuing
property for purposes of elective share). Cf Phillips v. Phillips, 252 S.E.2d 761 (N.C.
1979). In Phillips, the court also noted that North Carolina's statutory scheme for deter-
mining the qualified right to dissent might itself turn out to be "complex, time-consuming,
and expensive," thus discouraging a deserving spouse from exercising the right to dissent.
Id. at 770. Comparing the North Carolina qualified right to elect with the unqualified
right characteristic of most states, the court noted concerning the latter:. "[T]he compen-
sations of certainty, ease of administration, the avoidance of expensive and time-consum-
ing litigation . . . in all probability . . . results in no more inequities than does the
present statutory scheme [in North Carolina.]" Id. at 771 n.2.
59. But see, e.g., In re Estate of Merkel, 618 P.2d 872, 874-75 (Mont. 1980) (holding
that the elective share statute did not violate equal protection even though a competent
survivor had an unrestricted right to elect but an incompetent survivor could only elect
based on need). In Merkel, the Montana court found that, although the statute in question
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sources of wealth, or her conduct during the marriage.' The dura-
tion of the marriage is also irrelevant: the widow whose husband
dies immediately following the wedding vows and the widow
whose husband dies after decades of marriage are each entitled to
the same fixed portion of the deceased spouse's estate." Simply
put, the conventional forced share is highly arbitrary and may in
some instances work more harm than good.62
deprived the incompetent spouse of choice as well as excess funds to pass on to heirs, to
invest, or to spend on unnecessaries, the statute was reasonable and not arbitrary. Id. The
incompetent person is deprived of other choices as well by being placed under protective
orders, and the primary purpose of the elective share is to provide for the survivor's
needs. Id.
60. See, e.g., In re Estate of Peck, 497 N.W.2d 889, 889-91 (Iowa 1993) (holding
wife's estate not entitled to any of husband's assets she would have received in divorce
action pending at her death; moreover, husband could elect against her will which disin-
herited him). In a few jurisdictions, however, the surviving spouse's right to an elective
share may be limited by his or her acts during the lifetime of the testator. See, e.g., IND.
CODE §§ 29-1-2-14, -15 (1979) (surviving spouse who has abandoned decedent without
just cause, or who is living in adultery at time of decedent's death, takes no part of
decedent's estate); N.J. REV. STAT. § 3B:8-1 (1983) (surviving spouse entitled to one-third
of augmented estate provided that spouses were not living apart or had not ceased to
cohabit based on divorce from bed and board or under circumstances which would have
given rise to a cause of action for divorce or annulment). In Carr v. Carr, 576 A.2d 872
(N.J. 1990), the widow had ceased to live with testator and divorce proceedings were
pending at the time of his death. She was not entitled to equitable distribution because
the husband died before the divorce was finalized. Nor was she entitled to an elective
share: the New Jersey statute disallowed a forced share to a surviving spouse who was
living apart from the testator at the time of his death. Id. at 876. Noting recent attempts
to amend the New Jersey statute and eliminate this "black hole," the court concluded
there was no reason why general equitable remedies available to unmarried cohabitants
who separate should not be available to married persons who were in the process of
divorcing when one died. Id. at 879 n.3, 880. The widow was thus free to pursue claims
based on quasi-contract, quantum meruit, and constructive trust theories. Id.
One form of misconduct that will often prevent a surviving spouse from inheriting
from the decedent is, of course, the willful and felonious killing of the decedent by the
surviving spouse. The statutory requirements for forfeiture of an inheritance based on a
felonious killing vary from state to state. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-2-12.1(a) (1979)
(person is constructive trustee of any property acquired through decedent's death if that
person was found guilty of murder, causing suicide, or voluntary manslaughter of the
decedent); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-106 (1984) ("Any person who shall kill, or conspire
with another to kill, or procure to be killed" shall forfeit inheritance, but not where kill-
ing is done by accident or in self-defense).
61. Not surprisingly, the latter occurs with more frequency than the former. But cf.
Neiderhiser Estate, 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 302, 305 (1977) (after minister commenced prayer
following wedding vows, groom slumped to the floor, gasped, and died; court held bride
was widow entitled to letters of administration).
62. See supra note 54 (illustrating situations where application of the forced share is of
dubious value).
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2. The Uniform Probate Code-1969
In 1969, the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code ("UPC")63
promulgated a refined elective share 4 that was later adopted and
is currently used in a few common law jurisdictions.65 The most
striking departure from the conventional elective share approach
was the UPC's use of the "augmented estate." Under this approach,
the value of various properties traditionally not included in comput-
ing the decedent's estate are considered a part of the total estate
against which the surviving spouse can elect.' One of the primary
purposes behind the augmented estate concept was to prevent the
decedent from reducing the surviving spouse's elective share by
fraudulently transferring property to third parties shortly before his
death.67
63. See generally Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the
1990 Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALE. L. REV. 891, 893-901 (1992).
64. See 1969 UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-201 to -207, 8 U.L.A. 73, 73-87 (1983).
65. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.11.070-.100 (1962); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-
201 to -207 (1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 2-201 to -207 (West 1964 &
Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. §§ 524.2-201-.2-207 (Supp. 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-
2313 to -2319 (1943); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-05-01-.1-05-07 (1976 & Supp. 1993);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-201 to -207 (1953).
The UPC's elective share scheme was enacted in South Dakota in 1974, more than
eighty years after dower had been abolished in the state. See supra note 16 (discussing
dower and spousal protection in South Dakota). Interestingly, the provision was not "well
received" and the South Dakota legislature repealed it in 1976. See In re Estate of Smith,
401 N.W.2d 736, 737 (S.D. 1987) (discussing history of state elective share). In 1980,
however, South Dakota enacted a new elective share provision. Id.
66. See 1969 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 75, 75-81 (1983). Section 2-
202(1) includes within the augmented estate various transfers by decedent during the mar-
riage which are essentially will substitutes. Id. Under § 2-202(2), the augmented estate
also includes the survivor's property derived from the decedent (and property derived from
the decedent which the spouse has in turn given away in a will-like transfer). Id.
67. See 1969 UNiF. PROB. CODE, art. H, pt. 2, gen. cmt., 8 U.L.A. 73, 73 (1983)
(describing statute and its purpose to protect spouse against improper transfers by dece-
dent); see also In re Estate of Grasseschi, 776 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989)
(noting that the legislative purpose in enacting augmented estate concept was to provide
for surviving spouse and protect her from decedent's transfers to others to defeat her
elective right), cert. denied, 785 P.2d 1253 (Colo. 1989); Staples v. King, 433 A.2d 407,
411 n.4 (Me. 1981) (noting that one of the main purposes of the UPC provision is to
prevent spouses from making non-probate transfers to defeat the survivor's share); In re
Estate of Carman, 327 N.W.2d 611, 613 (Neb. 1982) (elective share combined with aug-
mented estate concept protects survivor from donative inter vivos transfers); Carr v. Carr,
576 A.2d 872, 878 (NJ. 1990) (noting that "a clear purpose" of UPC was to eliminate
unfair depletion of one spouse's estate to the detriment of the survivor). See generally
Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Augmented Estate Concept Under the Uniform Probate Code: In
Search of an Equitable Elective Share, 62 IOWA L. REv. 981, 1011-61 (1977) (describing
the augmented estate provisions in detail); Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 303
1994]
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The 1969 UPC spousal provisions not only successfully dimin-
ished the incentive for fraudulent conveyances by married individu-
als, 68 but also generally reduced the availability of election to sur-
viving spouses.6 9 The drafters accomplished this latter result by
requiring that certain amounts received by the surviving spouse
from the testator during his lifetime be applied against her elective
share.7" In most other respects, however, the 1969 UPC provisions
are similar to conventional elective share provisions7' and are be-
(noting that forced-share reform found in Uniform Probate Code of 1969 eradicated "fraud
on the widow's share").
Non-UPC common law jurisdictions typically have less structured methods for de-
termining which transfers are fraudulent. Predicting in advance which transferred assets
may be includable in the testator's estate is problematic in these jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Methodist Episcopal Church v. Hadfield, 453 A.2d 145, 148-50 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1982) (husband conveyed remainder interest in home to church, reserving life estate with
power to sell or encumber). The Hadfield court noted various factors which may be con-
sidered: completeness of the transfer; retention of control by transferor, motive for the
transfer; transferee's participation in alleged fraud; extent to which surviving spouse's
share has been reduced; relative moral claims of surviving spouse and transferee; other
provisions for surviving spouse; extent of surviving spouse's own estate or other means;
and passage of time between the transfer and the transferor's death. Id. at 148. Although
many non-UPC common law states have provisions addressing conveyances made to de-
feat or reduce a surviving spouse's statutory share, such statutes generally require proof
that the transfer was fraudulent before the property transferred can be brought back into
the decedent's estate. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-105 (1984) (fraudulent convey-
ance to defeat spousal forced share is voidable by surviving spouse). Proving fraud on the
part of the decedent is not always a simple task. See Warren v. Compton, 626 S.W.2d
12, 17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that there is no fixed rule in Tennessee for
determining when transfer is fraudulent under state statute). See generally Kurtz, supra, at
993-1011 (describing judicial and legislative safeguards against fraudulent transfers in non-
UPC states); Scott A. Curutte, Note, Preventing Spousal Disinheritance: An Equitable
Solution, 92 W. VA. L. REv. 441, 444-52 (1990) (discussing generally "illusory transfer,"
"retention of control," "intent to defraud," and "present donative intent" tests as applied
by courts in non-UPC common law jurisdictions to address "fraud on the widow's
share").
68. Reducing and preventing fraudulent transfers to minimize a surviving spouse's
forced share was an important ameliorative step in American forced share law. See supra
note 67 (discussing protection from fraudulent transfer). A substantial portion of the cases
involving the spousal elective share in non-UPC common law jurisdictions is still con-
cerned with precisely this situation.
69. See 1969 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 cmt., 8 U.L.A. 77, 78 (1983) (explaining
why the UPC elective share provisions "will operate in the long run to decrease substan-
tially the number of elections").
70. 1969 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-207, 8 U.L.A. 86, 86-87 (1983). Under this section,
amounts received by the surviving spouse from the decedent and included in the augment-
ed estate are applied to satisfy the elective share. Id. In many instances these amounts
will exceed the survivor's one-third share of the augmented estate.
71. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (discussing conventional elective
share provisions).
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set by many of the same problems.72 Upon determining the aug-
mented estate, for example, the survivor receives a fixed elective
share of one-third without regard to need, the size of the
decedent's estate, or the duration of the marriage.73 As with con-
ventional forced share statutes, potentially unfair outcomes will
occur at least occasionally.74 Nonetheless, the 1969 UPC provi-
sions were an improvement on their predecessors.
3. The Uniform Probate Code-1990
The arbitrariness of the fractional forced share continues to
concern legal scholars.76 Why should the surviving spouse be pro-
vided with only one-third of the deceased spouse's estate if, as the
current view would have it, marriage is an economic partner-
ship?77 Why should a fractional share be used at all?" Why not
72. As scholars have noted, the UPC of 1969-Iike its conventional forced share law
counterparts--demonstrated an "astonishing insensitivity to differences in the duration of a
marriage." Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 303. See generally Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform Pro-
bate Code, 26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 683, 715-48 (1992) (explanation of the rede-
signed spousal elective share by the Reporter of the Drafting Committee to Revise Article
II).
73. 1969 UNiF. PROB. CODE § 2-201(a), 8 U.L.A. 74 (1983) ("If a married person do-
miciled in this state dies, the surviving spouse has a right of election to take an elective
share of one-third of the augmented estate under the limitations and conditions hereinafter
stated."). But see Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 308 (noting that argument that
arbitrary fixed fraction inadequately addresses the survivor's need may be countered by
consideration of cost of individuation).
Pursuant to § 2-207, the value of properties received by the surviving spouse and
included in the decedent's augmented estate, as well as amounts which would have passed
to the spouse but were renounced, are applied against the survivor's elective share. 1969
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-207(a), 8 U.L.A. 86 (1983).
74. See, e.g., Hall v. McBride, 416 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1982). In Hall, the then-appli-
cable elective share statute for widows only was held violative of equal protection. Id.
Had the statute been upheld, the widow could have elected despite having lived apart
from the deceased husband for seventeen years, having her own income, and having des-
ignated herself as single on her income tax returns during the time the two were separat-
ed. Id; see also supra note 54 (providing examples of the arbitrary results of forced
share).
75. See Averill, supra note 63, at 900-01 (noting influence and use of UPC and listing
states that have adopted UPC largely in full). As Professor Averill notes, probate law in
numerous other states has been affected by the UPC. Id.
76. See, e.g., Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 320 ("Forced-share law is in-
trinsically arbitrary. The fixed fraction ... is arbitrary."). The drafters of the 1990 UPC
ultimately retained the forced share concept, but softened its harshness somewhat by aban-
doning the fixed fraction concept.
77. The commonly encountered fractional one-third may have been borrowed from the
right of dower, however, today few people would deny that in many marriages, particu-
larly those of long duration, the survivor made at least an equal contribution to the fami-
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consider the length of the marriage in determining the portion of
the estate to which the surviving spouse is entitled?79 Why should
the survivor's own estate not be considered in determining her
ability to take an elective share?"0
The drafters of the substantially redesigned elective share in
the 1990 revisions to the UPC sought to address some of these
questions.8' The general comment to the elective share provisions
ly wealth. Providing the surviving spouse with a fixed one-half interest in the testator's
estate might initially appear to place the surviving spouse in common law jurisdictions on
the same plane as his counterpart in community property jurisdictions, but it would not
do so in many or most instances. Under the community property system, the survivor
owns a one-half interest in marital property during the marriage and that ownership con-
tinues when the spouse dies. The survivor, however, is generally not entitled to any of
the testator's separate property at death if the testator's will disposes of it otherwise.
Thus, a fixed one-half interest in common law jurisdictions would be even more advanta-
geous for the surviving spouse than the system used in community property jurisdictions.
78. Providing the surviving spouse with any fixed fractional interest--one-third, one-
half, or whatever-in the testator's estate will be "arbitrary" unless adjustments for other
considerations are made. See, e.g., supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing how
the UPC of 1969 and conventional forced share provisions failed to consider the duration
of a marriage).
79. A related question would inquire into the status of the marriage at the testator's
death-are there circumstances indicating the marriage was not a happy one? A few com-
mon law jurisdictions make a limited, indirect inquiry of this sort, but the vast majority
do not. See supra note 60 (discussing how the conduct of the surviving spouse can effect
his or her right to an elective share).
80. See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing the introduction of need
into the elective share equation). See, e.g., In re Estate of Schriver, 441 So. 2d 1105,
1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). In Schriver, the testator's will provided as follows:
It is my intent that my present wife ...should not participate in my estate in
that her own estate is entirely adequate to provide for her care. It has been our
desire during our relatively short marriage that our estates should remain sepa-
rate and pass to our respective children.
Id. The couple had been married for five years at the time of the testator's death. Despite
the will provision, the widow's daughter from a previous marriage exercised a durable
power of attorney on behalf of her mother to claim the elective share. Id.
81. The policy objectives of the 1990 Article II of the UPC have been described as
follows:
(1) to respond to the changes in the American family, especially the
multiple-marriage society;
(2) to extend the partnership theory of marital property, now recognized
in divorce law, into the laws protecting surviving spouses from disin-
heritance;
(3) to move toward unification of the law of probate and nonprobate
transfers; and
(4) to diminish the formalistic barriers to the implementation of
transferors' intentions.
WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 44, at 63-64 (noting authors' belief that "1990 UPC Arti-
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states that the principal purpose for the revisions "is to bring elec-
tive-share law into line with the contemporary view of marriage as
an economic partnership.""2 This view, of course, is the basis of
cle II is destined to be the model for American family property law deep into the next
century"). See also John W. Fisher II & Scott A. Curnutte, Reforming the Law of Intes-
tate Succession and Elective Shares: New Solutions to Age-Old Problems, 93 W. VA. L.
REV. 61, 64, 98-100, 107-15 (1990) (reviewing the elective share provisions of the 1990
UPC).
82. 1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE, art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt., 8 U.L.A. 90, 90 (Supp. 1994).
The economic partnership or marital sharing theory is based on the idea that husbands
and wives presumably intend to combine their resources acquired during the marriage,
even though no formal agreement was entered into by the partners and even though title
to property may be in the name of only one spouse. The economic partnership does not
presume such a bargain regarding property acquired by a spouse through gift or inheri-
tance. See id. at 90-91; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMI-
LY LAW 131 (1989) (noting that the marital sharing theory recognizes and implicitly vali-
dates the contributions made by the spouse who stays home to rear children and further
takes into consideration the opportunities foregone by that spouse); WAGGONER et al.,
supra note 44, at 464-79 (providing cases and materials on partnership theory of mar-
riage); Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 308 ("Especially in the conventional mar-
riage, in which the burdens of home and childcare fall mainly upon the wife, she should
be entitled to a share of what she helped her husband earn."). The 1990 UPC provisions
do not, however, distinguish between community and separate property, thus leading some
to question the extent to which the economic partnership theory of marriage is success-
fully embodied in the provisions. See infra notes 92-93 (discussing the distinction between
community and separate property and the problem of tracing).
As the comments to the 1990 revisions note, the economic partnership view has
implicitly been accepted by the system of equitable distribution now followed in common
law states upon divorce of the spouses. See 1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE, art. II, pt. 2, gen.
cmt., 8 U.L.A. 90, 90-96 (Supp. 1994); JOHN D. GREGORY, THE LAW OF EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION 1.03, at 1-6 to 1-8 (1989). In attempting to define equitable distribution,
Gregory states as follows:
The hallmarks of the system are broad discretion for trial courts to assign to
either spouse property acquired during the marriage, irrespective of title, taking
into account the circumstances of the particular case and recognizing the value
of the contributions of a nonworking spouse or homemaker to the acquisition
of that property. Simply stated, the system of equitable distribution views mar-
riage as essentially a shared enterprise or joint undertaking in the nature of a
partnership to which both spouses contribute-directly and indirectly, financially
and nonfinancially-the fruits of which are distributable at divorce.
Id. at 1-6 (emphasis added). Although the revisers quoted this definition in the general
comment to the 1990 UPC elective share provisions, it is clear that they preferred to
avoid bestowing the broad judicial discretion characteristic of equitable distribution upon
courts faced with questions of the share of the surviving spouse. See infra notes 146, 149
and accompanying text (discussing equitable distribution as applied to forced shares at
death).
In Carr v. Carr, 576 A.2d 872 (NJ. 1990), the New Jersey-Supreme Court discussed
both equitable distribution and the forced share in the following terms:
[T]he principle that animates both statutes is that a spouse may acquire an
interest in marital property by virtue of the mutuality of efforts during marriage
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the community property system. 3 One might therefore expect that
in common law states adopting the 1990 UPC elective share revi-
sions, the result obtained will be similar to that achieved in com-
munity property jurisdictions.' Yet substantial differences remain
between the two systems. Most importantly, the survivor's contri-
butions to the marriage under the UPC revisions continue to be
recognized only upon the death of her spouse. While both spouses
are living, title alone determines ownership.'
To develop a more just forced share for the surviving spouse,
the revisers of the UPC ultimately chose an accrual system. Under
this system, the survivor receives an increase in his or her elective
share for each year of the marriage up through the fifteenth
year.86 This accrued elective share is an attempt to rectify the fre-
quently criticized fixed fractional elective share found in conven-
tional forced share statutes and also under the 1969 UPC provi-
sions.87 Upon completion of the fifteenth year of marriage, the
surviving spouse under the 1990 UPC is entitled to the maximum
that contribute to the creation, acquisition, and preservation of such property.
This principle, primarily equitable in nature, is derived from notions of fairness,
common decency, and good faith.
Id. at 879.
83. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of spouses as
equal partners in the community property system).
84. See Charles H. Whitebread, The Uniform Probate Code's Nod to the Partnership
Theory of Marriage: The 1990 Elective Share Revisions, 11 PROB. L.J. 125, 134-36
(1992) (criticizing the 1990 UPC as incorporating the universal community concept rather
than the community of acquests, thus not truly allowing for implementation of the partner-
ship theory of marriage).
85. The failure of common law jurisdictions to recognize ownership rights of the
spouse without "title" to property acquired during the marriage is, of course, not a pro-
bate problem. The drafters of the revised UPC provisions, recognizing the disparity of
treatment between the common law and community property systems, attempted to provide
some uniformity between the two systems upon the death of the spouse in the common
law jurisdiction. Left unresolved was the problem of fairness to the spouse without title to
property during an existing marriage in a common law jurisdiction. See infra note 96 and
accompanying text (giving an example of a spouse without title to property and discussing
the implications of that problem).
86. 1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202(a), 8 U.L.A. 92 (Supp. 1994). In each of the
first ten years, the elective share increases by three percent. In the lth through 15th
years, the elective share percentage increases by four percent per year. Because of the
augmented estate concept and the manner in which the elective share is satisfied, howev-
er, a surviving spouse entitled to a 50% elective share will not necessarily receive 50%
of properties owned by the testator at his death. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying
text (discussing the calculation of the augmented estate).
87. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (examining how the conventional fixed
share provisions and the UPC of 1969 are alike).
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elective share of fifty percent of the decedent's augmented es-
tate.
88
To satisfy the elective share, the 1990 UPC takes into consid-
eration part or all of the survivor's own wealth, depending upon
the duration of the marriage.89 Unlike the conventional forced
share statutes and the 1969 UPC, the 1990 provisions address the
common sense observation that a surviving spouse who is wealthy
in her own right typically will have less need for a forced share
than will a surviving spouse who has few assets titled in her name
at the testator's death. Moreover, for the needy surviving spouse,
the revised provisions even allow some additional protection in the
form of a "supplemental" elective share amount.' Significantly,
88. Assume Bill married Jill and Dan married Nan in a double wedding. Bill died
shortly after he and Jill celebrated their fifth anniversary. Dan died shortly after he and
Nan celebrated their 15th anniversary. Under the 1990 UPC provisions, Jill's elective
share of Bill's augmented estate is 15%. Nan's elective share of Dan's augmented estate
under the new UPC provisions is 50%. The accrual system thus contemplates vastly dif-
ferent treatment of spouses in five-minute, five-year, and 15-year marriages-all of whom
are treated identically under previous forced share approaches in common law states.
To determine the elective share amount under the UPC, one must determine the aug-
mented estate of the decedent against which the elective share percentage will be applied.
The value of the augmented estate is generally described in § 2-203. It includes the sum
of the values of all properties that constitute the decedent's net probate estate; the
decedent's nonprobate transfers to others; the decedent's nonprobate transfers to the surviv-
ing spouse; and the surviving spouse's property and nonprobate transfers to others. These
components of the augmented estate are specifically defined in §§ 2-204 to -207. Section
2-208 excludes the value of certain property from the decedent's nonprobate transfers to
others, provides for valuation of components within the augmented estate, and prohibits
double inclusions of property. Once the decedent's augmented estate is determined, the
elective share percentage is applied to obtain the elective share amount. Finally, § 2-209
charges against the spouse's elective share the following: amounts included in the
decedent's augmented estate which the survivor receives by testate or intestate succession;
the value of the decedent's nonprobate transfers to the surviving spouse; and an amount
representing the doubled elective share percentage multiplied by the survivor's own net
assets and reclaimables had the survivor predeceased the decedent. See generally 1990
UNI. PROB. CODE, art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt., 8 U.L.A. 90, 90-96 (providing examples that
demonstrate how revised elective share is to work). As can readily be seen, the revised
provisions are more complex than the conventional fixed fractional share of most common
law states.
89. 1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-209, 8 U.L.A. 112, 112-133 (Supp. 1994). See also
supra note 88 (discussing how the duration of the marriage determines the elective share
amount).
90. 1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202(b) cmt., 8 U.L.A. 97, 97-98 (Supp. 1994). Under
the provision, the following amounts are totalled: the value of the surviving spouse's
property and nonprobate transfers to others under § 2-207; amounts described in § 2-
209(a)(1), which are the amounts included in the augmented estate under § 2-204 that
pass or have passed to the surviving spouse by testate or intestate succession and the
amounts included in the augmented estate under § 2-206; and that part of the elective
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this marks the first time need has been given special consideration
in elective share law.9'
The result obtained under the 1990 UPC provisions is nomi-
nally similar to that reached under community property principles.
The accrual process employed in the revised UPC, however, is
quite unlike anything encountered in community property jurisdic-
tions. Moreover, the augmented estate concept invoked upon the
death of the first spouse does not distinguish between "separate"
and "community" property. The revised UPC simply applies the
appropriate accrued percentage to all of the assets of either spouse
that come within the augmented estate definition. This treatment of
assets is thus more similar to the universal community than to the
community of acquests found in American community property
states.92 The UPC solution does, however, avoid the sometimes
difficult tracing problems that arise in community property
states.93
Although the drafters of the revised UPC note the ease with
which the elective share may be calculated and administered, the
share amount payable from the decedent's probate estate and nonprobate transfers to oth-
ers under §2-209(b). If the sum of these amounts is less than a legislatively determined
amount (the drafters suggest $50,000), then the surviving spouse is entitled to a supple-
mental elective share of the legislatively determined amount minus the sum of the
amounts totalled above. Id. The supplemental elective share amount is payable out of the
decedent's probate estate. Id.; see also UNIF. PROB. CODE, art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt., exam-
ple 6, 8 U.L.A. 90, 95 (Supp. 1994) (demonstrating the mechanics of the supplemental
elective share provision).
91. The supplemental share demonstrates the UPC's concern that the marital duty of
support not be abruptly terminated to the detriment of a needy spouse. See Waggoner, su-
pra note 72, at 742-46 (noting that fixed fractional forced share inadequately addresses
need).
92. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 319; see supra note 38 (distinguishing the
two systems of community property); cf. Whitebread, supra note 84, at 134-36 (criticizing
1990 UPC's broad augmented estate which makes it almost impossible for spouse to
maintain separate property absent pre- or post-nuptial agreement opting out of UPC cover-
age).
93. See, e.g., In re Estate of Eliasen, 668 P.2d 110, 113-16 (Idaho 1983) (characteriz-
ing the decedent's property as community or separate and discussing the tracing process);
Verheyden v. Verheyden, 757 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Nev. 1988) (concluding husband's alleged
oral statement that 1982 Honda was a gift to wife was not enough to overcome presump-
tion of community property); see also WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 44, at 468-69 (pro-
viding three examples of tracing problems). See generally MCCLANAHAN, supra note 16,
at 338 (noting that if there is any doubt, the presumption that the property is that of the
community will control). Tracing ownership is required in American community property
states because the system employed in these states is based on the community of acquests
rather than upon the universal community. See supra notes 38, 50 and accompanying text
(discussing the community of acquests and tracing problems).
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provisions are more complex than those of the conventional elec-
tive share or the 1969 UPC.' Even with the accrued elective
share system, the 1990 provisions may be criticized as arbitrary
and somewhat inflexible, incapable of adequately covering the
unique scenario.9 Moreover, the 1990 UPC provisions do nothing
to further spousal equality or the economic partnership theory dur-
ing the marriage itself; in some scenarios, the provisions may not
accomplish these goals even upon the death of one spouse.96
94. See 1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE, art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt., 8 U.L.A. 90, 92 (Supp.
1994) (indicating that "ease of administration and predictability of result are prized fea-
tures of the probate system" and that new provisions were designed with these goals in
mind). Attorneys familiar with the fixed one-third elective share used in several states
might at least initially question whether these prized features were retained. Familiarity
with the mechanics of the process should prove that the new UPC provisions are not
unduly complex and indeed are much fairer than the earlier provisions.
Ease of administration and predictability of results are considerations that have long
concerned students of testate succession and descent and distribution. See, e.g., Langbein
& Waggoner, supra note 6, at 314-17 (advocating accrual-type elective share provision for
UPC and noting difficulty with discretionary system); see also J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY
OF LEGISLATION 177-86 (C.K. Ogden ed. 1931), quoted in WAGGONER ET AL., supra note
44, at 38-41. Nonetheless, England and other commonwealth countries have turned to a
discretionary system. The perceived problems with the discretionary system used in those
countries have, on the whole, not proved insurmountable. See infra notes 124-65 and ac-
companying text (discussing the discretionary system in England and other commonwealth
countries).
95. This criticism, of course, can be made of almost any attempt to formulate a well-
defined, fixed-rule system for invading the realm of testamentary freedom.
For an enlightening discussion of the drawbacks of the 1990 UPC elective share
provisions, see Whitebread, supra note 84, at 134-39. One problem of the 1990 provisions
is the extremely broad augmented estate, which is more akin to the concept of the uni-
versal community than that of the community of acquests. Id. at 134-36; see supra note
38 (discussing the community of acquests and universal community concepts). Moreover,
as Whitebread convincingly demonstrates, the provisions appear to be concerned primarily
with protection of the surviving spouse, despite the stated goal of incorporating the eco-
nomic partnership theory. Whitebread, supra note 84, at 137. The provisions also fail to
provide for the unique case and will produce unfair results in some cases, as indeed do
all forced share systems. Id. at 137-39. Whitebread concludes, "If the goal [of the 1990
UPC elective share provisions] is a partnership theory of marriage . . . it must be recog-
nized that while the revised UPC is certainly better than the pre-1990 UPC and a step in
the right direction, it is not a very large step." Id. at 139.
96. Assume, for instance, that when Dan dies after 15 years of marriage, wife Nan
possesses substantial wealth inherited from her own family. Dan's estate is comprised only
of assets earned during the marriage. In community property states, Nan's inherited wealth
would constitute separate assets which would not affect her one-half interest in community'
assets. Under the UPC provision, however, Nan's assets, from whatever source derived,
will to some extent offset the amount that she will be able to claim from Dan's net
probate estate and nonprobate transfers to others, depending on the length of the marriage.
How do we justify the UPC approach? Proponents of the UPC may argue that if Nan is
wealthy in her own right she hardly needs a full elective share from Dan's estate. If,
however, we consider the marriage as a partnership to which Nan has made a contribution
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Despite these deficiencies, the revised UPC forced share
scheme is an improvement over the conventional elective share
provisions and the 1969 UPC statutes.' The 1990 provisions are
not inordinately complex,9t and they do contain a special provi-
sion for the needy surviving spouse. While the provisions also
contain more flexibility than earlier counterparts," precise stat-
utory guidelines ensure that judicial discretion cannot run
equal to that of Dan, should she not be entitled to a full 50% of Dan's assets earned
during the marriage?
The general comment to the 1990 UPC elective share provisions implicitly ac-
knowledges the continuing difference between the common law and community property
approaches. It states: "By granting each spouse upon acquisition an immediate half interest
in the earnings of the other, the community-property regimes directly recognize that the
couple's enterprise is in essence collaborative." 1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE, art. II, pt. 2,
gen. cmt., 8 U.L.A. 90, 91 (Supp. 1994). Moreover, Professors Langbein and Waggoner
readily admit that "[florced-share law is the law of the second best. It undertakes upon
death to correct the failure of a separate-property state to create the appropriate lifetime
rights for spouses in each other's earnings." Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 306.
The drafters of the UPC did consider incorporating community property principles in the
common law states on a deferred-until-death basis. Perceived classification problems, in-
cluding tracing, appear to be the primary reason the drafters rejected this approach. See
Waggoner, supra note 72, at 730-34 (also noting that couples in common law states
would be at risk if good records were not maintained under the deferred-until-death ap-
proach).
To implement fully the economic partnership theory of marriage, common law states
must be willing to adopt community property principles. To date, they have shown little
inclination to make a permanent conversion. See supra note 50 and accompanying text
(discussing Wisconsin's adoption of community property in mid-1980s). A very few states
appear to be considering adoption of the Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA). See
Whitebread, supra note 84, at 141 (noting that several states are considering enacting
UMPA, but concluding that widespread adoption does not appear promising). Compare
June M. Weisberger, Should Your State Adopt UMPA? Yes, PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct.
1987, at 39-43 (asserting that principal reason for adoption is to ensure that marriage is
treated as a partnership; few opponents articulate ideological differences with community
property approach) with Jackson M. Bruce, Jr., Should Your State Adopt UMPA? No,
PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 1987, at 39-43 (asserting that Wisconsin reform was climax to
misguided feminist effort to reform a common law system that was already gender neu-
tral; new system has resulted in classification, estate planning, and creditor problems). See
generally Howard S. Erlanger & June M. Weisberger, From Common Law Property to
Community Property: Wisconsin's Marital Property Act Four Years Later, 1990 WiS.
L. REv. 769, 776-81 (1990) (discussing Wisconsin's experience in converting to communi-
ty property and examining differences between state statute and UMPA).
97. Both the Executive Board and the Assembly of the National Association of Wom-
en Lawyers approved the redesigned elective share provision of the 1990 UPC. 1990
UNtF. PROB. CODE, art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt., 8 U.L.A. 86, 86 (Supp. 1993); WAGGONER
Er AL., supra note 44, at 478.
98. The provisions are not simple, however. See supra notes 88-91 (discussing the
1990 UPC provisions for determining the elective share amount).
99. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing fixed fraction characteris-
tic of conventional elective share provisions and 1969 UPC forced share awards).
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amok."r In sum, the 1990 UPC elective share provisions are the
best forced share alternative devised to date. States have already
begun to adopt them and they will probably be influential for
many years. 10
D. Forced Heirship for Descendants
The three preceding subsections examined the principal means
by which a surviving spouse in the United States is directly pro-
tected from disinheritance. Disinherited minor children in this coun-
try historically have received only indirect protection trickling
down from the award to the surviving spouse." In many coun-
tries, however, this conduit theory of protection is unnecessary
because children receive direct protection as forced heirs of the
testator.
0 3
1. Common Law Jurisdictions
Although into the fourteenth century English law assured the
testator's children a forced portion of his chattels, that right had
largely vanished when America was colonized and had completely
disappeared by the time of the American Revolution." 4 Pollock
100. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing 1990 UPC elective share
provisions).
101. See supra note 35 (noting that West Virginia was the first state to adopt 1990
UPC elective share provisions). See also MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-221 to -227 (1993)
(adopting 1990 UPC provisions regarding elective share).
102. Pretermitted child statutes ultimately became part of the laws of testation in most
states. The protection they afford, however, is typically for the child who is unintentional-
ly omitted from the will. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-3-8(a) (1979) (providing that
child born after execution of testator's will and unintentionally omitted therefrom receives
intestate share); R.I. GEN. LAws § 33-6-23 (1956) (protecting pretermitted issue born after
execution of will unless omission was intentional); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302(b)(1),
8 U.L.A. 105 (Supp. 1994) (providing that a child intentionally omitted from testator's
will does not receive a share of the estate). See generally Robert E. Mathews, Trends in
the Power to Disinherit Children, 16 A.B.A. J. 293, 294-95 (1930) (suggesting that some
courts subordinated testamentary power to social obligation by misconstruing presumptions
underlying pretermitted child statute); Jan E. Rein, A More Rational System for the Pro-
tection of Family Members Against Disinheritance: A Critique of Washington's Pretermit-
ted Child Statute and Other Matters, 15 GONz. L. REv. 11, 25 (1979) (questioning the
validity of the presumption underlying pretermitted child statutes). Professor Rein states
flatly, "[florgetting about the existence of a child one already has is on a par with mis-
placing a house-not very likely." Id. She suggests that such statutes are solutions to the
wrong problem; the real problem is permitting intentional disinheritance of children. Id. at
26.
103. See infra note 111 (noting that most civilized countries give children direct protec-
tion from disinheritance by their parent).
104. JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 228 (6th ed.
1994]
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and Maitland suggest that the demise of the child's portion in Eng-
land may have been an unfortunate historical accident. 5 Never-
theless, the American colonies and their successor states ultimately
borrowed the English model, recognizing curtesy and dower in the
spouse"° while rejecting direct protection for the testator's chil-
1990); see also ATKINSON, supra note 4, § 36, at 138 (noting that the children of an
English testator generally lost the right to claim a share of testator's personalty by the
time of Charles I). Because land was equated with wealth in feudal England, disinheri-
tance involving personalty was less important than disinheritance involving realty. In por-
traying the confused history of the English child's forced portion of chattels, Pollock and
Maitland suggest the following:
To the modem Englishman our modem law, which allows the father to leave
his children penniless, may seem so obvious that he will be apt to think it
deep-rooted in our national character. But national character and national law
react upon each other, and law is sometimes the outcome of what we must call
accidents. Had our temporal lawyers of the thirteenth century cared more than
they did about the law of chattels, wife's part, baims' part and dead's part
might at this day be known south of the Tweed.
2 POLLOCK & MARLAND, supra note 17, at 353. See generally id. at 348-56 (discussing
the history of English); George W. Keeton & L.C.B. Gower, Freedom of Testation in
English Law, 20 IOWA L. REv. 326, 337-40 (1935) (discussing the history of the child's
forced portion in England). Prior to the disappearance of the right, the testator's surviving
children were entitled to one-third of his personalty. The protection of the children from
disinheritance is mentioned in the Charter of 1215. Keeton & Gower, supra, at 337. Al-
though this scheme of forced heirship appears to have died out in large part by the end
of the 14th century, in some localities it lasted much longer. Id. at 338. The scheme con-
tinued in London until 1724. Id. The protection may finally have disappeared because it
was unpopular with London merchants, who refused to live in a city where they could
not completely dispose of their personalty by will. Cahn, supra note 5, at 140-41.
With regard to realty, the Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. VIII (1540), largely ended com-
pulsory primogeniture. See generally J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 293 (3d ed. 1990) (statute allowed landowners to devise two-thirds of land held
in knight service and all lands held in socage); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE
LAND LAW 191 (2d ed. 1986) (same). Military tenure was abolished in 1660 by 12 Car.
II c. 24; from that time forward, a testator was free to devise all of his land. ATKINSON,
supra note 4, at 18 n.56.
105. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 353 (noting that English law
concerning the child's forced share "seems to [have] slip[ped] unconsciously into the deci-
sion of a very important and debatable question"); Keeton & Gower, supra note 104, at
339 (noting historical accident theory); see also 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 554-56
(noting that the testator's freedom to dispose of his realty and the need for a court to
supervise the children's guardian may account for the demise of the child's share).
106. See Haskins, supra note 30, at 197 (comparing curtesy and dower and noting that
the marital life estate appeared in the colonies as early as 17th century). Although the
child's forced share of personalty was ultimately rejected in all common law states, it
appears to have received very limited recognition in colonial America before disappearing
altogether. See, e.g., SALMON, supra note 21, at 149 (noting that in colonial Maryland,
one-third of male testator's personalty descended absolutely to children despite will provi-
sions to the contrary). Concerning realty, following the Revolutionary War the states by
constitutional provision or statute rejected the English system of primogeniture with its
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dren.
Disinheritance of adult children appears to be quite common
in the United States 7 and is less troubling than disinheritance of
a minor child. After all, adult children presumably are capable of
providing for themselves. A minor child excluded from a parent's
will, however, typically is unable to provide for herself and often
must depend solely or largely upon the surviving parent for sup-
port, if a surviving parent exists."0 ' When few marriages ended in
preference for the eldest surviving male heir. See Richard B. Morris, Primogeniture and
Entailed Estates in America, 27 COLuM. L. REv. 24, 24-25 (1927) (noting attacks on and
abolition of primogeniture in the early history of the United States); see also THOMAS F.
BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 9
(2d ed, 1984) (asserting that primogeniture was "never cordially received in this country").
This is not to say that eldest sons were treated the same as other children early in the
history of the United States. For a fascinating and valuable study of women and inheri-
tance in early America, see SALMON, supra note 21, at 141-84 (noting that until the late
1700s several colonies or states retained primogeniture or granted the eldest son double
portions or other special treatment). Salmon notes that mothers stated their dislike of pri-
mogeniture more frequently than did fathers. Id. at 142. Cf JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE
GUARDIAN OF EvERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
30 (Kermith Hall et al. eds., 1992) (asserting that Americans favored dispersal of wealth
and disliked the aristocratic system of limiting inheritance of land to a single heir).
For a general discussion of primogeniture, see 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at
*212-16 (noting that "as our male lawgivers have somewhat uncomplaisantly expressed it,
the worthiest of blood shall be preferred"). Explaining the English system of primogeni-
ture, Blackstone carefully notes that, unlike under other legal systems, English females
were not totally excluded from the right of inheritance; if there were no son, then the
daughters would take equally before any collateral relatives. Id. at *214. England did not
abolish primogeniture until the Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch.
23 (Eng). See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra, at 8 n.20 (discussing abolition of primogeniture
in England and noting that at least during some early period following the Norman inva-
sion, a system of equal distribution to surviving sons challenged the system of primogeni-
ture before succumbing); cf. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *215-16 (noting equal
descent of socage estates to all sons as late as the reign of Henry II and further noting
inheritance by the youngest son only in some localities).
107. See SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 97-103 (detailing specific examples of and
motives behind disinheritance of adult children).
108. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting that, at least in part, dower also
served to ensure the support of the married couple's young children). Blackstone himself
apparently believed that the indirect protection afforded by dower was preferable to a
forced inheritance directly to the testator's children. In discussing wills and testaments, he
noted that "[i]f a man disinherits his son, by a will duly executed, and leaves his estate
to a stranger, there are many who consider this proceeding as contrary to natural justice."
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *13. Blackstone concluded, however, that such a stance
is erroneous and that "the law of nature suggests, that on the death of the possessor the
estate should again become common, and be open to the next occupant, unless otherwise
ordered for the sake of civil peace by the positive law of society." Id. Discussing the ori-
gins of inheritability of property, Blackstone noted that a "strict rule of inheritance made
heirs disobedient and head-strong . . . and prevented many provident fathers from dividing
or charging their estates as the exigence of their families required." Id. at *12; see also
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divorce, the common law marital estates of dower and curtesy
served to protect most minor children from complete disinheritance.
In his writings, Blackstone explicitly acknowledged the importance
of dower to the testator's children."
In the United States, legislators apparently believed that the
forced share would indirectly benefit the couple's minor children
just as dower had done. Initially, the forced share achieved that
goal. When the forced shares were first enacted in the 1930s, mul-
tiple marriage and single parenthood were uncommon; thus, the
minor children receiving the indirect benefits of the elective share
were in most instances the minor children of the testator. Today,
however, often the testator's minor children are not children of the
surviving spouse. In these instances, the surviving spouse has no
legal obligation and may have little emotional incentive to use her
elective share for their benefit. Moreover, she quite often will have
minor children who are not those of the testator; ironically, the
conduit effect will inure to their benefit (because of her legal obli-
gation of support) while the testator's own disinherited children are
excluded. It seems unlikely that legislators anticipated this anoma-
lous result in light of social norms which existed when forced
shares were first enacted."'
id. at *116 (discussing entailed estates and noting that "[c]hildren grew disobedient when
they knew they could not be set aside").
109. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing dower and its importance to
the testator's young children). This "trickle down" or conduit theory also applies to the
forced share in the traditional nuclear family and may be important in intestacy scenarios
governed by the 1990 UPC. See Waggoner, supra note 72, at 707 (noting that the revised
intestacy provision of the 1990 UPC grants everything to the surviving spouse and ex-
cludes the children in a strict nuclear family). But cf infra notes 255-57 and accompany-
ing text (noting that conduit theory leaves children of cohabitants unprovided for).
110. Courts today emphasize that the elective share's purpose is to provide for the
surviving spouse or perhaps to recognize her contributions to the marriage. Not surprising-
ly, these courts ignore the indirect benefits afforded to her children, who in modern times
frequently are not children of the testator. See, e.g., In re Estate of Anderson, 394 So. 2d
1146, 1147 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("[Tlhe elective share is for the express purpose of
caring for the surviving spouse and not to augment the estate for the benefit of heirs.").
In Anderson, the surviving but incompetent husband died shortly after his wife, without
exercising his right to take an elective share under Florida law. Id. at 1446. The court re-
fused to allow the husband's son, who was also the husband's personal representative, to
make the election posthumously for the husband. Id. at 1447. The court concluded that
the elective share was not meant to benefit the survivor's adult children from a prior
marriage. Id. See also supra note 25 (Blackstone on the purpose of dower); supra notes
107-10 and accompanying text (discussing surviving spouse as conduit for indirect benefit
of her children).
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2. Civil Law Jurisdictions
Forced heirship is a characteristic of the laws of succession in
civil law countries"' and provides protection from disinheritance
to children of a testator."2 The French system of testate succes-
sion, for example, ensures protection for the children of a testator
by recognizing the legitime, or portion of the parent's estate of
which a child cannot be disinherited without cause."3 By con-
trast, the French testator is free to disinherit his surviving spouse,
because she is protected through recognition of her ownership of
one-half of the community property and through retention of her
separate property."4
111. See In re Estate of Panzeca, 543 N.E.2d 161, 163-64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
(contrasting succession laws in civil law and common law countries). In civil law jurisdic-
tions, the testator's intent is important only with respect to the portion of his estate not
subject to forced heirship laws. Id. at 164. In common law jurisdictions, however, the
testator's intent is the primary focus of inquiry and will be given effect if not against
public policy. Id.
Most of the civilized countries in the world provide direct protection from disinheri-
tance to children of a testator. A few of the many countries that protect the children of a
testator from complete disinheritance include Argentina, MARTINDALE-HUBBELL INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW DIGEST ARG-7 (1994); Austria, id. at AuT-4; Belgium, id. at BLG-3; Brazil,
id. at BRZ-6; France, id. at FRA-11; Germany, id. at GER-9; Greece, id. at GRC-4; Italy,
id. at ITL-5; Japan, id. at JPN-6; Spain, id. at SPN-6; Sweden, id. at SWD-4; and Switzer-
land, id. at Swz-19. See also George A. Pelletier, Jr. & Michael R. Sonnenreich, A Com-
parative Analysis of Civil Law Succession, 11 VILL. L. REV. 323, 349-53 (1966) (discuss-
ing forced heirship in civil law countries); cf infra notes 124-65 and accompanying text
(discussing the system of testator's family maintenance used in Englard, New Zealand,
Australia, and some .provinces of Canada).
112. Forced heirship can also apply in favor of ascendants of the decedent. No Ameri-
can jurisdiction includes parents among the forced heirs of a testate decedent, although
Louisiana did so until 1982. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1494 (West 1987) (repeal
effective Jan. 1, 1982) (discussing disposable portion of testator's estate when parents sur-
vived); see also Michael P. Porter, Comment, Forced Heirs, The Legitime and Loss of the
Legitime in Louisiana, 37 TUL. L. REv. 710, 728-31 (1963) (discussing the history of the
parental forced heirship provision in Louisiana).
113. See GLENDON, supra note 82, at 246-49 (discussing French system of intestate and
testate succession, citing French Civil Code art. 913). Thus, unlike his counterpart in 49
of the 50 American states, the typical testator in France may not bequeath his entire
estate to the surviving spouse if he dies leaving children. Id. at 248.
114. Id. In discussing testate succession, Professor Glendon notes that the difference in
treatment of the surviving spouse under French and American laws is not remarkably
disparate. She states, however, that "[plerhaps it is the American failure to secure a
share of parental estates to children that ought to appear remarkable." Id. (emphasis
added). On this latter point, however, she concludes that the French may have a genuine-
ly different attitude concerning the importance of blood ties:
One must never forget when one speaks of the surviving spouse as a forced
heir, that there will always be a fundamental and irreversible difference between
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In the United States, only Louisiana employs the civil law
concept of forced heirship. Even there, forced heirship has been the
source of much controversy. After acrimonious struggles, the Loui-
siana legislature in 1989 and 1990 severely restricted the traditional
legitime that had applied to all children of a testator."5 Under the
the spouse and the other forced heirs. The others are the ascendants and the
descendants of the decedent. Their right to a forced share is an unquestionable
right, because it is founded on a blood tie, which no one, not even the future
decedent, can destroy. It is different with a spouse. The inheritance rights of a
spouse are derived from marriage, in the absence of divorce or legal separation.
The protection that one might wish to assure to a surviving spouse can only
boomerang against him because of the fragility of the basis of such a right.
Id. (quoting Michel Dagot, Le Conjoint Survivant, Heritier Resdnataire?, 1974 RECUEtL
SIREY DE DOCTRINE 39, 40). Despite French opinion polls indicating that participants
favor increasing protection for the surviving spouse, the participants also remain in favor
of forced heirship for children. Id. at 248-49.
An American Bar Foundation telephone survey conducted in five states in May of
1977 indicated that American parents generally are willing to leave the matter of their
children's inheritance to the surviving spouse, except perhaps when there are children
from a prior marriage. See Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 367 (noting that citizens ap-
pear to feel "primary but not exclusive responsibility to the spouse even when a child of
a prior marriage also survives"). The 1977 survey found no significant differences in
attitudes towards property distribution between respondents with wills and those without
wills. Id. at 385. But see id. at 327 (noting that the sample was somewhat biased in
underrepresenting the lowest education and income categories, but that generalizations
could be made with reasonable confidence); id. at 360 (suggesting that regional differences
in attitudes may exist; respondents in southern states were more likely than other respon-
dents to favor intestate share for children). The respondents were less willing, as a whole,
however, to leave their entire estate to the surviving spouse than were testators studied in
previous surveys. Id. at 359; see also infra note 273 (discussing studies by Dunnam,
Browder, and Sussman).
115. Forced heirship was a hotly debated issue in Louisiana throughout the 1980s. See
Jeri Clausing, Repeal of Forced Heirship Narrowly Passes Senate, UPI, May 29, 1984,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (providing views of Louisiana state sena-
tors on forced heirship issue). In 1984, opponents of the legitime sought to pass a consti-
tutional amendment that would allow the state legislature to abolish forced heirship. Id.
Opponents of forced heirship argued that testators should have the same freedom to disin-
herit children enjoyed by testators in the other 49 states. Id. Advocates for the legitime,
however, argued that forced heirship was needed now more than ever, since the likelihood
of a longer life combined with the increased chance of senility might cause parents to
take unjustified actions to disinherit their children. Id. They also noted the possibility that
blood relations might be passed over in favor of second families. Id.
The 1990 statute, which severely restricted forced heirship, also engendered contro-
versy. See Frances F. Marcus, Disinheritance Law Kindles Passion in Louisiana, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1989, at B7 (discussing 1990 statute). Some scholars believed that the
amended legitime, which for the first time permitted parents to disinherit an adult child
for no reason, would "tear at family ties, add fuel to the fire in family disputes and cre-
ate the potential of costly intrafamily litigation." Id. Cynthia Samuel, a law professor at
Tulane, stated that "[gireed, prejudice, jealousy, meanness and fear will henceforth have a
much freer hand in influencing a parent's testamentary plans." Id. She also noted that
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amended statute, the Louisiana legislature limited the class of
forced heirs principally to children who had not reached age twen-
ty-three at the death of the testator."6  In September of 1993,
however, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the 1989 and
1990 amendments and the limiting statute violated the state consti-
tution and restored the right of forced heirship to all children of a
testator."7
forced heirship "is an old legal institution that serves a new social purpose, guaranteeing
that kids don't get divorced from their inheritance when their parents get divorced from
each other." Id. Professor Glendon stated that "with about 50 percent of all marriages
ending in divorce, [the old forced heirship law] has become modem again because of the
changed circumstances." Id. Comparing the forced heirship law with the testamentary
freedom allowed in the other states, Professor Glendon noted that when a parent remarries
in other states, children from the first marriage "are apt not to see property that was
accumulated during that marriage . . . [The forced heirship law of] Louisiana enabled an
older person to say to the second spouse 'the law requires me to leave a portion of my
estate to my children."' Id.
It appears that many of those who supported abolition of forced heirship were "testa-
tors ... involved in some down-and-dirty family fight[s]." Id. (quoting a state representa-
tive in favor of continuing the forced heirship system). A former staff lawyer in the State
Attorney General's office who favored continuation of the old system stated that one
legislator had told her, "[t]his is my money, I made it and I can do what I want with
it." Id. Her reply was "[t]hey're your children and you made them too and they have a
claim." Id.
116. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1493 (West Supp. 1994). The class also included (a)
descendants of a predeceased child if the child would not have reached the age of 23 at
the time of the testator's death and (b) children of any age who were incapable of taking
care of themselves because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity. Id.
117. Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993). The court relied on the first
sentence of Article XII, § 5 of the 1974 Louisiana constitution, which provides that "[n]o
law shall abolish forced heirship." Lauga, 624 So. 2d at 1157. The court found that the
constitutional provision "guarantees the individual right of a child to an equal share of a
forced portion of his or her decedent's estate and maintains the correlative public principle
of equality of heirship, which furthers the goals of dispersion of wealth, family solidarity,
and reduction of litigation.' Id. at 1158. The court noted that by dividing children into
"eligible" and "ineligible" categories, the amended statute would lead to inequality of
treatment and likely breed litigation-exactly those things forced heirship was intended to
counter. Id. The majority did not address the question of whether the statute violated the
equal protection clause under the state constitution. See id. (stating that it was not neces-
sary to address the equal protection argument).
There were three dissenting opinions, all of which concluded that the majority erro-
neously interpreted the second sentence of Article II, § 5, which provides: "The determi-
nation of forced heirs, the amount of the forced portion, and the grounds for disinherison
shall be provided by law." Lauga, 624 So. 2d at 1183 (Marcus, J., dissenting); id. (Hall,
J., dissenting); id. at 1184 (Kimball, J., dissenting). Justice Kimball concluded the amend-
ed statute did not violate Article II, § 5 or Article I, § 3, the equal protection clause, of
the state constitution. Id. at 1197-1200. See also infra note 284 (discussing equal protec-
tion concerns regarding a legitime which discriminates based on age).
Note that Justice Kimball's lengthy dissent contains a valuable history of forced
heirship beginning with Roman law. See Lauga, 624 So. 2d at 1185-93 (discussing Ro-
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Under the Louisiana system, the forced heir cannot be de-
prived of the legitime, or fixed portion of his parent's estate, un-
less just cause for disinheritance exists."8 If only one child quali-
fies as a forced heir, then his legitime is twenty-five percent of his
parent's estate."9 If two or more forced heirs are living at their
parent's death, the legitime of the children is fifty percent.' Just
cause for disinheritance of a child otherwise entitled to a forced
share is defined in a fascinating statute."' Procedurally, the parent
man, French, and Spanish law). He presents persuasive historical arguments that the forced
heirship system Louisiana borrowed is not static, but rather is subject to change as society
changes. See id. at 1185-89.
118. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1494 (West. Supp. 1994).
119. Id. art. 1495. The parent's "donations" that are subject to the forced heirship provi-
sion include all property belonging to the testator at death and property disposed of by
certain gifts inter vivos. Id. art. 1505.
120. Id. art. 1495. It is possible that in some instances a child's intestate share would
be smaller than his forced share under Louisiana law. In those situations, the legitime is
to be calculated using the intestate fraction. Id.
121. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1621 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994). The statute lists twelve
"just causes" for disinheriting a child. Undoubtedly, some of them are largely relics. For
instance, if the child has refused to ransom a parent detained in captivity, just cause for
disinheritance of the child exists. Id. art. 1621(7). A child may also be disinherited if he
has attempted to take the parent's life, id. art 1621(3); has accused the parent of a capital
crime, id. art. 1621(4); was able but refused to provide sustenance to the parent, neglected
to take care of the parent who was insane, id. art. 1621(6); used violence or coercion to
prevent the parent from making a will; was convicted of a crime punishable by life im-
prisonment or death, id. art. 1621(11); was able but refused to provide security for a
parent to take the parent out of prison, id. art. 1621(9); or knew how but failed without
just cause to contact the parent for two years after attaining the age of majority (except
when on active duty in the U.S. military), id. art. 1621(12).
The statute potentially could justify disinheritance in a great number of cases. For
example, just cause also exists if the child has raised his or her hand to strike the parent
(although a mere threat to do so is not sufficient!). Id. art. 1621(1). Moreover, the child's
cruelty toward the parent is a reason to cut the child out of the parent's estate. Id. art.
1621(2). But in Succession of Landry, 463 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1985), these two
grounds were interpreted somewhat strictly. In Landry, the testatrix died 33 years after the
incident between her and her son Wilbert that gave rise to her attempt to disinherit him
in her will. Id. at 682-83. During a squabble with his testatrix/mother over the removal of
a refrigerator, Wilbert took a hatchet and threatened to chop up the refrigerator in front
of her. Id. at 683. There was conflicting testimony whether Wilbert had pushed or shoved
the testatrix during the fracas. Id. at 684. Noting that "[tihere is no right more sacred
than that of a forced heir to inherit his legitime," the court held that the conduct did not
constitute an attempt to strike his mother. Id. Nor were Wilbert's act and his subsequent
failure to speak to his mother for the 33 years preceding her death "cruelty" as contem-
plated in the statute, because "[a]n argument which results in prolonged indifference by
both parties cannot be characterized as 'cruelty' by one of the parties." Id. Note that
subsequently the legislature statutorily overruled Landry. See Succession of Pizzo, 557 So.
2d 388, 389 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (pointing out that under modem subparagraph 12 of
article 1621, if a child today fails without just cause to communicate with the parent for
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attempting to exclude a forced heir must express the reason for the
disinheritance in the will. Unless the disinherited heir proves
the stated just cause did not exist or that a reconciliation with the
testator-parent occurred after the act in question, the child is effec-
tively disinherited."
E. Judicial Discretion and Family Maintenance
1. England
Unlike civil law countries, which recognize both community
property and the legitime to protect family survivors, common law
countries traditionally attach great importance to testamentary free-
dom.' 2' At the very beginning of this century, however, New
Zealand became the first common law country to buck tradition by
enacting provisions allowing judicial awards to certain family mem-
bers disinherited or unprovided for by the testator." Almost four
a period of two years after attaining the age of majority, he can be disinherited), cert.
denied, 561 So. 2d 501 (La. 1990).
One final cause for disinheritance that is the subject of some older case law is the
marriage of a minor child without the consent of the parent. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN.
art. 1621(10) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994). See, e.g., Stephens v. Duckett, 36 So. 89, 90
(La. 1904) (quoting testator who partially disinherited his daughter "who so deeply grieved
and offended me by her elopement and marriage with Mr. J.D. Stephens against my con-
sent"); Successions of Bums, 27 So. 883, 884-85 (La. 1900) (upholding disinheritance of
son, although parents' wills were executed 17 years after minor son had married without
parental consent).
122. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1624 (West Supp. 1994). See also Stephens, 36 So.
at 90 (noting a will clause expressing intent to disinherit a child for marrying without
parental consent and testator's failure to mention child's minority did not prevent disinher-
itance).
123. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1624 (West Supp. 1994). Proof of reconciliation must be
clear and convincing, and evidenced in a writing signed by the testator. Id.
124. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing testamentary freedom); see
also Dainow, supra note 4, at 344 n.42 (noting that despite five centuries of testamentary
freedom in England prior to 1938, complete testamentary freedom in fact was not estab-
lished until the Wills Act of 1837, which removed limitations on dispositions of certain
land tenures excluded from the Statute of Wills of 1540).
125. In 1900, New Zealand abandoned absolute testamentary freedom in favor of a radi-
cally innovative system which ultimately served as the basis for current testate succession
laws in Australia, several of the Canadian provinces, and England. Testator's Family
Maintenance Act of 1900, N.Z. STAT., No. 20 (1900). See also Widows and Young
Children's Maintenance Act, 1906, Vicr. STAT., 6 Edw. 7, No. 2074; Testator's Family
Maintenance Act, 1920, BRrr. COL. STAT., 10 Geo. 5, ch. 94. For a discussion of the ori-
gins of New Zealand's laws concerning testamentary disposition, see Joseph Dainow, Re-
stricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, 36 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1107-
17 (1938). The Family Maintenance Act of 1900 avoided the forced heirship provisions of
civil law countries and generally allowed the testator freedom to dispose of his property
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decades later, England (the country from which our near reverence
for testamentary freedom originated) adopted provisions similar to
those of New Zealand." 6 One of the factors persuading Parlia-
ment to change course was its acknowledgment that very few
civilized countries still permitted the disinheritance of children and
other members of the immediate family. 7 Moreover, like New
Zealand, other countries within the commonwealth had increasingly
abandoned the notion that testamentary freedom should prevail over
the obligation to one's dependents.'28 The inheritance system that
originated in New Zealand and that has significantly diluted testa-
mentary freedom in commonwealth countries is commonly referred
to as testator's family maintenance. 9 The following textual dis-
as he wished. See id. at 1110-15 (providing examples and effects of the Act). Where,
however, the testator died without leaving adequate provision for the proper maintenance
and support of the testator's spouse or children, the court was given discretion to order
such provision from the estate of the testator as the court thought fit. See id. at 1110-12
(discussing Testator's Family Maintenance Act of 1900 and amendments). The legislative
history of the Act indicates its purpose was to ensure that a testator's dependents were
treated justly and to avoid unwarranted burdens upon the state where the testator's proper-
ty is left to others. 113 N.Z. PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES 502, 613-15 (1900), cited in
Dainow, supra, at 1109. Some jurisdictions subsequently adopting a family system similar
to that of New Zealand minimized the state's interest in avoiding indigent survivors. See,
e.g., In re Doogan, 23 S.R. (N.S.W.) 484, 409 W.N. 121 (1923) (noting that the New
South Wales statute was intended to benefit testator's dependents, not to relieve public
burden), cited in Dainow, supra, at 1121.
126. Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 45 (Eng.). See gener-
ally J. Unger, The hIheritance Act and The Family, 6 MOD. L. REv. 215, 224-27 (1943)
(reviewing early cases under the 1938 Act and concluding that they showed no decline in
family obligations but did hint at uncertainty of direction).
Dower, perhaps the most important protection against disinheritance at common law,
survived into the 20th century. The Dower Act of 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 105 (Eng.),
however, allowed a husband to extinguish his wife's right of dower; from that time until
the Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 45 (Eng.), the English
testator was essentially free to disinherit all members of his family. See 3 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 17, at 197 nn.4-5 (discussing Dower Act of 1833). The widow remained enti-
tled to dower after the 1833 Act, but (i) only to those estates to which the husband held
a beneficial interest at his death and (ii) only if he had not exercised his power to defeat
her right by deed or will. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 197; see also Keeton &
Gower, supra note 104, at 335-37 (history of dower to its abolition in 1925); see supra
notes 17-30 and accompanying text (discussing dower at common law). For several centu-
ries prior to 1939, the English testator had largely been free to disinherit his children. See
supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (discussing testators' rights from the 13th to
the 18th century).
127. Dainow, supra note 4, at 356.
128. See generally Dainow, supra note 125, at 1117, 1124-25 (discussing early 20th-
century abandonment of absolute testamentary freedom in Australia and Canada); see also
supra note 125 (noting that in 1900 New Zealand became the first common law country
to depart from traditional testamentary freedom).
129. This was the name of the original statutory scheme adopted in New Zealand in
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cussion focuses on the current English provisions, which are found
in the Inheritance (Provisions for Family and Dependents) Act
1975.130
Under Section 1 of the Act, a decedent's spouse"' or chil-
dren 32 may file a claim against the decedent's estate if the will
(or the law of intestacy) does not provide the survivor with a
"reasonable financial provision."' 3 This curtailment of testamenta-
ry freedom is only the beginning, however. Claims for reasonable
financial provision may also be made against the estate by any
person who was treated by the decedent as a child during any of
the decedent's marriages,"34 as well as by any person who was
being maintained in whole or in part by the decedent immediately
prior to the decedent's death. 13  Perhaps most unusual is the
1900. See supra note 125 (discussing New Zealand's laws on testamentary disposition).
130. Inheritance (Provisions for Family and Dependents) Act, 1975, ch. 63 (Eng.) (ef-
fective Apr. 1, 1976). When the English Law Commission sought to reform the original
1938 Inheritance Act, the commissioners considered and rejected both a fixed share sys-
tem and the community property concept and instead recommended an expansion of the
discretionary powers under the Act. See Richard R. Schaul-Yoder, Note, British Inheri-
tance Legislation: Discretionary Distribution at Death, 8 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
205, 212-13 (1985) (discussing the Law Commission's recommendation to give the court
discretionary power to ensure that the surviving spouse would receive at least the protec-
tion afforded a divorced spouse).
131. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, ch. 63, § l(l)(a)
(Eng.).
132. Id. § l(l)(c).
133. Id. § 1. The meaning of the term "reasonable financial provision" depends on the
relationship of the claimant to the decedent. In the case of the surviving spouse, the term
means the provision that would be reasonable in light of all circumstances, whether or not
the provision is required for maintenance of the spouse. Id. § ](2)(a). For all other appli-
cants, the term includes only that amount reasonable under the circumstances for main-
tenance. Id. § l(2)(b). See also J. Gareth Miller, Provision for a Surviving Spouse, 102
LAW Q. REv. 445, 473-74 (1986). The English system of "reasonable financial provision"
for the surviving spouse was based upon earlier provisions in English divorce law. Profes-
sor Miller concludes that a discretionary system operating under clear guidelines should be
able to perform the function of providing a reasonable financial provision for the surviv-
ing spouse better than a fixed system of inheritance. Discussing reasonable financial provi-
sion to the surviving spouse, he notes, however, that "[w]hat is needed ... is a clear
statement of objectives which draws attention to the need to achieve a division of capital
assets if appropriate in the circumstances of a particular case." Id. at 474.
Prior to the 1975 Act, all claims were limited to amounts needed for maintenance.
In its Working Paper which preceded the Inheritance Act 1975, the Law Commission
noted that women were disenchanted with the discretionary system and were demanding
definite property rights. THE LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER No. 42, 0.22 (1971),
cited in Schaul-Yoder, supra note 130, at 210-11.
134. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, ch. 63, § l(l)(d)
(Eng.).
135. Id. § l(l)(e). The decedent is deemed to have been maintaining a claimant under
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statute's provision that specifically permits a claim to be made by
the decedent's former spouse who has not remarried.
36
The Act effectively permits a judge not only to alter the testa-
mentary wishes of the decedent,1 37 but also to do so in a highly
§ l(l)(e) if he was providing a "substantial contribution" towards the claimant's reason-
able needs other than for full consideration. Id. § 1(3). See generally Suman Naresh,
Dependents' Application Under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act
1975, 96 LAW Q. REV. 534, 536-54 (1980) (discussing difficulties of determining whether
an applicant was being "maintained in whole or in part" under § l(l)(e)).
Concerning the New Zealand approach to spousal claims, an instructive case is Re
Sutton, 2 N.Z.L.R. 50 (C.A. 1980), in which the 40-year-old testator died leaving a wife
(against whom he had instituted divorce proceedings) and their four minor children. His
will left his current dwelling to his 20-year-old lover and cohabitant, with the residue of
his estate to go to his children equally upon reaching 21. The lover gave birth to the
testator's child after his death. The Court of Appeal noted the difficulty of administering
the Family Protection Act where parties with competing moral claims are vying over a
small estate. The court concluded:
[T]he fairest course, and the best that can be done towards satisfying the claim
of the plaintiff and her children in the light of the competing moral claims on
the testator's estate, is to divide the net estate into halves. As to one half the
widow should have the income for life, the capital to be divided equally be-
tween the children of her marriage with the testator. As to the other half, [the
lover] should receive thereout the sum of $3000 and the balance should be
held on trust for [the illegitimate child].
Id.
136. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, ch. 63, § l(l)(b)
(Eng.). Although the collective sense of obligation in the United States may have success-
fully limited testamentary freedom for the sake of the surviving spouse (and, indirectly,
minor children in traditional families), Americans seem unlikely to embrace a comprehen-
sive inheritance scheme which allows testamentary plans to be revised to benefit former
spouses. Cf. In re Estate of Rayman, 495 N.W.2d 241, 243-44 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). In
Rayman, Richard included his ex-wife Laura in his will. The couple subsequently remar-
ried only to divorce a second time. Although the provision for Laura in Richard's will
had not been changed, the court held that the bequest had been revoked upon the di-
vorce. Id. (noting split of authority on issue of revocation in these circumstances).
137. In re Mercer, I N.Z.L.R. 469 (1977), demonstrates the power of a New Zealand
court to deviate from the testator's will. In that case, the testator specifically disinherited
the wife from whom he had been separated for several years, noting that she had deserted
him and alienated the affection of his children. He also disinherited his two daughters
from the marriage, leaving everything instead to a cousin's wife because she had been
good to him.
The court noted two important questions to be addressed. First and most important,
"what provision [would] a just and wise husband and father ' . . . have thought it his
moral duty to make . . . had he been fully aware of all the relevant circumstances."' Id.
at 472. The court noted that fault of the applicant could be taken into consideration in
answering this question. In the instant case, however, the court found that fault lay pri-
marily with the testator. Second, the court must ask "what is the need for maintenance
and support in the case of the claimants before the court?" Id. at 473. The court stated
that the claimants need not be in necessitous circumstances to qualify for an order, al-
though the size of the estate must be considered before an order can be made. Id.
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discretionary manner. 3 Surprisingly lacking in the statute are
well-defined guidelines 39 to lend some element of certainty and
predictability to the outcome of a claimant's application against the
testator's estate."4' Also, an application under the English Act
must be made to and evaluated by a court. As a result, the costs
associated with an English applicant's claim 4' will generally be
greater than costs associated with a surviving spouse's claim in the
United States, since the latter claim is submitted to the estate exec-
utor.
142
The court concluded that in this scenario, a "wise and just husband and father"
would have regarded the circumstances in which the wife and daughters had lived and
further would have considered their expenses. Id. In light of the age and health of the
wife, the court concluded that the estate should be divided so that the widow received
two-fifths, the two daughters one-fifth each, and the beneficiary named in the will the re-
maining one-fifth. Id.
138. See, e.g., Re Christie, 1 All E.R. 546, 550-52 (Ch. 1979) (transferring residuary
property left equally to son & daughter solely to applicant son). For an excellent discus-
sion of finding the proper balance of fixed rules and discretion, see generally Mary Ann
Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law,
60 TUL. L. REv. 1165, 1165-68 (1986) (noting that property law is characterized by fixed
rules, family law by discretion-where the two meet at death or divorce the optimal bal-
ance between rules and discretion is difficult to maintain). Professor Glendon, voicing the
view of most American commentators, states that "it is far from clear that a system that
permits redistribution of decedents' estates according to a judge's own notion of what is
reasonable is preferable to either free testation or forced heirship" Id. at 1186. She notes
further that family allowance provisions found in most states already permit judges to
make discretionary support allowances to meet the needs of the surviving spouse and
children during estate administration. Id. at 1189.
139. Lack of guidance for courts was one of the unsuccessful objections raised to the
Inheritance Act of 1938. See Dainow, supra note 4, at 355-56.
140. Even when an application under the Inheritance Act 1975 on its face appears likely
to succeed, the amount of the award cannot be predicted with accuracy. Moreover, the
order of abatement of legacies under the will against which the award will be made can-
not be foretold. Rather, the judge's discretion permeates all phases of the decision. See,
e.g., Malone v. Harrison, 1 W.L.R. 1353 (Fam. Div'l Ct. 1979) (determining reasonable
financial provision to one of testator's mistresses and reducing legacy to testator's broth-
er).
141. Historically, costs in most English probate actions were paid out of the estate. This
is in contrast to the general English law, under which the losing party may be ordered to
pay costs for both sides. See Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 868-70
(1929) (noting that English probate law required estate to pay costs). In Re Fullard, 2 All
E.R. 796 (C.A. 1981), however, the court noted that judges should look closely at merits
of an application before ordering the estate to pay costs when the applicant is unsuccess-
ful. This is especially true concerning a small estate. Thus there may be some
disincentive to bringing baseless claims under the Act.
142. See, e.g., Jelley v. Iliffe, 2 All E.R. 29 (C.A. 1981) (repeatedly expressing con-
cers over litigation costs on small estate in doubtful claim by brother-in-law against
testator's estate); Re Coventry, 3 All E.R. 815 (C.A. 1979) (it was "little short of disas-
trous that the plaintiff was advised to contest" in light of the small estate involved). See
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When a surviving spouse files a claim under the Act, the
court is to consider the provision she would likely have received if
the marriage *had ended by divorce at the time of the testator's
death. 4 3 If such a provision were to be adopted in American ju-
also Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 308 (suggesting that the cost of individual
determinations may be too high to justify adoption of discretionary system in the United
States).
143. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, ch. 63, § 3(2) (Eng.).
Under § 3(2) of the Act, the court is also to consider the age of the applicant and the
duration of the marriage as well as the applicant's contribution to the welfare of the
decedent's family, including looking after the home and caring for the family. Id.
§ 3(2)(a) & (b). See also Miller, supra note 133, at 447-48. Although the English Law
Commission was attracted to a fixed inheritance concept, it ultimately decided to use a
discretionary system in which
[s]o far as is practicable in the differing circumstances, the claim of the surviv-
ing spouse upon the family assets should be at least equal to that of a di-
vorced spouse, and the court's powers to order family provision for a surviving
spouse should be as wide as its powers to order financial provision on di-
vorce ....
[We now propose criteria which would enable the court to adopt an
approach similar to that adopted in divorce proceedings and to recognize that a
surviving spouse may be entitled to a share of the family assets by virtue of
contributions to the welfare of the family ....
Id. at 448, 454 (emphasis omitted) (quoting THE LAW COMMISSION, SECOND REPORT ON
FAMILY PROPERTY: FAMILY PROVISION ON DEATH, Law Com. No. 61, 1 2(b), 33
(1974)).
Difficulties arise "from the need to apply to relatively straightforward family circum-
stances the sophisticated machinery of the 1975 Act, which combines elements of fact-
finding, discretion and hypothesis in a formula of some elaboration." Moody v. Stevenson,
2 All E.R. 524 (C.A. 1992) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file). The Moody court noted
that the English succession act beginning in 1938 had increasingly reduced the testamenta-
ry freedom "cherished for many years in England and Wales." Id. It further noted that
the test of reasonableness as to the testator's provision is to be determined objectively
under the 1975 Act. With regard to application by surviving spouses, the court stated as
follows:
In other words the 1975 Act, when stripped down to its barest terms, amounts
to a direction to the judge to ask himself in surviving spouse cases: "What
would a family judge have ordered for this couple if divorce instead of death
had divided them; what is the effect of any other section 3 factors of which I
have not taken account already in answering that question; and what, in the
light of those two inquiries, am I to make of the reasonableness, when viewed
objectively, of the dispositions made by the will and/or intestacy of the de-
ceased?" If the judge finds those dispositions unreasonable, he will go on to
ask himself: "What, in the light of those same inquiries, would be a reasonable
provision for me to order for the applicant under section 2?"
Id. The court noted that the widower/applicant in question was 81 years old; the decedent
was 86. His assets were 6000 pounds and hers included 1000 pounds and the matrimonial
home. They had been married for 17 years, although during the last four she had been in
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risdictions, courts presumably would apply the principles of equita-
ble distribution to the surviving spouse's claim.'" The law of eq-
uitable distribution, however, is notorious in its unpredictability of
application'45 and certainly has not met with universal satisfaction
in the United States.'"
a nursing home. They had no children, but she had a middle-aged stepdaughter from a
prior marriage living on her own. The applicant's contribution to the welfare of the fami-
ly was only his limited earnings for four years immediately following the wedding. In
view of these factors, the court concluded that if the parties had obtained a divorce under
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, "a family judge would in our view be most unlikely to
regard the case as one for refusing financial relief to the husband altogether." Id. The
court projected that the probable outcome would be to grant the husband a right of occu-
pancy in the matrimonial home so long as he was willing and able to use it, and that a
part of the husband's 6000 pounds should be used to provide some comforts for the wife
in the nursing home. Moreover, the decedent had no moral obligations or responsibilities
to the stepdaughter, even though the stepdaughter admittedly had limited financial resourc-
es. Id.
The court proposed two possible solutions. First, the applicant might be given a right
of occupancy in return for an obligation on his part to keep the property in good repair.
Second, and alternatively, the applicant might be required to pay a sum of money to the
stepdaughter to discharge his present and future obligations to repair and maintain the
property. In either case, the applicant would have to expend some of his 6000 pounds in
savings, which the court believed would be in the spirit of the 1975 Act: achieving re-
suits similar to those that would have occurred had the marriage ended by divorce. Upon
further inquiry, however, it appeared that the applicant in fact did not have 6000 pounds,
but was "wholly or virtually" without means. Id. The court stated that under such circum-
stances, the appropriate order was simply to direct settlement of the property enabling the
applicant to live there so long as he was willing and able. Id.
144. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing equitable distribution).
145. See Glendon, supra note 138, at 1168-85 (proposing a distinction between divorce
affecting minor children and other divorces, and suggesting in the former that a "children
first" principle should apply and be determined under a discretionary system supplemented
by guidelines to lend predictability to the process).
146. See, e.g., Max Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 WILLAMEwrE L. REV.
413, 431-34 (1976) (discussing fixed rules and judicial discretion and questioning whether
individual justice is worth the cost); see also Schaul-Yoder, supra note 130, at 231 (not-
ing claims that equitable distribution has produced litigant dissatisfaction, is costly eco-
nomically and judicially, and increases acrimony).
Although arbitrary elective share provisions may be of dubious value, the rise of no-
fault divorce and the discretionary system of equitable distribution has hardly been a boon
to women. See, e.g., LENORE J. WErrzMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 323
(1985) (noting that men experience 42% rise in standard of living in first year after di-
vorce; women and children experience 73% decline); James B. McLindon, Separate But
Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21 FAM. L. Q.
351, 391-95 (1987) (providing statistical evidence that in 1980s men emerged from di-
vorce in far better economic shape than did women and questioning whether the gap be-
tween them narrows in the years following divorce); see also Michael G. Heymann,
Goodwill and the Ideal of Equality: Marital Property at the Crossroads, 31 J. FAM. L. 1,
2 (1992-93) (equal treatment of parties to divorce has not occurred despite passage of
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Under such a nebulous approach, cases involving spousal
claims have little or no precedential value;147 rather, each new
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Home-
maker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under
No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 67, 119 (1993) (asserting that under the rhetoric of equality
today's wife is "catapulted into financial independence, and probably financial ruin" upon
divorce).
American commentators on discretionary inheritance systems have frequently criticized
the analogous judicial discretion characteristic of equitable distribution. See, e.g., Glendon,
supra note 138, at 1186-91 (stating that most defects in the American family protection
systems can be cured without such judicial discretion); Langbein & Waggoner, supra note
6, at 314 (calling the effects of such judicial discretion a "terrible price" to pay for re-
form).
147. Predictability of result is one of the advantages of a forced share system. Cf.
Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 314 (discussing testator's family maintenance and
judicial discretion). Where. the forced share is determined solely as a fractional part of the
testator's estate, without regard to duration of the marriage or the survivor's own
wealth-as indeed it is in most common law states in the United States-one may ques-
tion whether predictability (or ease of administration) is being emphasized at the expense
of fairness.
On the other hand, the element of judicial discretion under the Inheritance Act 1975
is very large. Even the period for making an application against the estate is subject to
discretion of the court. Section 4 of the Act provides that "[a]n application for an order
under Section 2 of this Act shall not, except with the permission of the court, be made
after the end of the period of six months from the date on which representation with
respect to the estate of the deceased is first taken out." Inheritance (Provision for Family
and Dependents) Act, 1975, ch. 63, § 4 (Eng.) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Re Salmon, 3
All E.R. 532 (Ch. 1980) (noting that statute provides court with no guidelines as to what
considerations should apply); Escritt v. Escritt, 3 Fam. 280 (1981) (refusing to waive time
period for application made by widow three years after statutory six-month period had
expired where widow had full understanding of availability of claim within the six-month
period).
For those who fear this substantial element of discretion, the following passage from
Re Coventry, 2 All E.R. 408 (Ch. 1979) is both comforting and instructive:
It is not the purpose of the Act to provide legacies or rewards for meritorious
conduct. Subject to the court's powers under the 1975 Act and to fiscal de-
mands, an Englishman still remains at liberty at his death to dispose of his
own property in whatever way he pleases or, if he chooses to do so, to leave
that disposition to be regulated by the laws of intestate succession. In order to
enable the court to interfere with and reform those dispositions, it must . . . be
shown, not that the deceased acted unreasonably, but that, looked at objectively,
his disposition or lack of disposition produces an unreasonable result in that it
does not make any or any greater provision for the applicant and that means,
in the case of an applicant other than a spouse, for that applicant's mainte-
nance.
It clearly cannot be enough to say that the circumstances are such
that if the deceased had made a particular provision for the applicant, that
would not have been an unreasonable thing for him to do and therefore it now
ought to be done. The court has no carte blanche to reform the deceased's dis-
positions or those which statute makes of his estate to accord with what the
court itself might have thought would be sensible if it had been in the
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case turns on its singular facts. 4 Moreover, divorce and disinher-
itance are substantially different in numerous important ways. 49
Obviously and quite significantly, the divorce scenario involves two
living spouses. Often the deceased spouse will take to his grave
relevant information that only he and the survivor knew, and thus
no one can counter the evidence presented by the surviving spouse
in support of her application.'5 ° Although the Act presents a list
of considerations for determining whether non-spousal applicants
should receive maintenance from the estate, this list similarly fails
to provide a court with a tangible, structured formula that leads to
consistent results.' The list takes a common sense but very gen-
eral approach; the overarching inference one draws is that the court
deceased's position
Id. at 418.
148. However inconvenient this result may be for the attorney, scholar, or potential
applicant, an appropriately structured discretionary system potentially can best address the
needs of the individual family. When dealing with family struggles, the players will al-
ways perceive their circumstances as unique. See Miller, supra note 133, at 458 (noting
ability of discretionary system to address differences). But cf. Waggoner, supra note 72, at
726-29 (explaining conclusion of UPC drafters that modelling the elective share on equita-
ble distribution principles was quite unsatisfactory).
149. See Miller, supra note 133, at 456-59 (examining propriety of English system in
which court powers and standards in disinheritance cases were modeled on powers and
standards in divorce scenario). Professor Miller acknowledges that both death and divorce
situations may involve support obligations and property division. The differences in the
situations, however, may be greater than the similarities. Unlike the divorcee, for instance,
a decedent often has no possibility of future earnings which can be accumulated for chil-
dren or other natural objects of his bounty. Id.
150. Under a discretionary system a claimant must be allowed to present evidence ex-
trinsic to the will to establish his claim. The nature of the relationship between the appli-
cant and the testator must be explored even though the will itself is admittedly free from
ambiguity, equivocation, or mistake. Thus, in determining the propriety of an applicant's
claim under the English system, the decedent's oral and written statements are admissible.
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, ch. 63, § 21 (Eng.) (provid-
ing for admissibility in accordance with § 2 of the Civil Evidence-Act 1968). In America,
dead man's statutes, which prevent a claimant against the estate from initially testifying
about transactions with the decedent, could pose a conflict in some jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
hi re Estate of Lopata, 641 P.2d 952, 957 (Colo. 1982) (Quinn, J., dissenting) (criticizing
allocation of burden of proof combined with dead man's statute which provided "virtually
an insurmountable barrier" for surviving spouse who claimed elective share despite ante-
nuptial agreement); In re Estate of Stauffer, 476 A.2d 354, 356-57 (Pa. 1984) (stating that
purpose of dead man's act is to prevent injustice that might result from allowing surviv-
ing party to testify about transaction with decedent, which decedent's representative could
not refute; claimant not permitted to testify concerning conversation with decedent to
prove status of common law marriage).
151. See Glendon, supra note 138, at 1196 ("A list of factors with no indication of
relative weight and no over-arching guideline other than the vague admonition to be fair
is virtually the same as providing no factors.").
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may make such an award when it seems proper to do so.'52 What
one judge sees as a proper instance in which to make an award, of
course, may not appear to be so to another.'53 Because the out-
come of an applicant's claim against an estate cannot be reasonably
predicted, 54 there is little to discourage a prospective applicant
152. Some of the factors the court is to consider include the following:
(a) the financial resources and financial needs which the applicant has or
is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(b) the financial resources and financial needs which any other applicant
for an order under . . . this Act has or is likely to have in the
foreseeable future;
(c) the financial resources and financial needs which any beneficiary of
the estate of the deceased has or is likely to have in the foreseeable
future;
(d) any obligations and responsibilities which the deceased had towards
any applicant for an order . . . or towards any beneficiary of the
estate of the deceased;
(e) the size and nature of the net estate of the deceased;
(f) any physical or mental disability of any applicant . . . or any bene-
ficiary of the estate of the deceased;
(g) any other matter, including the conduct of the applicant or any other
person, which in the circumstances of the case the court may consid-
er relevant.
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, ch. 63, § 3(l)(a)-(g) (Eng.);
see also id. § 3(2), (3), (4) (listing additional factors that the court must consider).
153. Section 3 of the Act, which lists factors for the court to consider, does not speak
in terms of "moral" obligations. Id. Yet the implication exists and courts in some cases
under the Act have attempted to discern whether a moral obligation to the applicant ex-
isted. See, e.g., Re Coventry, 1 Ch. 461, 487-89 (1980) (although noting that moral obli-
gation is not mentioned under § l(1)(c), court nonetheless examined the facts and found
no such obligation to applicant existed; application denied); see also Joseph Laufer, Flexi-
ble Restraints on Testamentary Freedom-A Report on Decedents' Family Maintenance
Legislation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 277, 294-99 (1955) (courts under testator's family mainte-
nance systems view their task as correcting breaches of morality).
Commentators have suggested that the different judicial traditions in England and
America might make a discretionary system infeasible in the United States. See, e.g., Olin
L. Browder, Jr., Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States and England,
67 MICH. L. REv. 1303, 1307 (1969) (English provisions might prove objectionable in the
United States because administration would be vested in many local probate courts rather
than in a single court); Verner F. Chaffin, Protection of the Surviving Spouse, in 1977
COMP. PROBATE LAW STUDIES 187, 195-96 (1976) (vesting discretion in probate court
which is provided over by lay judge would be unwise). See also Langbein & Waggoner,
supra note 6, at 314 (stating that application of the English system in America is a
frightening thought and has no future here so long as American judicial selection prefers
politics over merits). Recognizing their need to be omniscient to reach a just result, pro-
bate judges themselves might be among the most vocal opponents of a discretionary sys-
tem in America. Cf. Re Joslin, 1 All E.R. 302, 305 (1941) (early case under 1938 Act
noting the extreme difficulty judge has in properly exercising discretion); Schaul-Yoder,
supra note 130, at 209 (judges in early cases under Inheritance Act 1938 protested diffi-
culty of their task).
154. See Jelley v. Iliffe, 2 All E.R. 29 (C.A. 1981) (noting difficulty in determining
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with a weak claim from bringing suit under the Act.'55 Even
when it appears that an applicant has a well-grounded claim for
maintenance against the estate, neither the applicant nor the testa-
mentary beneficiaries can accurately foretell what a court's "reason-
able financial provision" to the applicant will be. 5 ' The conduct
of the applicant and others is also a factor to be considered in
determining whether to grant an applicant's claim. Thus, an enor-
mous amount of a family's dirty laundry may be brought before
the court.'57
The traditional reason given for making a will-to ensure the
passing of the testator's estate as he wishes-withers under the sys-
whether decedent was "maintaining" her brother-in-law applicant under § 1(1)(e) at her
death). The opinion discourages litigation in small estates, noting that where a small estate
is involved, litigation costs may make a viable claim irrelevant.
155. Under the Inheritance Act 1975, even antenuptial or post-nuptial agreements entered
into by a testator may be varied by the court on behalf of an applicant. See Inheritance
(Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, ch. 63, § 2(1)(t) (Eng.). It is possible
to contract out of the Act, however, through a divorce decree. See id. § 15.
Opponents of the Inheritance Act 1938 unsuccessfully claimed that an endless stream
of applications could be predicted under the Act and would thereby forestall the winding
up of estates. See Dainow, supra note 4, at 355-56. Indeed, one criticism of New
Zealand's original discretionary act was that such an act would provide "food for law-
yers:' Dainow, supra note 125, at 1108. The fear that the discretionary sys-
tems-particularly after the broadening of the categories of potential applicants under the
Inheritance Act 1975-would breed litigation appears unfounded in light of the numbers
of reported cases. As of 1985, fewer than 40 reported cases appeared under the Inheri-
tance Act 1975. A similarly small number of cases appeared in the years immediately
following the enactment of the Inheritance Act 1938. Schaul-Yoder, supra note 130, at
220 n.182 (noting that less than 40 cases were decided under the Act from 1976 to
1985). One commentator has noted that English courts may be effectively withholding
standing where an applicant cannot show that the decedent assumed responsibility for him
or owed him a moral obligation. Id. at 225-26 (citation omitted).
156. But cf. id. at 220-28 (noting that judiciary has discouraged applications by empha-
sizing continued importance of testamentary freedom, the privacy of family matters, and
costs of litigation to small estates).
157. See, e.g., Re Collins, 2 All E.R. 47 (1990) (discussing details of decedent's unfor-
tunate marriage and her illegitimate child's life in opinion granting award to child). In
considering whether to adopt a system involving discretionary awards against a testator's
wishes, the English lawmakers realized that such a system would sometimes lead to em-
barrassing revelations about the family involved. See Dainow, supra note 4, at 346 (noting
concern that greeted early discretionary proposals in House of Lords); Schaul-Yoder, supra
note 130, at 225-26 (noting fear that Inheritance Act 1975 would lead to monumental
family squabbles). Of course the airing of family linen in public is characteristic of many
family lawsuits. Under a system of fixed rules, however, the testator's family survivors
(other than the surviving spouse) who are unhappy with their bequest or devise must
nonetheless accept or renounce it. Only if the traditional, limited grounds for a will con-
test exist is the disgruntled survivor likely to be able to use the court to antagonize or
embarrass other family members or will beneficiaries.
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tem of testator's family maintenance. The testator knows that his
will may be effectively rewritten by the courts, despite his testa-
mentary capacity and his clearly expressed intent in the document
itself. Although the English courts have stated that theirs is not the
prerogative to ignore or refashion the testator's will in general,'
the testator can seldom if ever be certain that his last will and tes-
tament will be honored upon his death.'59
The judicial discretion afforded by the testator's family main-
tenance system is the modern commonwealth remedy to the diffi-
cult problem of balancing testamentary freedom with moral obliga-
tion to protect and provide for one's spouse and children,"
among others. 6t  As scholars have pointed out,6 2 however, un-
158. See supra note 147 (quoting Re Coventry, 2 All E.R. 408 (Ch. 1979)). See also
Schaul-Yoder, supra note 130, at 221-25 (discussing the continuing importance of freedom
of testation even under the Inheritance Act 1975 and noting that courts are unlikely to
disregard testator's will except where the estate is large, the named beneficiaries are not
needy, or the will did not conform to testator's true intent).
159. See, e.g., Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 314 (noting statement by Aus-
tralian justice concerning the lack of certainty that will provisions will be upheld under
discretionary system); see infra note 161 (testator's will effectively rewritten to include
testator's grandchildren in residuary clause, although the testator had intentionally excluded
their father as a residuary legatee).
160. For example, in Re J, (C.A. 1991) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file), the testator
left his estate of 30,000 pounds to his second wife and their child. His teenaged daughter
from a prior marriage applied for a provision under the 1975 Act. In a two-step process,
the court first concluded that there was not a reasonable financial provision for the teen-
ager under the will. Second, the court determined the amount to be awarded the teenager.
The court noted as follows:
[Allthough in any given case there may be no single figure which it can be
said represents a reasonable financial provision for the applicant, there will be a
bracket below which it can be said that the disposition of the estate does not
make reasonable financial provision for the applicant and above which it can be
said that the disposition makes financial provision for the applicant which ex-
ceeds that which is reasonable. The court, in exercising its powers to make an
order, cannot exceed the upper limit.
Id. After discussing factors under § 3 which are to be considered by the court in exer-
cising its powers under § 2, the court concluded that 5000 pounds was the maximum
reasonable financial provision for the teenager. Id.
161. In Re Horton, I N.Z.L.R. 251 (C.A. 1976), the testator died leaving as survivors
his second wife, two adult unmarried children from his second marriage, and an adult
son, Brian, from his first marriage. Brian was not included as a residuary legatee under
the will because the testator felt he had assisted Brian sufficiently during his lifetime.
Brian, who had not fared well financially, had a wife and two teenage children, and it
appeared unlikely that he would be able to help provide for their future. Id.
Brian's children themselves made a claim under the Act. The court noted that histor-
ically it had not been easy for a grandchild to establish a breach of moral duty on the
part of the testator-particularly where the grandchild's parent was still living or when the
grandchild was claiming against another child who had a family of his own to support.
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guided and. unprincipled use of judicial discretion can lead to re-
suits as arbitrary and unsatisfactory as those under a system of
fixed rules applied unswervingly to everyone.'63 Moreover, the
concept of testamentary freedom remains more important in the
United States than in other countries."6 Americans probably
would object strenuously to efforts to implement a "redistribution"
system, such as family maintenance, in the absence of very well-
defined, restrictive guidelines to temper judicial discretion.
2. The United States
Although the pervasive discretion characteristic of testator's
Id. The court concluded that here, however, "a wise and just testator would have regarded
himself as owing some moral duty to these grandchildren." Id. The court noted that the
testator's estate was large enough to provide for his two children from the second mar-
riage and also satisfy such other moral claims against his estate. The court thus awarded
each of the two grandchildren a one-sixth interest in the residue, contingent on surviving
the widow. (The court noted that interests in remainder would not likely help with the
education or start in life for the grandchildren, but further noted that proper maintenance
and support is not necessarily confined to those purposes.) Id.
162. American commentators have repeatedly objected to the discretionary nature of the
family maintenance system. See supra note 153 (expressing the negative view of several
scholars to a discretionary approach). One commentator has noted that it would be partic-
ularly unwise to employ such a discretionary system in jurisdictions where probate judges
are not required to have legal training. Verer F. Chaffin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth
Transmission Process: The Surviving Spouse, Year's Support and Intestate Succession, 10
GA. L. REv. 447, 462-63 (1976). But cf. Rein, supra note 102, at 53-56 (noting that
Washington probate judges are highly trained and experienced and could properly exercise
discretionary powers; that feared increases in litigation have not been experienced in actual
experience; and that testamentary freedom of the reasonable man would not be disturbed).
163. Of course Parliament was not unaware of the problems with judicial discretion
when it adopted the Inheritance Act 1938. In considering whether to depart from the
long-established principle of testamentary freedom, the Law Lords in 1928 opined that
judges were not sufficiently capable and wise to be permitted the use of discretion in re-
solving complicated family matters involving a testator's estate. Dainow, supra note 4, at
345 n.48.
164. The evolution of English inheritance law demonstrates, however, that commitment
to testamentary freedom can change over time. Until the passage of the 1938 Act, abso-
lute testamentary freedom had long been the rule in England. When the argument for
testamentary freedom was made in the House of Commons during the English consider-
ation of the disinheritance problem, the response was that "private limitation [is] the con-
sequence of nearly all legislation, which must look toward the general good rather than
the individual inconvenience." Dainow, supra note 4, at 355; see also infra note 287
(some commentators have questioned whether continued American emphasis on testamenta-
ry freedom results from true belief in its value or instead from mere legislative inertia).
165. Although the family maintenance system is characterized by discretion, some com-
mentators have noted that this has not been a problem. See, e.g., Dainow, supra note
125, at 1111. Thirty-eight years after the passage of the initial family maintenance bill,
Dainow noted that "general principles of construction have been consistent, and despite
the extreme latitude of the court's discretion, the decisions have not been conflicting." Id.
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family maintenance perhaps makes the system infeasible for use in
America," probate courts in the United States already possess
discretionary power to deviate from a testator's will under current
family allowance statutes. The allowance, however, originated as a
means of providing the widow and minor children temporary shel-
ter and sustenance while dower was being assigned after the death
of the husband. 67 Thus, unlike testator's family maintenance, the
allowance provides only short-term, limited protection.
Modem allowance provisions in America vary significant-
ly. "'68 In some jurisdictions, the allowance is a one-time award for
166. See supra note 153 (comparing different judicial traditions in England and Ameri-
ca).
167. See ATKINSON, supra note 4, at 128-29 (tracing origins of family allowance back
to Magna Carta's mention of quarantine of dower, which permitted widow to occupy
husband's principal house for 40 days after his death); cf. Haskins, supra note 17, § 5.44
(noting that modem quarantine is separate and distinct from family allowance).
168. Most states have a family allowance provision which inures primarily to the benefit
of the surviving spouse, although often an award may also be made on behalf of minor
children. See, e.g., 1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-404, 8 U.L.A. 101 (Supp. 1994) ("sur-
viving spouse and minor children whom the decedent was obligated to support and chil-
dren who were in fact being supported by the decedent are entitled to a reasonable allow-
ance in money out of the estate for their maintenance during the period of administra-
tion"); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6540-6545 (West 1994) (reasonable family allowance neces-
sary for maintenance; potential recipients include surviving spouse, minor children, adult
children physically or mentally incapacitated and dependent upon the decedent for support;
other adult children dependent upon decedent; a parent dependent upon decedent); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-403(2) (Supp. 1993) (reasonable allowance not less than $1500 nor
more than $25,000); R.I. GEN. LAws § 33-10-3 (1956) (reasonable allowance for support
of family for six months with a possible extension for another six months; realty may be
sold to provide the amount of allowance decreed); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-2-102 (Supp.
1994) (reasonable allowance for survivor's maintenance for one year after death of
spouse). See also In re Estate of Lawson, 721 P.2d 760, 762 (Mont. 1986) (purpose of
family allowance is to ensure that surviving spouse is not left penniless and abandoned);
Chaffin, suspra note 162, at 476-90 (reviewing family support provisions and noting pro-
tection afforded by Georgia's statute). At least in small estates, the entire estate may
frequently be awarded to the surviving spouse to meet her needs during the period of
estate administration or during such other period as defined in the statute. See, e.g., OR.
REV. STAT. § 114.085 (1993) (court may order entire estate set apart for support of
spouse and dependent children). See also Hall v. Jeffers, 795 S.W.2d 135, 137-38 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1990) (stating that purpose of Tennessee statute is to maintain surviving spouse
while he or she adjusts to decrease in standard of living resulting from death of dece-
dent).
Unlike the common law forced share, the family allowance in many states is not
automatically granted upon request. See, e.g., Estate of Welch, 797 S.W.2d 742, 747-48
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (surviving spouse failed to present substantial evidence to support
her application for $12,000 as maintenance). Instead, the amount of the allowance is ordi-
narily within the discretion of the court. See, e.g., In re Estate of Bowman, 609 P.2d
663, 668 (Idaho 1980) (stating factors that court considers in making discretionary allow-
ance award); Hall, 795 S.W.2d at 137 (noting that legislature intended widow to receive
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a fixed period, usually not exceeding one year.69 In other juris-
dictions, the award may be renewed if the estate has not been
closed by the end of the period for which the original award was
made. 7 The amount of the award is typically at the probate
court's discretion, although some states impose a statutory maxi-
mum."' Some jurisdictions also provide that the allowance should
reflect the spouse's standard of living prior to the decedent's death,
taking into consideration the condition of the estate.""
The family allowance award may occasionally result in the
abatement of some legacies in the testator's will. Nonetheless, the
allowance normally does not infringe unduly upon testamentary
freedom.'73  Many courts appear to award generous
allowances;"4 however, the award is not intended as a substitute
for the long-term protection afforded to disinherited spouses by
dower or the elective share. The most liberal of family allowances
will seldom, if ever, be sufficient to provide protection over a
substantial period of time to disinherited spouses or minor children.
Even so, in very small estates the family allowance award in con-
junction with a homestead allowance'75 and exempt personal
liberal allowance). At least in some jurisdictions, however, an eligible surviving spouse or
minor child is automatically entitled to a fixed allowance. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-101
(1981) (surviving spouse entitled to $10,000 allowance from personal estate of decedent);
In re Estate of Burton, 541 A.2d 599, 604 (D.C. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing allowance
provision and noting that proceeds from court-ordered sale of decedent's realty are a part
of decedent's estate from which allowance may be satisfied).
169. See supra note 168 (citing examples).
170. See infra note 181 (discussing Georgia allowance statute).
171. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-403(2) (Supp. 1993) (maximum allowance of
$25,000).
172. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-2-102(a) (Supp. 1993) (stating that the court may
consider the "totality of the circumstances" including the surviving spouse's previous stan-
dard of living and the condition of the estate in setting the allowance award).
173. See ATKiNSON, supra note 4, at 134 (noting that allowances generally are not set
at such a high figure that they will significantly disrupt testamentary plans).
174. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
374 (4th ed. 1990) (noting that reported case law indicates that courts tend to be gen-
erous in awarding family allowance); Chaffin, supra note 162, at 476-90 (discussing
courts' treatment of the Georgia provision).
175. Homestead awards or allowances, like the family allowance, vary significantly from
state to state. Cf 1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-402, 8 U.L.A. 96 (Supp. 1993) (recom-
mending homestead allowance of $15,000); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6520-6528 (West 1991)
(providing for the most appropriate property available not beyond the lifetime of the sur-
viving spouse, preference being given to community and quasi-community property rather
than separate property); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-401 (Supp. 1993) (limiting the allowance
"to the extent of 160 acres"). See generally 2A RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY I 263[9][b] (Patrick J. Rohan, rev. ed. 1993) (discussing various homestead
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property'76 may leave little or nothing in the estate to be distrib-
uted pursuant to the will.
F. Permitting Spousal Disinheritance
Of the forty-one common law jurisdictions in the United
States, Georgia employs the most unusual approach to spousal
disinheritance.'77 Georgia alone affords the surviving spouse no
provisions upon death of head of household); Carolyn S. Bratt, Family Protection Under
Kentucky's Inheritance Laws: Is the Family Really Protected?, 76 KY. L.J. 387, 391-92
(1987-88) (discussing the history of homestead in the United States). The homestead
award is discretionary with the court in at least some states. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR.
El AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 105-06 (1988) (discussing homestead provisions in
several states); George L. Haskins, Homestead Rights of a Surviving Spouse, 37 IOWA L.
REV. 36, 36-56 (1951) (comparing homestead rights among jurisdictions).
176. See, e.g., 1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-403, 8 U.L.A. 98 (Supp. 1993) (surviving
spouse or children are entitled to a value, not exceeding $10,000 in excess of security
interests therein, in household furniture, automobiles, furnishing, appliances, and personal
effects); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6510 (West 1993) (court has discretion to set apart "all or
any part of the property of the decedent exempt from enforcement of a money judgment,
other than the family dwelling," to surviving spouse or minor children); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-403(1) (Supp. 1993) (wearing apparel, family library, pictures, musical instruments,
furniture and household goods, utensils and implements used in the home, one automobile,
and provisions and fuel on hand necessary for the support of the spouse and minor chil-
dren for one year); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-10-1 (1956) (wearing apparel, household effects,
supplies, and other personal property exempt from attachment by law as probate court
deems necessary); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-401 (Law. Co-op 1976 & Supp. 1993) (not to
exceed $5,000 in excess of any security interests therein in household furniture, automo-
biles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects). See also Estate of Welch, 797 S.W.2d
742, 746-47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (statute providing surviving spouse with right to certain
household effects and food was to provide temporary support). What property falls within
such statutes may not always be easy to determine in the absence of explicit statutory di-
rection or case law. In Welch, for instance, a picnic table and lawn chairs were consid-
ered to be household effects while a lawn mower was not. Id. at 747. See generally
PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 151-54 (1987)
(discussing exempt property as well as family allowance and homestead).
177. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-9 (1982) (expressly allowing disposition of testator's
entire estate to strangers); Hood v. First Nat'l Bank, 133 S.E.2d 19, 21 (Ga. 1963) (con-
struing mortmain provision and noting that moral duty is irrelevant where statute expressly
allows disinheritance of spouse and children); see also Chaffin, supra note 162, at 469
(stating "[w]hen all the factors are considered . . . it is difficult to make a compelling
case in favor of the notion that a person should not be permitted to cut his spouse out
of his will"). But see Peter H. Strott, Note, Preventing Spousal Disinheritance in Georgia,
19 GA. L. REV. 427, 427-57 (1985) (arguing that equitable distribution concept should be
extended to Georgia probate law). As discussed previously, elective share statutes are
generally deemed unnecessary in community property states. See supra notes 44-48 and
accompanying text.
Georgia is not the only state ever to have allowed disinheritance of the surviving
spouse. See supra note 16 (noting that for most of this century, North Dakota and South
Dakota gave no protection to the disinherited widow or widower); see also Cahn, supra
note 5, at 141 (1936 article noting that five states in the West and Southwest provided
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protection in the form of dower17 1 or a forced share.7 9 Unlike
his counterparts in the other common law states, a Georgia testator
who bequeaths his estate to someone other than his spouse may
rest in peace concerning the substantial fulfillment of his testamen-
tary wishes. His widow will have no right to assert a claim to any
fixed fraction or percentage of his estate.' A properly executed
disinheritance is effective in Georgia despite the testator's wealth,
the duration of the marriage, or the need of the family members
the testator leaves behind. Of the various approaches to willmaking
taken in common law states, Georgia's thus comes closest to being
one of absolute testamentary freedom for the married testator. Even
in Georgia, however, complete freedom to disinherit the family
does not exist. Like most jurisdictions, Georgia provides short-term
protection to the surviving spouse and minor children through an
allowance from the estate of the deceased spouse.'
no protection to the surviving widow at that time).
178. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-1-1 (1982) (abolishing right of dower).
179. See supra note 177.
180. When a Georgia testator does leave his estate entirely to someone other than his
spouse and children, however, the will is subject to close scrutiny. Jn such cases, "upon
the slightest evidence of aberration of intellect, or collusion, or fraud, or any undue influ-
ence or unfair dealing, probate should be refused." GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-9 (1982).
Georgia courts have stressed the use of the adjectival superlative-slightest evidence-to
prevent probate of a will entirely disinheriting the testator's spouse and children when
even "very slight" evidence casting doubt on the will appears. See Bowman v. Bowman,
55 S.E.2d 298, 308 (Ga. 1949); Deans v. Deans, 156 S.E. 691, 699 (Ga. 1931). But the
provision will not protect the disinherited spouse and children in the absence of at least
some evidence of one of the problems specified in the statute. See, e.g., Crawford v.
Crawford, 128 S.E.2d 53, 55-56 (Ga. 1962).
Moreover, the close scrutiny contemplated by the statute is only available when the
testator's entire estate has been devised or bequeathed to strangers. In Beman v.
Stembridge, 85 S.E.2d 434, 439 (Ga. 1955), the testator provided his widow with one
dollar because of his "unqualified belief that she married me for what she hoped to get
out of the marriage in a financial way." The court did not apply the close scrutiny of the
statute because the widow was not altogether excluded from testator's estate. Id.
181. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-1 (1982). See supra notes 167-76 and accompanying text
(discussing the limited usefulness of the family allowance as a long-term protection pro-
vision). The allowance is a concept distinct from and typically much more limited than
that of dower or the elective share. Although the Georgia allowance statute referred only
to widows until 1979, an amendment in that year removed the gender classification so
that the statute now applies to widowers as well. See Adams v. Adams, 291 S.E.2d 518,
520 (Ga. 1982) (determining that year's support statute as amended is not-unconstitution-
al).
The Georgia year's support allowance is also available to the testator's minor
children. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-2(b) (Supp. 1993). Moreover, where the decedent dies
leaving minor children by a former spouse, the probate court is to specify those properties
set apart for the children by that former spouse. See id. § 53-5-9. See also James C.
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Rehberg, Recent Year's Support Decisions, 3 GA. B. J. 427 (1967) (discussing usefulness
of year's support statute and examining related case law).
The amount awarded under the Georgia statute is discretionary with the court. The
Georgia Supreme Court has stated, however, that the award must bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the actual needs of the applicant. See Young v. Ellis, 301 S.E.2d 271, 272
(Ga. 1983). Although the statute provides that the family is entitled to a minimum sum of
$1600, there is no cap on the amount that can be awarded to the surviving spouse and
minor children of the testator. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-2(b) (1982). The applicant for
the year's support has the burden of proving the amount necessary. The statute also pro-
vides that the amount should be sufficient to maintain the standard of living the applicant
had prior to the death of the testator, taking into account the support available to the
applicant from other sources, from his or her own estate, and from his or her own earn-
ing capacity. Id. § 53-5-2(c)(1). In determining the amount of its award, the court is also
to consider "other relevant criteria" as it deems equitable and proper. Id. § 53-5-2(c)(2).
See also James C. Rehberg, Wills, Trusts, and Administration of Estates, 38 MERCER
L. REv. 417, 419 (1986) (discussing Georgia's support statute).
Since the year's support is often the sole protection for the disinherited surviving
spouse and minor children under Georgia law, its importance to them is obvious. To
claim the year's support, the surviving spouse must present the court with a schedule of
property or a statement of the amount of money-or both-she seeks to have set aside
for her support. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-6 (Supp. 1993). Upon receipt of the application,
notice is published. Id. § 53-5-8(b) (Supp. 1993). If all goes well for the applicant, the
court sets aside a year's award from the decedent's estate sufficient to maintain the
applicant's standard of living prior to the testator's death. Id. § 53-5-2(c).
If the testator bequeaths or devises property to the spouse in lieu of her year's
support, then the survivor must make an election. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-5 (1982). The
surviving spouse will not be required to elect between the will and the year's support un-
less it is clear that the will provisions were intended to be in lieu of the year's support.
See Young v. Ellis, 301 S.E.2d 271, 272 (Ga. 1983) (widow not required to elect be-
tween legacy and year's support where court could not discern "manifest implication" of
will requiring election). See also Strickland v. Miles, 205 S.E.2d 880, 882 (Ga. Ct. App.
1974) (devise of personalty and life estate in realty did not preclude year's support to
widow); Studstill v. Studstill, 204 S.E.2d 496, 497-98 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974) (testator de-
vised residue equally between current and former spouse; current spouse allowed to seek
year's support because will did not expressly require election).
When administration of the estate lasts beyond one year, the surviving spouse may
petition for support in each additional year the estate is kept together, if creditors have
been given proper notice and there are assets adequate to pay both the additional support
and all known unpaid debts and claims against the estate. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-5-4
(1982). See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 390 S.E.2d 892, 894 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (widow not
entitled to award for subsequent years; award of $10,000 was not an abuse of discretion
in light of widow's income and social security benefits). See also Wolters v. Kennedy,
355 S.E.2d 665, 666 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (application for second year's support denied
where estate had outstanding obligations for probate court costs, legal advertisements, fu-
neral expenses, and attorney fees); Kitties v. Kitties, 352 S.E.2d 649, 650 (Ga. Ct. App.
1987) (executors cannot avoid paying support in subsequent years by deliberately and
intentionally failing to satisfy debts against the estate solely to defeat statute). The disin-
herited survivors may therefore hope for a protracted period of administration, because
there is no elective share or dower to provide them with long-term protection. But see id.
(noting that widow cannot recover support in subsequent years if the estate is kept togeth-
er as a result of her conduct or connivance).
For criticism of the Georgia approach, see Strott, supra note 177, at 427, 441-48
DISINHERITANCE AND THE MODERN FAMILY
I. NEED AND OBLIGATION IN THE MODERN FAMILY
If the American laws regarding disinheritance are to be
changed, questions of fundamental policy must be considered anew:
Who, if anyone, in the modem family should be protected from
disinheritance? Should such protection be based solely on status
rather than need, as is the case with most spousal forced share
provisions currently in use?' If children deserve direct protection
from disinheritance, how should the state balance their interests
with the decedent's long-established privilege of testamentary free-
dom? The ensuing discussion focuses first on the relationship of
spouses and cohabiting lovers. inter se, and various reasons why
the "modem" forced share may in truth be an anachronism. Then
follows an exploration of the plight of disinherited minor children
and their increasing need for statutory protection as the family
structure continues to evolve.
(stating that Georgia law is inequitable and proposing adoption of equitable distribution
principles to protect surviving spouse). But cf. VERNER F. CHAFFIN, STUDIES IN THE
GEORGIA LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND FUTURE INTERESTS 56 (1978), cited in
Strott, supra note 177, at 427 (stating "perhaps the Georgia solution of giving complete
freedom to both spouses to disinherit the other will point the way for other states to do
likewise").
182. Throughout the past several decades increasing protection has been given to the
surviving spouse, while little attention has been paid to the testator's minor dependents
who survive him. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (discussing disinheri-
tance of children). Status as surviving spouse is the paramount criterion for protection
against disinheritance in the United States. See GLENDON, supra note 82, at 240 (noting
that custom and law now prefer surviving spouse over marital children and other blood
relatives of decedent). On the increasing protection afforded to the surviving spouse in
modem inheritance law, Professor Glendon has stated:
The traditional ideas that family wealth should be preserved for transfer from
one generation to another and that a surviving spouse should not take such
wealth away from the children are weakening, but they still exist, more so in
parts of Europe than in the United States, and more so among certain groups
of society than others. The resulting transformation of the surviving spouse's
position is substantial when compared with the not-too-distant past.
Id.
183. Although the term "lover" may be discomfiting to some readers, it reflects the sex-
ual nature of the relationship of the unmarried couple addressed in this discussion. The
frequently used term "cohabitant" can be somewhat misleading, for it may refer merely to
one who lives with another, such as two friends or siblings. In this article, the term co-
habitant refers to unmarried lovers (or partners) who reside together.
1994]
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A. Spouses (and, Sometimes, Lovers Too)
1. The Forced Share and Paternalism
It is very difficult to gauge the frequency with which a spouse
is disinherited, although empirical observation and instinct tell us
that such an act is unusual. The few studies that have been con-
ducted indicate that disinheritance of a spouse is rare.' 4 The tes-
tator has a variety of incentives to provide adequately for his
spouse. The testator, for example, typically feels a natural affection
for his spouse and wants to ensure that she is provided for upon
his death. 5 Even when the testator's affection for the spouse has
waned, fear that his disinherited spouse will vilify his memory may
provide a sufficient impetus to include her in his will. The testator
also often has a tax incentive for leaving his estate to the surviving
184. See SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 86-95. In 85.8% of the 226 estates sur-
veyed in which the testator was survived by spouse and lineal kin, the testator bequeathed
everything to the surviving spouse. In 89.2% of 37 estates in which the testator was sur-
vived solely by the spouse, the testator bequeathed all to her, in only two of 37 cases
was the surviving spouse disinherited. In one of the two cases of disinheritance, the au-
thors were unable to obtain further information. In the other, however, it appeared that the
survivor and the testator were separated at the time of his death and that the survivor had
already received upon separation one-half of the testator's assets along with his first
wife's household furnishings. Nonetheless, the widow elected to take against the will. Id.
at 87. Other studies also indicate the testator's preference for the spouse over his children.
See BROWDER, supra note 153, at 1307 (26 of 54 testators bequeathed everything to sur-
viving spouse although there were also surviving issue). See also Allison Dunham, The
Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV.
241, 252-53 (1963) (surviving spouse received everything in all of 22 testate estates stud-
ied where decedent was survived by wife and children). One must take care in drawing
conclusions from these studies conducted before serial polygamy and parenting multiple
sets of children became common.
If spousal disinheritance is indeed rare and yet some form of statutory protection is
deemed necessary, an argument can be made that the costs of individuation, as exempli-
fied by the English family maintenance system, might not be prohibitive. See Plager, infra
note 185, at 715 (finding that need for elective share is not great and would be better
served by a system keyed to individuation).
185. See Sheldon J. Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Sohtion in Search of a
Problem, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1966). In his examination of the spousal share, Profes-
sor Plager stated as follows:
The married testator on the whole shows little inclination to avenge himself at
death for the slights and frictions of marital bliss. For the total society this has
real meaning: the need for a surviving spouse's choice between the deceased
spouse's testamentary largess and the legislatively-decreed share is not a need
of massive proportions.
Id. at 715.
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spouse. 8
Elective share and dower statutes thus may be partly based on
a distorted perception of the disinheritance problem.'
Nonetheless, forty of the forty-one common law states afford the
surviving spouse dower or the elective share to guard against the
potential evil of disinheritance.' 8 If spousal disinheritance is a
problem of de minimis proportions, then the typical fractional
forced share found in most common law states does more harm
than good. The broad swath cut by the fixed fraction elective share
is obvious: its arbitrariness may be used by the survivor unjustifi-
ably to reduce legacies to minor dependents and other needy mem-
bers of the testator's family.'89
Moreover, when spousal disinheritance does occur, the modem
testator may have legitimate reasons for so doing. The disinherited
spouse today will often have her own income or be provided for
through assets passing outside the estate. In many instances, the
surviving spouse is the recipient of a pension" or federal or
186. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2056 (West Supp. 1993) (marital deduction).
187. A study of mid-18th-century wills from three counties in eastern Virginia indicates
that in even colonial days a spouse was unlikely to be completely disinherited. See Speth,
supra note 25, at 15-21. Male testators with minor children were particularly likely to be-
queath the wife more than her minimum dower rights. Id. at 17, 20 (slightly more than
80% of testators in Amelia County and Prince Edward County bequeathed substantial
legacies to their wives when, minor children were still in the home; 62% in Mecklenburg
County). Bequests to the widow, however, often were limited to her lifetime or were
conditioned upon her remaining unmarried. This served to preserve the estate for the
testator's children. In fact, older testators were more likely to leave property directly to
their adult children and to grandchildren while charging the eldest son with his mother's
"gentle maintenance." Id. at 17 (nine of 16 older testators left widow less than dower).
188. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text (noting Georgia's unique approach
to spousal disinheritance).
189. See supra notes 54, 72 & 74 and accompanying text.
190. Even an otherwise valid and apparently comprehensive antenuptial agreement may
of itself be ineffective to waive the surviving spouse's entitlement to certain benefits. See,
e.g., Callahan v. Hutsell, Callahan & Buchino, 813 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Ky. 1992). Two
days prior to their marriage, Ed and Nancye entered into an antenuptial agreement under
which Ed promised to provide Nancye with $100,000 to be paid upon his death. At the
time of his death, Ed was a participant in two plans governed by ERISA. The court not-
ed that under 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1988 & Supp. III 1991), for a spouse to waive her
right to ERISA pension plan benefits, she must execute a written consent/waiver, the
consent must provide the name of the designated beneficiary, and the consent must be
witnessed by the plan representative or a notary. Callahan, 813 F. Supp. at -542-45. The
court also noted that the couple had not complied with the requirements of § 1055 and
thus Nancye did not waive her interest in Ed's pension and profit sharing accounts de-
spite the purported waiver in the antenuptial agreement.
The court stated as follows:
[We are] acutely aware of the apparent dissonance between this outcome and
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state governmental benefits derived from the testator' that can-
not be conveyed to others through his will.'92 Particularly now,
when young newlyweds are presumed to enter into the marriage as
approximate equals, an arbitrary forced share scheme may ultimate-
ly serve the interests of greed rather than obligation and need.
Occasionally, the testator may disinherit the survivor in retalia-
tion for her misconduct. 93 The idea that fault or bad behavior on
the part of a spouse should diminish her inheritance has in fact
largely disappeared from intestacy laws. 94 Understandably, courts
are reluctant to engage in murky, highly subjective determinations
the intent of Ed Callahan. We are also mindful of the logic favoring a policy
of informed premarital agreement concerning the distribution of assets. However,
the mandate to give effect to an antenuptial waiver of benefits under ERISA
must come from Congress or a higher court.
Id. at 549. The court found that Nancye also was entitled to the $100,000 provided for in
the antenuptial agreement. Id. at 548-49. See also Pedro Enter., Inc. v. Perdue, 998 F.2d
491 (7th Cir. 1993) (agreeing with Second Circuit that under ERISA's regulation of quali-
fied profit-sharing plans, antenuptial agreements do not waive spouses' rights to survivor
benefits; holding that decedent's second wife, not his children, was entitled to pension
plan benefits despite antenuptial agreement).
191. See, e.g., Burnes v. Gordon, 1980 WL 6368, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1980)
(widow's receipt of Social Security and Veterans' Administration benefits upon death of
husband is irrelevant under state elective share statute, since such benefits flow automat-
ically and not by bequest).
The unmarried cohabitant usually will not receive pensions or governmental benefits
from the decedent's former employment. Whether he or she will do so in the future
depends in large part upon the extent to which federal, state, or local government and
private employers begin to acknowledge "alternative" family relationships. For instance,
entry into a "domestic partnership" agreement already serves as the basis for limited sur-
vivorship rights in some cities. See infra note 239.
192. See Burnes v. Gordon, 1980 WL 6368, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1980); see also
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 174, at 372-73 (discussing social security and
private pension plans under ERISA); Chaffin, supra note 162, at 465-67 (discussing
survivor's right to social security, medical benefits, governmental pensions among other re-
tirement, disability and death programs); Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 6, at 303,
305 n.9 (discussing spousal rights in the employed spouse's federal pension).
193. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (describing reasons for disinheritance in
survey case). Often the testator may state explicitly the reasons for disinheritance, as in
the following example: "On account of the insults, outrages, cruelty, disgrace and humilia-
tion which was constantly, and without reason, during my entire married life heaped upon
me, she is wholly undeserving of my generosity." Mark Bernstein, The Wooing of
Hillsboro, OHIO, Jan. 1990, at 23 (describing Samuel P. Scott's disinheritance of his wid-
ow). The testator who wishes to disinherit a spouse for cause should use caution to avoid
possible tort actions against the estate when the will is probated. See also Leona M.
Hudak, The Sleeping Tort: Testamentary Libel, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1147, 1149 (1975)
(discussing testators "who have vented their spleens upon their widows through the medi-
um of the will-perhaps daring in death what they dared not in life").
194. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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of what behavior is improper within the family. 9  When the tes-
tator through his will has explicitly disinherited the spouse for
cause, however, a court is not called upon to make such a deci-
sion.'96 When the testator's express desire is viewed in combina-
tion with the apparent rarity with which spousal disinheritance oc-
curs, there may be little reason to indulge in provisions of such
questionable value as the forced share. 97
Even if spousal disinheritance occurred more often, abolition
of the forced share does not seem unduly harsh in view of the
variety of means through which a spouse may protect her interest
in family assets during the testator's lifetime. Today, almost all
Americans are aware of the availability of the antenuptial agree-
ment, by which a prospective spouse can ensure her financial posi-
195. Courts are not reluctant, however, to inquire into the conduct of an heir or benefi-
ciary who may have wrongfully killed the decedent. See, e.g., 1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE
§ 2-803(b), 8 U.L.A. 161 (Supp. 1993) (person who "feloniously and intentionally kills
the decedent forfeits all benefits with respect to the decedent's estate"); ILL. ANN. STAT..
ch. 755, pam. 5/2-6 (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("person who intentionally and unjustifiably causes
the death of another shall not receive any property, benefit, or other interest by reason of
the death, whether as heir, legatee, beneficiary, joint tenant, survivor, appointee or in any
other capacity"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-106 (1984) ("any person who shall kill, or
conspire with another to kill, or procure to be killed, any other person" shall forfeit right
to inherit from that person).
196. Courts are not unaware of this, but are currently constrained by elective share
statutes even when the testator expressly states the reason for disinheriting his or her
spouse. In In re Estate of McVicker, 492 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio C.P. 1985), for example, the
court noted that "[w]hatever a decedent spouse's motives are, good, bad, or otherwise,
there are most likely some personal reasons why a decedent spouse did what he or she
did." Id. at 493. Nonetheless, the McVicker court recognized that the surviving spouse was
entitled to her statutory share under Ohio law. The court held that federal estate taxes
were to be deducted from the gross estate, however, before her one-third share was deter-
mined. The court noted that the legislature had already invaded the area of testamentary
freedom with the elective share and apparently did not intend further to invade this do-
main by imposing the entire federal estate tax solely on the testator's intended beneficia-
ries. Id. at 494.
197. Because the surviving spouse is a natural object of the testator's bounty, however,
disinheritance of a spouse should always be cause for close scrutiny of the will. For
example, under the Georgia approach, the least evidence of undue influence, fraud, or lack
of testamentary capacity is cause for refusing to probate the will when there is complete
disinheritance of a spouse. See supra note 180. Moreover, the disinherited spouse may, if
necessary, bring a will contest as an intestate heir. The testator's beneficiaries unwilling to
risk their legacies often can be persuaded to settle with the surviving spouse who is a
sympathetic claimant. This is particularly true if the will beneficiaries cannot inherit by
intestacy should the entire will be proven invalid.
At least some commentators have also suggested that by allowing the testator to
dispose of his estate as he wishes, we would also provide the testator with a greater
incentive to become a more productive member of society. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 5,
at 145 (citing the concept of individuality in the law of inheritance).
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tion for the future.'98 No longer novel or used solely by the
wealthy, 99 such an agreement is not properly viewed as a con-
tract in anticipation of marital failure.' Rather, it is the expres-
sion of two responsible persons who recognize that marriage is in
many respects a business and that, in marriage as in business,
advance planning can avert later disaster."0 ' The post-nuptial
198. See generally Janice E. Kosel, Property Disposition in Antenuptial, Postnuptial and
Property Settlement Agreements, in VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
4-1 to 4-29 (John P. McCahey ed., 1988) (discussing requirements for valid antenuptial
agreement and history of such agreements). A caveat may be appropriate here, however.
The law of marital agreements is in transition; thus, it may be impossible to predict with
certainty the ultimate validity of such an agreement. Id. at 4-4. Antenuptial agreements
regarding disposition of property upon the death of one spouse, however, engender less
controversy than do agreements pertaining to property disposition upon divorce, id at 4-
14, 4-15, and usually will be upheld if substantively fair or based on full disclosure at
the time the contract was entered into. Most states have enacted specific legislation per-
taining to the antenuptial agreement. See, e.g., UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B
U.L.A. 369, 369-80 (1983 & Supp. 1993) (adopted in 18 jurisdictions in whole or in
part); 1969 UNIF. PROB. CODE, 8 U.L.A. 82 (1983 & Supp. 1993) (permitting contractual
waiver of elective share and other rights); 1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE, 8 U.L.A. 99, 99-100
(Supp. 1993) (incorporating standards for validity from Unif. Premarital Agreement Act).
See generally LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND
THE LAW (1981) (arguing for explicit contracts within marriage and as alternatives to mar-
riage); Lenore J. Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62
CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1249-88 (1974) (earlier, abbreviated version of Weitzman's theories
suggesting that contracts in lieu of marriage would allow for various types of interperson-
al relationships); Michael K. Davis, Till Death Do Us Part: Antenuptial Agreements Con-
cerning Wills and Estates, 8 PROB. L.J. 301, 313-25 (1988) (discussing varying treatment
among jurisdictions and emphasizing need for reform and uniformity). For a stimulating
discussion of need and fairness in prenuptial agreements, see Paul G. Haskell, The Pre-
marital Estate Contract and Social Policy, 57 N.C. L. REv. 415, 419, 425-39 (1979)
(suggesting that antenuptial contracts should not be enforceable if substantively unfair to
surviving spouse at the time of the decedent's death). Professor Haskell concludes that
contractual avoidance of marital responsibility erodes the institution of marriage and
should not be countenanced by law. Id. at 439.
199. Cf. Richard W. Bartke, Marital Sharing-Why Not Do It By Contract?, 67 GEo.
L.J. 1131, 1147-51 (1979) (discussing history of antenuptial agreement in United States
and noting its use primarily by wealthy, well-advised spouses).
200. Apparently many individuals continue to view the prenuptial agreement as an omen
of doom. Some practitioners have suggested that the antenuptial agreement is often unnec-
essary for young newlyweds; such a contract is more likely to benefit older individuals
embarking upon second or later marriages who wish to protect children from their previ-
ous marriages. See, e.g., Joseph N. DuCanto, Taking Your Layer to the Altar: A Differ-
ent Perspective on Premarital Agreements, PROB. & PROP. 46, 47 (Jan.Feb. 1990) (ex-
pressing concern that when the parents of the bride and groom insist that the couple enter
into premarital contract, "a slow-growing cancer between the young lovers [can be cre-
ated] which may ultimately prove fatal to the long-term health of an otherwise joyous
union"); cf. Herndon Inge, Jr., Antenuptial Agreements, 48 ALA. LAW. 140, 140 (1987)
(suggesting that antenuptial agreements may be beneficial for wealthy prospective spouses
and prospective spouses who have children from previous marriages).
201. See Bartke, supra note 199, at 1151-64 (discussing use of a marital property shar-
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agreement between willing spouses may serve to accomplish similar
results. Although the will contract is less satisfactory as a means of
ensuring protection from disinheritance, it too may be useful in
some circumstances." 2 Life insurance is yet another way in which
a spouse can protect herself from disinheritance.2 3
Alternatively or in addition to these explicit contractual ar-
rangements, the spouse can assure herself protection somewhat
similar to that afforded in community property states by having
valuable property placed in the name of both spouses during the
marriage." Although only married couples may own property as
tenants by the entirety with an indestructible right of survivor-
ship,2" both married and unmarried couples may hold property as
ing agreement to establish a system approximating that of a conventional marital commu-
nity). Under current law, an antenuptial agreement may provide that the property rights
described in the instrument are in lieu of the elective share or dower. See WAGGONER ET
AL, supra note 44, at 477 (noting that couple may enter into antenuptial agreement to
avoid 1990 UPC elective share).
Of course, some engaged couples may terminate their relationship prior to marriage
if the individuals cannot negotiate a mutually satisfying agreement. See Weitzman, supra
note 198, at 1170 ("one wonders how many men and women would agree to the mar-
riage contract if they were given the opportunity to read it and to consider the rights and
obligations to which they were committing themselves").
202. L. Rush Hunt, Joint Wills May Provide a Solution to Drafting Problems for Cli-
ents Concerned with Remarriage, 12 EST. PLAN. 88, 93 (1985) (noting admonitions
against and disadvantages of the joint will, but concluding that it can be used in some
instances). Cf. Browder, supra note 153, at 1342 (discussing disadvantages of contractual
joint and mutual wills). See generally WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE
ON THE LAW OF WILLS §§ 10.1-10.50 (1960 & Supp. 1993 by Jeffrey A. Schoenblum)
(discussing the will contract); id. §§ 11.0-11.10 (joint, mutual, and reciprocal wills).
203. See 3 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 24:125 (2d ed. by Ronald A.
Anderson, rev. vol. by Mark S. Rhodes, 1984 & Supp. 1993) (noting that husband and
wife have insurable interests in one another's lives). If the policy of life insurance is is-
sued without the knowledge or consent of the insured, however, the policy may be void
or voidable. Id. § 24:124. See generally Plager, supra note 185, at 688-97 (discussing
available will substitutes).
204. See generally 4A RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY 599-624 (Patrick J. Rohan, rev. ed. 1993) (discussing the tenancy in com-
mon, the joint tenancy, and the tenancy by the entirety).
205. See Girard Acceptance Corp. v. Sroop, 425 A.2d 1095, 1097 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1980) (noting that tenancy by the entirety achieves many of the same goals as dow-
er and curtesy but provides even greater protection for the surviving spouse). See general-
ly 4A POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 204, 1 620-624 (discussing tenancy by the entire-
ty). There are many approaches taken to the tenancy by the entirety in the jurisdictions of
the United States. Some states have abolished the tenancy by the entirety by statute or
judicial decision. Id. 620[4] (noting that 25 states and the District of Columbia affirma-
tively recognize the tenancy by the entirety; five additional states mention it in their
codes; only 13 states appear to have abolished it definitively; four states have conflicting
statements on the tenancy; three states have taken no known position). The treatise con-
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joint tenants" or as tenants in common."'
The elective share provisions in most common law states
assume that adults will marry and live happily (or at least will
remain together) ever after, despite overwhelming statistics to the
contrary in late twentieth century America. Today, one of two
marriages in the United States ends in divorce. 8 and little stigma
is attached to one's status as a divorced person. Thus, it seems
highly likely that the rare spouse who might have been disinherited
seventy-five years ago will instead find herself in divorce court,
left to take her chances with equitable distribution. The Georgia
experience indicates there is little reason to believe that permitting
spousal disinheritance weakens the marital relationship." 9
cludes that the tenancy by the entirety "is much more alive and vigorous than its ancient
and anachronistic purposes would suggest." Id. In a few jurisdictions, the tenancy by the
entirety is the only concurrent estate a married couple can hold. Id. 1 620[2]. A convey-
ance to a husband and wife which does not specify the form of concurrent ownership
intended will result in a tenancy by the entirety in some states. See, e.g., Dearman v.
Bruns, 181 S.E.2d 809, 811 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971).
In many of the jurisdictions recognizing the tenancy by the entirety, direct convey-
ances from one spouse as the sole owner of the property to the couple as tenants by the
entirety is now allowed. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 184, § 8 (West 1991);
OR. REV. STAT. § 108.090(2) (1990). Moreover, many states recognizing tenancy by the
entirety extend the concept to personalty. See 4A POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 204,
621[6].
206. See generally 4A POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 204, 615-19; Sandra J. Chan,
Determining When Spousal Joint Tenancies Should Be Used to Meet Estate Planning
Goals, 14 EST. PLAN. 161, 161-66 (May/June 1987). Some states have abolished the joint
tenancy with right of survivorship. Frequently, attempts to create a joint tenancy in these
jurisdictions will result in a tenancy in common. Alternatively, a court may recognize con-
current life estates in the grantees with a contingent remainder in fee to the survivor. The
right of survivorship in such cases is typically indestructible. 4A POWELL & ROHAN,
supra note 204, 616[2]. Cf. infra note 207 (describing rare tenancy in common with
right of survivorship). In jurisdictions recognizing the joint tenancy, the historical require-
ment of the unities has often been removed. Thus, in those states a direct conveyance
from a grantor to himself and others as joint tenants will be recognized as creating a
valid joint tenancy. 4A POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 204, 616[3].
207. Because the tenancy in common does not carry with it a right of survivorship, the
surviving spouse or significant other holding property as a tenant in common will be
protected only to the extent of her fractional interest in the property. In states which have
abolished or restricted the joint tenancy, courts have occasionally recognized a hybrid
form of concurrent ownership, the tenancy in common with a right of survivorship. See,
e.g., Durant v. Hamrick, 409 So. 2d 731, 736-38 (Ala. 1981) (recognizing tenancy in
common with right of survivorship, citing similar decisions from other jurisdictions, and
describing the estate). See generally 4A POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 204, 60112].
The interests of the tenants in common are presumed to be equal in the absence of indi-
cations to the contrary.
208. See supra note 11 (recent divorce statistics).
209. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text (discussing lack of spousal protec-
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Abolition of the elective share could be expected to cause
many individuals contemplating marriage to engage in meaningful
planning for future contingencies. Contractual arrangements based
on full disclosure and good faith and concurrent ownership in its
various forms would not only assure protection for a surviving
spouse (or lover, in the case of unmarried couples), but would also
emphasize the economic aspects of the partnership. If the couple so
wished, nothing would prevent them from agreeing that the survi-
vor should receive one-third (or any other arbitrary fractional inter-
est) of the estate of the first spouse to die. By allowing the couple
itself to make the decision, states would respect testamentary free-
dom and eliminate unnecessarily intrusive legislation. Abolition of
the forced share also would encourage women to take an active
role in the management of family wealth and to demand deserved
recognition of their contributions as wives, mothers, and wage
earners. The homemaker whose contributions are evidenced by her
current ownership of marital assets may reap psychological rewards
from the knowledge that she is not dependent upon her husband's
control of the fruits of her labor until his death or their di-
vorce.
210
In sum, the argument for abolition assumes that spouses are
capable, responsible individuals and should be treated as such.
Intervention by the state in their relationship is seldom necessary
and should be discouraged. The current arbitrary, paternalistic elec-
tive share statutes may trammel testamentary freedom by imposing
a mandatory inheritance in favor of competent surviving spouses
who can protect themselves. Nevertheless, no one should expect to
see the demise of the forced share in the near future. As legisla-
tion in Georgia).
210. Because there may indeed be spouses who have entered into presently existing
marriages at least in partial reliance on the elective share (one hopes spouses do not enter
marriage solely in reliance on the forced share), a decision to abolish the forced share
should apply only to future marriages-for instance, those entered into on or after January
1, 2000. To abolish the elective share for existing marriage would in particular place
many "heroines of the Betty Crocker culture . . . who have already devoted their most
career-productive years to homemaking" at a complete disadvantage. Starnes, supra note
146, at 70 (discussing the results of the equality rhetoric in modem divorce law). As
Starnes points out, society must not forget that the homemaking role "was the only
'proper' one" at the time many existing marriages were entered into. Id. at 75.
State programs to educate prospective spouses about the change in the law could
ensure that such individuals realize that each will be held to the same standard of respon-
sibility as any other adult entering into an agreement. An advisory statement or paragraph
provided on a marriage license application could serve to give notice to prospective
spouses.
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tures were loathe to move from dower to the forced share, so will
they be reluctant to adopt new measures to protect the new fami-
ly. 211
2. Husbands and Wives as Equals
Whether or not grounded in modem reality, the solutions that
state legislators develop to address disinheritance of family mem-
bers ultimately depend on their vision of what a family is.2 The
early forced share statutes were primarily attempts to protect the
then-typical nuclear family from impoverishment should the hus-
band seek to disinherit his widow and children. In light of the
historical distribution of marital wealth in common law states,
legislatures enacting forced share laws naturally were concerned
more with the disinherited widow than the disinherited widower; in
fact, the originally enacted forced share of some jurisdictions ap-
plied only to widows. 23 To the extent that the spousal disinheri-
tance problem existed, the protective intent behind the statutes was
admirable.
Unfortunately, the statutes were often enacted long after the
211. Plausible reasons can be asserted to perpetuate the paternalistic attitude towards
spousal disinheritance. Couples embarking upon marriage are often oblivious to the finan-
cial aspects of their commitment; it may be unrealistic to expect them to engage in ratio-
nal estate planning prior to the vows. Further, the surviving wife (particularly the full-time
homemaker) who fails to protect herself remains unlikely to have resources approximating
those of her husband. See infra note 217 and accompanying text. Although the forced
share may provide a belated remedy for these problems, it also tacitly encourages irre-
sponsibility and dependence.
212. It would be interesting to discern the familial status of state legislators. As one
commentator has stated,
[T]he success of a universal family law depends on the existence of a
paradigmatic family upon which the law is based. Families must share enough
common features for universal laws to operate in roughly the same way for all
those to whom they apply. If there is an insufficient "essence" of family, if
there is no governing norm against which all families can fairly be measured,
then family laws will only tend to work well for those families the drafters
had in mind.
Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 J.L. & SEXUALITY 9,
33 (examining same-sex marriage from an "anti-essentialist" stance).
213. Under the rubric of gender equality, states which originally protected widows only
have extended the protection to widowers. See, e.g., Hall v. McBride, 416 So. 2d 986,
988-92 (Ala. 1982) (discussing Alabama's widows-only provision which was replaced by
gender-neutral statute). In many states, the surviving spousal protection statutes have al-
ways been gender-neutral in application (if not in effect). See Cahn, supra note 5, at 143
(early article on elective shares noting that many statutes applied in favor of either a
widow or widower).
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time when they were most needed-that is, the time when wives
were largely excluded from the workplace and were thus incapable
of providing for themselves and their children.1 4 The belated en-
actment of the forced share is therefore somewhat ironic: as state
by state turned to the protective, elective share beginning in 1930,
women were entering the job market in record numbers.2"5 Al-
though the forced share statutes may have satisfied some continu-
ing need, that need was growing less each year. Even so, as re-
cently as 1992-long after sex equality had become a serious issue
in American society and the status of women in the job force had
risen significantly-common law states were still in the process of
converting from dower to the elective share bas.ed on the tradition-
al family model.2"6
Has the status of women in general and wives in particular so
improved in American society that the protective forced share for
widows is no longer necessary?2"7 Men continue to control most
forms of wealth in the United States, and in common law jurisdic-
tions husbands control most marital wealth.2"' Despite important
214. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing rationale underlying transition
from dower to elective share).
215. Of course, most women entered the job market at lower salaries and in less-es-
teemed positions than those of men.
216. See supra note 35 (discussing West Virginia's adoption of 1990 UPC elective
share provisions).
217. Men (and perhaps more importantly, male-dominated legislatures) must be careful
not to overestimate the social and economic strides women have made in recent decades.
As one commentator stated in 1987:
One by-product of the women's movement has been an image of women trium-
phant over the barriers of past discrimination, fully equal members of, and fully
integrated into, the American labor force. Regrettably, this image has far out-
stripped social and economic reality. The grim truth is that the average woman
still earns roughly 60 percent of what the average man earns. Further, over the
course of her working life, her pay will increase much more slowly than his.
McLindon, supra note 146, at 396 (citations omitted). Cf. Hall, 416 So. 2d at 988-92. In
Hall, the Alabama forced share provision for widows only was challenged successfully as
an impermissible gender-based classification violative of equal protection. The court chose
to abolish the statute rather than extend its benefits to all surviving spouses, stating as
follows:
It is clear that the widow's right to dissent had its origin in a time when
women had no property rights. Women needed some protection of the law to
prevent their husbands from transferring all assets that would provide women
with a means of support. This is no longer the case. Women may, and do,
freely build separate estates and freely transfer assets. In many cases, women
may accumulate more wealth than their husbands.
Id. at 990.
218. See 1992 STATISTICAL ABSTRACr, supra note 11, at 412 (table showing greater
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strides in the sex equality movement, wives are still more likely
than husbands to experience discrimination in the workplace. More-
over, many wives who work outside the home may choose (or be
compelled by family circumstances) to take less demanding jobs or
forego promotions and other vocational opportunities because they
also serve as the primary homemaker and caretaker for the marital
children." 9  Although statistically a shrinking minority, some
wives work exclusively as unpaid homemakers and mothers.Y°
With this scenario in mind, it may appear initially that we have
not reached a degree of sex equality that of itself would fully
justify the elimination of the forced share. Nonetheless, there are
persuasive arguments that the forced share has outlasted its useful-
ness and, in fact, implicitly encourages wives to be dependent upon
and subordinate to their husbands during the marriageY This is
especially true when the focus shifts from society at large to the
two individuals comprising the marriage.222
numbers of male workers in labor force and higher median weekly earnings than those of
females). See also Margaret Valentine Turano, UPC Section 2-201: Equal Treatment of
Spouses?. 55 ALB. L. REV. 983, 1001-02, 1001 n.132 (1992) (noting that wives as a
group earn less money than do their husbands and women's work is undervalued). For an
analysis using game theory to explore why women might be "systematically worse off
than men when it comes to acquiring and owning property," see Carol M. Rose, Women
and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421, 422 (1992).
219. Significantly, the economic disadvantage suffered by the primary caretaker (typically
the wife) is inadequately addressed by the 1990 UPC elective share provisions. See
Turano, supra note 218, at 998-1006 (suggesting that the primary caretaker of marital
children be allowed a larger percentage of estate or a lump sum substantially larger than
the currently suggested supplemental elective share amount).
220. This kind of marriage, however, in which a wife is truly dependent upon her hus-
band-the "bourgeois" marriage-was in decline even at the beginning of the 20th centu-
ry. See Rheinstein, supra note 146, at 414 (noting that percentage of women in United
States' nonagricultural labor force was 23% in 1900).
221. See supra notes 198-207 and accompanying text (discussing protections other than
the elective share that are available to spouses).
222. The forced share statute may impede the progress of sex equality by deceptively
leading one to believe it is in the widow's best interest. Although today's statutes are
gender-neutral, they are still permeated with the historical taint of paternalism, which in
turn is linked to subordination of women. (If one is servile and docile, one can hope to
be protected by the beneficent and powerful.) If legislatures really believe that the mar-
riage is an institution where two spouses participate in an economic partnership, it is
ironic that in 41 of 50 states title alone determines ownership of property until divorce or
death. Cf. Bartke, supra note 199, at 1133 (noting that the "fragmented compilation of
marital property laws represents a 'non-system' and an abdication of responsibility by the
legislatures of common law states").
For a discussion of the rejection of community property in England, see 2 POLLOCK
& MAITLAND, supra note 17, at 425-31. Almost a century ago, Pollock and Maitland de-
scribed the question of property ownership during marriage as "comparatively uninteresting
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When, as today, two presumably competent individuals enter
into a marriage as equals in the eyes of the law, the elective
share-especially the fixed fraction elective share-is unduly pa-
tronizing. The marriage contract is an agreement between two
individuals, each of whom is fully capable of providing for and
protecting himself or herself prior to and after the nuptial vows.
Even in its gender-neutral form, the forced share perpetuates to no
small degree the lingering impression of the meek and needy wife
and discourages equality among the spouses during the marriage. If
legislatures want to provide truly gender-neutral treatment for
spouses, then they must replace the forced share with community
property principles or, alternatively, abolish the forced share and let
the spouses protect themselves.'
3. Partnerships and Protection
The forced share devised in the late 1920s and early 1930s
remains the principal family protective provision' in common
law states. This is true even though the exponential increase in
rates of multiple marriage, unmarried cohabitation, and childbirth to
single parents demonstrate the profound change in family structure
since the early decades of this century. Perhaps because the forced
share no longer provides the range of protection originally intend-
ed, scholars now attempt to justify the modem share based on the
economic partnership view of marriage, thus minimizing the share's
origins as a protective provision primarily for widows and young
children of the marriage."5
and academic." A husband, after all, had "everywhere a very large power of dealing ...
with the whole mass of property." Id. at 397-98. With the enactment of equal manage-
ment statutes in community property states in the 1960s, however, the situation for wives
improved substantially in those parts of the United States. See supra note 43 and accom-
panying text. See also Bartke, supra note 199, at 1142-47 (noting that negative reaction
of common law states to community property may be lessening).
223. See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 182. Not all recently promulgated spousal inheritance provisions
increase the survivor's protection, however. Under the UPC provisions, for example, the
survivor who is wealthy in her own right may receive a smaller elective share amount
than she would receive under the conventional forced share. See supra note 89 and ac-
companying text (1990 UPC provisions consider wealth of survivor and duration of mar-
riage). Thus while it is generally true that in this century greater inheritance protection
has been afforded to the surviving spouse (to the detriment of other family members),
Pollock and Maitland's 1895 protest remains valid: not every change from the law of
savagery to the present has been favorable to the wife. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
supra note 17, at 400-01.
225. Compare JESSE DUKEMINtER, JR. & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH
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To the extent that the elective share is now being
recharacterized as a posthumous means of correcting deficiencies in
the common law system of ownership of marital property, legisla-
tures should instead focus their attention on correcting that system
during the marriage, not at its end." 6 If states wish to view mar-
riage as an economic partnership in which contributions of each
spouse should be recognized, then they must adopt community
property principles, not forced share statutes that provide recogni-
tion of spousal contributions only to the survivor when the mar-
riage is terminated by death.27
Despite the recent tendency of scholars to reclassify the forced
share as an acknowledgement of marriage as an economic partner-
ship, case law involving the forced share indicates that most courts
still perceive the predominant purpose of the share to be that of
protection: the surviving spouse should not be left impecunious if
disinherited by the decedent.22 Although the elective share once
served as a somewhat effective substitute for a comprehensive
scheme of family protection from disinheritance, today its benefits
reach increasingly few family members. This is because the term
family no longer is used to describe only the traditional hus-
band/wife/child relationship. Particularly where minor children are
involved, a family is now generally thought to exist whether the
parents are single, married, or cohabiting. 29 In light of this
TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS, FUTURE INTERESTS, AND ESTATE PLANNING 461-63 (1972)
(noting that forced share was result of concern for wife's possible disinheritance and the
limited protection afforded by dower) with DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 174, at
377-78 (policy underlying elective share is same as that underlying community proper-
ty-to recognize the spouse's contribution to the economic success of the marriage).
Even the most modern forced shares do nothing to promote the economic partnership
theory during the marriage itself. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. Some schol-
ars have also questioned the degree to which the economic partnership theory is success-
fully embodied in modem forced share law even upon the death of the first spouse. See
supra note 84 (criticizing 1990 UPC elective share provisions for incorporating universal
community concept rather than that of community of acquests).
226. See Whitebread, supra note 84, at 142 (questioning whether the 1990 UPC elective
share effectively implements the economic partnership view of marriage and noting that
"eventually all states will have to abandon elective or forced share law and adopt some
sort of community property system" if there is to be a nationally uniform system of prop-
erty rights completely incorporating the partnership theory of marriage).
227. Sadly, the contributions of the minor children to the marriage and the family are
ignored by most legislatures, courts, and commentators. But see infra note 280.
228. Cf. supra note 82 (discussing the economic partnership theory of marriage as basis
for 1990 UPC elective share provision).
229. Despite the oft-expressed hope of televangelists and politicians for a return to tradi-
tional family values, the prospects for turning backward are bleak. "The restoration of
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definitional evolution, the following question arises: If the elective
share is retained, should it now be extended to the surviving co-
habitant"' who stands in the place of the spouse but lacks the le-
gally valid marital contract?"1
Puritan sex ethics is not realistic, and those who preach it are merely evading the difficult
questions of policy." RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 442 (1992). The percentage
of families headed by a married couple with children under 18 in relation to all families
with children under 18 continues to decrease. See Married with Children, AM. DEMO-
GRAPHICS DESK REFERENCE, July, 1992, at 6 (discussing the impact of the reconfiguration
of the American family).
230. The terms "lover," "partner," and "cohabitant" as used in this article include nei-
ther putative spouses nor valid common law spouses. A putative spouse is "[a]ny person
who has cohabited with another to whom he is not legally married in the good faith
belief that he was married to that person ...." UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE Acr
§ 209, 9A U.L.A. 174 (1987). If the jurisdiction recognizes the putative spouse doctrine
or common law marriage, the inheritance rights of the surviving "spouse" are frequently
the same as those of the validly married spouse. See generally WAGGONER et al., supra
note 44, at 104-06.
231. Although the surviving partner is not entitled to the forced share in the absence of
marriage, in many cases he or she is not totally without recourse. In Poe v. Estate of
Levy, 411 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), the court addressed several different
theories of recovery for a surviving cohabitant claiming against the estate of the deceased
cohabitant. In Poe, Michael sought to recover real and personal property interests against
the estate of his deceased cohabitant, Gertrude. The court found that his allegations were
sufficient to state a claim on an express contract or for a constructive trust, but not for
breach of an implied contract or in quantum meruit. Id. at 256. The court noted that "as
long as it is clear there was valid, lawful consideration separate and apart from any ex-
press or implied agreement regarding sexual relations," the cause of action on an express
contract or for a constructive trust is enforceable. Id. Accord, Donovan v. Scuderi, 443
A.2d 121, 125 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (upholding survivor's contract claim, finding
services and expenditures provided by survivor to decedent "were not dependent upon, in
consideration for, or necessarily to promote, an unlawful cohabitation"); In re Estate of
Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 708 (Wis. 1980) (allowing plaintiff to recover reasonable value
of lawful services rendered because illicit relationship with decedent defendant was only
an incidental factor to performance).
In In re Estate of Ericksen, 337 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1983), Pamela and Jorgen had
agreed orally to make equal contributions towards the purchase of a home. The cohabiting
couple placed title solely in Jorgen's name because Pamela was married to another man
at the time. Upon Jorgen's death, the court imposed a constructive trust on a one-half
interest in the home in favor of Pamela. Because Pamela had made contributions equal to
those of Jorgen, an award of the entire home would unjustly enrich his estate. The court
emphasized that Pamela was not asserting a claim to the property of her cohabitant, but
rather was merely protecting her own property interest which she acquired for cash con-
sideration independent of any oral cohabitation service agreement. The court analogized
her claim as similar to one made by a joint venturer or partner. Id. at 672-74.
Quantum meruit has long been recognized as a potentially successful claim for a
surviving cohabitant. See, e.g., Lynch v. Rogers, 10 A.2d 619, 624 (Md. 1940) (awarding
domestic servant compensation for 10 years of service to decedent and holding that there
was sufficient evidence for jury's determination that her services were not based on a
contract of illicit cohabitation, although she bore the decedent's child while residing in his
home). See generally Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From
1994]
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As recently as the 1950s and early 1960s, male-female cohabi-
tation involving a sexually intimate relationship without the benefit
of marriage was unusual and often considered scandalous. 2 Since
the so-called sexual revolution of the late 1960s, however, the
public attitude towards unmarried cohabitants has softened marked-
ly as their numbers have greatly increased.233 Although some
Americans may still object to unmarried cohabitation, even the
Census Bureau has recently recognized the cohabiting couple as a
family, at least for statistical purposes.234 Why not then extend
the protection of the elective share to the surviving cohabitant? 35
Status to Contract and Back Again?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 47 (1978) (discussing remedies
available to cohabitants upon dissolution of relationship).
232. Between 1950 and 1989 there was a greater than 660% increase in the number of
multiperson nonfamily households in America. See James R. Wetzel, American Families:
75 Years of Change, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1990, at 4, 5 (noting the proportionally
smaller increase in the number of married couples relative to the overall increase in total
number of households) (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CUR-
RENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 441, HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, MARITAL
STATUS, AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1989, (ADVANCE REPORT) 4-9 (1989)).
Over half of these households (approximately 2.6 million) were headed by unmarried cou-
ples. Id. According to Wetzel, who directed the work of the Center for Demographic
Studies at the Bureau of the Census, the number of unmarried couples maintaining house-
holds increased 400% between 1970 and 1989 alone. Id. By 1991, there were over three
million households maintained by unmarried couples. See 1992 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
supra note 11, at 45 (listing the number of households maintained in various categories).
In almost one million of these households, children under the age of 15 were present. Id.
233. A 1988 study by National Center for Health Statistics indicated that 45% of wom-
en between the ages of 25 and 29 had cohabited at some point in their lives. A third of
women between the ages of 15 and 44 had done so. See Barbara Vobejda, Americans
Spending Less Time Married, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1991, at Al (identifying factors con-
tributing to America's declining marriage rate). See also Felicity Barringer, Divorce Data
Stir Doubt on "Trial Marriage," N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1989, at Al (citing National Sur-
vey of Families and Households which indicated that 60% of persons who remarried
between 1980 and 1987 cohabited with someone before remarrying).
234. See, e.g., Victor F. Zonana, Census Will Count "Unmarried Partners" for First
Time, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1990, at A38 (noting that counting "unmarried partners" re-
flects changing definition of American family and growing acceptance of family diversity).
235. Noting that the legal groundwork for replacing marriage (a status relationship) with
cohabitation (a contractual relationship) has been laid in Western countries, Judge Posner
states the following:
The principal effect of refusing to give legal recognition to cohabitation-an
effect entirely perverse from the standpoint of preserving the nuclear family for
the sake of the children-will be to make it more difficult for women to ob-
tain contractual protection for themselves and their children against abandonment
by the child's father.
POSNER, supra note 229, at 266. Judge Posner further notes that as contractual freedom
makes more inroads on formal marriage, it becomes increasingly difficult to prohibit un-
conventional forms of voluntary sexual relationships, including homosexual relationships.
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Marriage remains the preferred status for adults in society,
perhaps in part because of the lingering perception that marriage
makes adults more responsible citizens. If the forced share is per-
ceived as an inducement for adults to enter into marriage and help
preserve the social order, then extending its applicability outside
the traditional nuptial framework destroys that inducement."
Moreover, the state-imposed spousal forced share may itself be the
reason why some couples choose to cohabit rather than marry,
particularly if they seek to leave their estates to others (such as
children from a former marriage). Denying male-female cohabitants
the elective share is not discriminatory, 7 because those who seek
its benefits are not denied the right to marry." Extending the
elective share to cohabitants also could lead to practical problems:
How would an executor decide who is a surviving lover and who
is merely a surviving roommate of the decedent? 9 If the cohab-
iting couple has no children, it could be exceedingly difficult to
determine whether the survivor stands in the place of the legal
spouse absent intrusive and potentially embarrassing inquiry into
their private lives.
The complexion of the cohabitation arrangement is changed
significantly, however, when children are born to unmarried
cohabitants, as is now frequently the case. The current structure of
the law of wills provides the children of cohabitants even less than
the indirect protection afforded to marital children. Although the
surviving cohabitant and the surviving spouse have the same legal
obligation of support to their minor children, the disinherited co-
habitant receives no statutory share which can trickle down for the
See id. at 264-66.
236. Of course, if marriage is the threshold to social responsibility, then forced shares
themselves would seem to be unnecessary. Cf. Weitzman, supra note 198, at 1230-36
(questioning whether the Judeo-Christian ideal of monogamous heterosexual marriage is the
only appropriate model for personal relationships in modem, diverse society).
237. Moreover, there is empirical and statistical evidence that cohabitation is fundamen-
tally different from marriage. Research indicates that cohabitation may actually function as
another "stage of courtship rather than as a replacement for marriage." Barbara Foley
Wilson, The Marry-Go-Round, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Oct. 1991, at 52. Nor does the desire
to cohabit rather than marry appear to be an immutable trait.
238. Exceptions may exist where one or both are already married or within prohibited
degrees of kinship, for example.
239. Domestic partnership registration is one possible solution to this problem. An in-
creasing number of cities provide the opportunity for cohabitants to register. See Craig A.
Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis
of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COL. L. REv. 1164, 1188-95 (1992) (discussing
domestic partnership ordinances in various cities).
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children's benefit. Excluding the adult cohabitant from a survivor's
share may not be unduly disturbing, but imposing a penalty also
upon the cohabiting couple's minor children is unfair to both the
child and society. Perhaps rather than extending the surviving
share, what is needed is to restructure the family inheritance
scheme to protect first the minor children of the testator without
regard to the testator's marital status.2"
Unlike most unmarried heterosexual cohabitants, homosexual
cohabitants24' do not have the legal option to marry one anoth-
er242 and thereby ensure statutory inheritance protections for them-
240. See infra notes 282-308 and accompanying text (discussing various schemes of
protecting children from disinheritance).
241. A 1988 census survey estimated that 1.6 million of the nation's 91 million
households are made up of unmarried couples of the same sex. Zonana, supra note 234.
242. Marriage, which the Supreme Court once observed creates "the most important
relation in life," Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888), is a relationship forbidden to
same-sex couples in all states. Homosexuals' challenges to state marriage laws until re-
cently have been singularly unsuccessful. See generally Rorie Sherman, Gay Law No
Longer Closeted, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 26, 1992, at 1 (detailing inroads gays and lesbians
have made in the controversial area of family law, noting lack of success in attacking
marriage statutes, and describing recent challenge to Hawaii statute). For example, in
Baker v. Nelson, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that marriage between persons of
the same sex is prohibited and denied the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges. 191 N.W.2d
185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (finding lack of a substan-
tial federal question). All states continue to define or interpret their marriage statutes to
exclude homosexual unions. Unsuccessful challenges by homosexuals to marriage laws
include those reported in Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); De
Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187
(Wash. Ct. App.), review denied, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974).
In a somewhat surprising decision in this area, however, a plurality of judges of the
Hawaii Supreme Court recently held that the state marriage law denies same-sex couples
access to the marital status and its concomitant rights and benefits, thus implicating the
equal protection clause of the state constitution. The plurality took care to note that it
had not held that same-sex applicants have a civil right to marry nor that the statute was
unconstitutionally discriminatory. Rather, the court vacated the order of the lower court
and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the state was to have the burden under
a strict scrutiny standard to overcome the presumption that the statute is unconstitutional
by demonstrating that it furthers compelling state interests and is narrowly drawn to avoid
unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67-68
(Haw. Ct. App. 1992), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993). But
see Hawaii's Marriage Laws Don't Sanction Same-Sex Marriage, [Current Developments]
Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1448 (Aug. 2, 1994) (noting that in June 1994 the Ha-
waii legislature reacted to Baehr by amending state marriage statutes to emphasize that a
valid marriage contract can be entered into only by a man and a woman).
Perceiving marriage as an instrument of oppression, at least some participants in the
gay and lesbian rights movement do not desire the extension of the right to marry to the
homosexual community. See Mary C. Dunlap, The Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate: A
Microcosm of Our Hopes and Troubles in the Nineties, 1 J.L. & SEXuALTY 63, 64
(1991) (quoting contrasting views on the same-sex marriage issue which has polarized
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selves or their children.243 Yet in recent years, gay and lesbian
couples have fought with increasing success2 " for the legal recog-
lesbians).
243. For a discussion of various legal strategies employed by gay and lesbians seeking
legal recognition of their families, see William B. Rubenstein, We Are Family: A Reflec-
tion on the Search for Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Relationships, 8 J.L. &
PoL. 89, 90-99 (1991). The four strategies discussed by the author include direct challeng-
es to existing marriage laws; use of existing gay rights laws; creation of domestic partner-
ship laws; and interpretation of existing statutes.
In light of the AIDS crisis, extension of spousal status to the gay male partner has
become a particularly important issue. An extension of medical benefits to the homosexual
partner stricken with AIDS may greatly help the couple defray the exorbitant expense
associated with the disease. See Law Firm to Reimburse Health Costs for Same-Sex Do-
mestic Partners, Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 785 (April 5, 1993) [hereinafter Law Firm
to Reimburse] (describing efforts of first large law firm "to reimburse gay and lesbian
employees for the health care insurance costs of their same-sex domestic partners, despite
refusal of . . . health care insurers to provide such coverage"). Even the longtime com-
panion of an incompetent gay man or lesbian may have no say in the care and treatment
of the sick person if the "legal" family of the incompetent person steps in and decides to
exclude the longtime companion. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 382 N.W.2d
861 (Minn. Ct. App.) (naming father guardian of daughter impaired in auto accident,
despite petition of daughter's lesbian partner of four years; father immediately terminated
lesbian partner's visitation privileges with his daughter), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085
(1980). If the decedent leaves no will, the longtime companion will receive nothing
through intestacy. If a will does exist and the survivor is not included, the survivor has
no right of election. The survivor's best and perhaps only hope in many cases is to claim
the value of her services from the estate-basically, the claim of a creditor. See supra
note 231 (discussing the availability of quantum meruit as a means of recovery for sur-
viving unmarried partners). Finally, even if a will in favor of the survivor exists, provi-
sions to the homosexual partner may be subject to attack by members of the decedent's
legal family, whom courts may consider the "natural objects" of the decedent's bounty to
the exclusion of the surviving partner. Alternatively, the survivor may be deemed to have
exerted undue influence over his or her lover. For a well-known example of the latter,
see In re Kaufmann's Will, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 1964) (finding survivor-legatee
to have exerted undue influence upon testator, despite eight-year relationship in which the
couple had lived and travelled with one another). aft'd 205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965). A
dissenting judge in the lower court opinion stated: "The verdict in this case rests upon
surmise, suspicion, conjecture and moral indignation and resentment, not upon the legally
required proof of undue influence .... " 247 N.Y.S.2d at 689 (Witmer, J., dissenting).
Professors Dukeminier and Johanson question whether the result would have been the
same had the relationship been a heterosexual one. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra
note 174, at 161; see also Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual
Testator, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 225, 266-67 (1981) (concluding in light of the dearth of
case law that the lover-legatee of the homosexual testator may have a more difficult chal-
lenge at probate than does his or her heterosexual counterpart and suggesting planning
procedures by which the testator may help to circumvent potential challenges somewhat).
244. Decriminalization of homosexual acts is obviously an important initial goal of gay
and lesbian activists. For example, in September of 1992 the Supreme Court of Kentucky
held that Kentucky's so-called antisodomy statute was violative of privacy rights under the
state constitution and was also violative of equal protection as guaranteed by the state
constitution. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 491-92 (Ky. 1992) (striking
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
nition of family property rights245 traditionally limited to their
statute punishing "deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the same sex;" the
statute was not limited to acts of sodomy). Gays and lesbians cannot realistically hope to
gain the full panoply of family property rights in states that retain such statutes. See also
infra note 245 (discussing homosexuality and family property, marriage, and child cus-
tody).
245. In 1989, for example, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that a surviving "life-
time partner" of a deceased tenant was a member of the decedent's family under a New
York City rent control regulation:
[W]e conclude that the term family, as used in [the regulation], should not be
rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their relationship by
obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or an adoption order. The intended
protection against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions
or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in the reality of family
life. In the context of eviction, a more realistic, and certainly equally valid,
view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long
term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interde-
pendence. This view comports both with our society's traditional concept of
"family" and with the expectations of individuals who live in such nuclear
units.
Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (survivor could not be
dispossessed by the landlord merely because only decedent's name was on the lease). For
a discussion of the case by the attorney who served as co-counsel for Braschi, see gener-
ally Rubenstein, supra note 243, at 95-97 ("It was the first time in history that a gay
couple had been found to be the legal equivalent of a family by the highest court in any
state.").
Also important are the increasing number of state statutes and municipal ordi-
nances which prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See Sherman,
supra note 242, at 1 (noting that approximately 20 states have anti-gay discrimination leg-
islation in employment or housing). Most of these laws are attempts to prevent discrim-
ination in the workplace. As opponents are quick to note, however, absent very careful
wording such laws may later be read expansively to include benefits for the homosexual
employee's family. See Rubenstein, supra note 243, at 92-93 (noting how general nondis-
crimination statute may allow lesbian to argue entitlement to health care benefits for her
partner and the couple's child). But see, e.g., Hinman v. Department of Personnel Admin.,
213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 411, 419-20 (Ct. App. 1985) (denying dental benefit coverage to
unmarried partners of homosexual state employee did not unlawfully discriminate in viola-
tion of equal protection provision of California constitution or executive order prohibiting
employment discrimination in state government based on sexual orientation).
On the local level, domestic partnership ordinances have been enacted in a
number of cities. See Sherman, supra note 242, at 1 (noting cities and municipalities that
allow cohabiting couples to register as domestic partners; others provide employees with
certain domestic partnership benefits). See generally Bowman & Cornish, supra note 239,
at 1186-21 (examining domestic partnership ordinances and proposing model language).
Some large private companies have begun to extend certain benefits to the
partners of homosexual employees. See Sherman, supra note 242, at 1 (noting recent
successes by gays and lesbians). And in 1993, a San Francisco law firm became the first
large law firm to provide health benefits to partners of homosexual employees. Law Firm
to Reimburse, supra note 243; see also Victoria Slind-Flor, Domestic Policy, NAT'L LJ.,
Sept. 7, 1992, at 2 (reporting on the new benefits). Many employers, however, may be
reluctant to provide employee benefits to nontraditional family units because of lack of
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heterosexual, married counterparts.24 If homosexuality ultimately
proves to be based on a genetic predisposition and is immuta-
ble-as most scientists' believe and some noted jurists"
acceptance by the IRS and insurers. See [Jul.-Dec.] 18 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 2010
(Nov. 4, 1991) (citing a 1991 research paper by Hewitt Associates).
At a time when almost half of the states still criminalize homosexual behavior,
it is unlikely that gay and lesbian marriage will be legally recognized within the foresee-
able future even in the more traditionally liberal states. See, e.g., Ken Hoover, Same-sex
Marriage Bill Stalls, UPI, Apr. 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File
(describing opposition to California bill, introduced in 1991, that would legalize same-sex
marriage). But see supra note 242 (discussing Baehr v. Leivin and recent challenge to
Hawaii marriage statute). Perhaps a more realistic goal for all cohabiting couples-gay or
straight-is the enactment of comprehensive domestic partnership acts on the state level.
At least in states that acknowledge the changed structure of family relationships in mod-
em society, such acts would protect the cohabiting family to some degree. Cf. POSNER,
supra note 229, at 311-14, 440-41 (suggesting further study of the domestic partnership
laws of Denmark and Sweden as potential models for use in the United States as an
intermediate solution to the question of homosexual marriage).
246. In Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59, Judge Levinson listed several marital rights and benefits
denied to same-sex couples in Hawaii. These include (1) rights relating to dower, curtesy,
and inheritance; (2) rights to notice, protection, benefits, and inheritance under the UPC;
(3) control, division, acquisition, and disposition of community property; (4) a variety of
state income tax advantages, including deductions, credits, rates, exemptions, and estimates;
(5) public assistance from and exemptions relating to the Department of Human Services;
(6) award of child custody and support payments in divorce proceedings; (7) the right to
spousal support; (8) the right to enter into premarital agreements; (9) the right to change
of name; (10) the right to file a nonsupport action; (11) post-divorce rights relating to
support and property division; (12) the benefit of the spousal privilege and confidential
marital communications; (13) the benefit of the exemption of real property from attach-
ment or execution; (14) the right to bring a wrongful death action. Id.
247. At least five studies in recent years have indicated that biology may help to ex-
plain homosexuality. In 1991 neuroscientist Simon LeVay published his findings that a
cluster of cells in the hypothalmus of the male homosexual resembled that found in fe-
males rather than in heterosexual males. See Ann Gibbons, Is Homosexuality Biological?,
253 SCtENCE 956, 956 (Aug. 30, 1991) (reporting on contemporary efforts to identify a
genetic basis for homosexuality). Also in that year a study of male twins conducted by
J. Michael Bailey and Richard C. Pillard indicated an increased likelihood that an identi-
cal twin of a gay male will himself be gay. A subsequent study by Bailey and Pillard
found that an identical twin of a lesbian is herself much more likely to be lesbian than is
the fraternal female twin or other sisters. A 1992 study by Laura Allen and Roger Gorski
found a brain structure (the "anterior commissure") to be 34% larger in homosexual males
than in heterosexual males and 18% larger than in heterosexual women. Joyce Price,
Mother's Genes Called Determiner of Homosexuality, WASH. TIMES, July 16, 1993, at A5.
Some of these studies have been criticized as flawed or incomplete or because their
authors are gay and may have political reasons for promulgating their hypotheses. See,
e.g., Richard A. Knox, Gene May Help Explain the Origin of Homosexuality, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 16, 1993, national/foreign section at 1 (pointing out that some critics have
called studies "merely circumstantial" or "methodologically flawed"); The MacNeil/Lehrer
News Hour: Focus-Sexual Chemistry, (PBS television broadcast, July 15, 1993) (transcript
#4711) [hereinafter MacNeillLehrer News Hour] (noting that some Freudian psychoanalysts,
still asserting their ability "to cure" homosexuality, dispute the biological link to homosex-
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strongly suspect-family laws which exclude gays and lesbians
from marriage and its benefits will be very difficult to justify
uality and point out that at least two of the previous studies were authored in part by
gay men).
The most recent and persuasive study was released by Dean H. Hamer, a geneticist
at the National Cancer Institute, and four colleagues on July 16, 1993 in the journal
Science. The work suggests that certain genes on the bottom half of the X chromosome
inherited from the mother may predispose some men to be homosexuals. See Natalie
Angier, Report Suggests Homosexuality Is Linked to Genes, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1993, at
Al (noting that even those who denounced earlier studies consider this one to be "im-
pressive science"); Boyce Rensberger, Study Links Genes to Homosexuality, WASH. POST.,
July 16, 1993, at Al (noting scientists' views that this study, unlike earlier ones, is excel-
lent, but needs replication). According to Dr. Hamer, the study indicates there is a 99%
probability that specific genes increase the likelihood of a man being homosexual. See
Charles Petit, New Evidence of "Gay Gene" In Some Men, S.F. CHRON., July 16, 1993,
at Al, A15 (noting that such genes are passed from mother to son on X chromosome).
In a television appearance, Dr. Hamer stated:
I think all scientists that have studied sexual orientation already agree that
there's very little element of choice in whether or not people "choose" to be
gay or heterosexual. The important question is whether or not there's a defined
genetic component, and if we can ultimately understand how that works.
ABC News Nightline: The Genetic Link to Male Homosexuality (ABC television broadcast,
July 15, 1993) [hereinafter Nightline].
Not everyone is impressed with the Hamer study, however. The president of the
Traditional Values Coalition, the Reverend Louis Sheldon, stated: "This is just another sci-
entific study being manipulated for the political gain of the homosexual lobby. It doesn't
change the nature of their demands or the fact that they are out of the mainstream."
Price, supra, at A5. Sheldon noted that the matter is simple: "The body parts don't fit.
And I don't believe nature would do that to the human race." MacNeil/Lehrer News
Hour, supra. Sheldon stated that his feelings would not change even if the genetic link
were conclusive, because "you still cannot justify the lifestyle." Id.
Moreover, some gays and lesbians had mixed reactions to the Hamer report.
Some feared that it might lead to efforts to detect homosexuality, resulting in further
discrimination against them. Such genetic information could also lead to ethical con-
cerns-for instance, the propriety of aborting of a fetus containing the genetic material in
question. See, e.g., Nightline, supra (relating the concerns of medical ethicist Arthur
Caplan that establishing a genetic basis for homosexuality may lead to attempts to elimi-
nate homosexuality biologically or to compare homosexuality to a disease such as alcohol-
ism); MacNeil/Leher News Hour, supra (expressing concern over genetic alteration of
homosexuals and abortion of potentially gay babies).
248. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 229, at 98-108, 119, 163, 438 (1992) ("I have re-
jected the suggestion that sexual preference is itself chosen; I believe it is for the most
part immutable."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 1616 (2d ed.
1988) (noting that sexual orientation is probably not a matter of choice and that "homo-
sexuals in particular seem to satisfy all of the Court's implicit criteria of suspectness"). In
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 500-01 (Ky. 1992), Justice Liebson refused
to ignore the medical, scientific, and sociological evidence that sexual orientation is likely
not a choice and rejected as "simply outrageous" the Commonwealth's assertions that ho-
mosexuals are more promiscuous than heterosexuals and are more prone to engage in sex
acts in public.
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objectively.249 In the not too distant future, the claim of a ho-
mosexual to an elective share in the deceased partner's estate may
not be dismissed as easily as it was in a recent New York case."
249. See Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family," 26
GoNz. L. REv. 91, 106-11 (1990-91) (discussing constitutional questions concerning same-
sex marriage). In Baehr, Judge Bums of the Hawaii Supreme Court examined local media
coverage of the origins of homosexuality and concluded that if homosexuality is "biologi-
cally fated," then the Hawaii constitution probably bars the state from discriminating
against persons on the basis of sexual orientation. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 69-70. Cf. Thomas
H. Maugh II, Study Strongly Links Genetics, Homosexuality, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1993, at
Al (mentioning scientist/attorney Richard Green's opinion that if homosexuality is immu-
table, constitutional limitations on discrimination may necessarily include gays and lesbi-
ans); All Things Considered: New Study Suggests Biological Basis of Homosexuality (NPR
radio broadcast July 15, 1993) (interviewing Richard Green, who opined that in light of a
genetic basis for homosexuality, laws discriminating against gays could be upheld only if
they fulfilled a compelling national interest).
As long as many Americans believe AIDS to be a gay male disease, however, some
segments of society may assert public health as a compelling state interest for excluding
gay men (though not lesbians) from the full panoply of family rights. Cf UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-1-2(1) (1953 & Supp. 1987) (repealed 1993) (prohibiting and declaring void
marriage with person afflicted with AIDS). Concerning religious beliefs and custom as
compelling interests, the words of Judge Levinson of the Hawaii Supreme Court seem
particularly apt: "With all due respect . . . we do not believe that . . . judges are the
ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving [v. Virginia] amply
demonstrates, constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that customs change with an
evolving social order." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 63.
250. In In re Estate of Cooper, the Surrogate's Court of Kings County, New York held
that the survivor of a same-sex couple has no right or standing to elect against the
decedent's will. 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688 (Sur. Ct. 1990). The plaintiff argued that he and
the testator had lived together for over four years and that, except for their homosexual-
ity, their relationship was identical to that of heterosexual spouses. They shared a common
home; they shared expenses; their friends recognized them as spouses; and they had a
physical relationship. Id. at 685. Although the court reviewed the Braschi decision and its
broadened definition of family the Court of Appeals had recognized under a rent control
statute, see supra note 245, it concluded that "[tihere is a great distinction between being
part of a family entitled to the protection of rent control laws because of public policy
and legislative intent, and in being a surviving spouse of a decedent." Cooper, 564
N.Y.S.2d at 688. The court stated that recognizing the plaintiff's claim to an elective
share would be impermissible judicial legislating and contrary to the public policy ex-
pressed by the New York legislature. The court also noted:
[T]he state has a compelling interest in fostering the traditional institution of
marriage (whether based on self-preservation, procreation, or in nurturing and
keeping alive the concept of marriage and family as a basic fabric of our soci-
ety), as old and as fundamental as our entire civilization, which institution is
deeply rooted and long established in firm and rich societal values.
Id. In 1993, the Appellate Division affirmed. In re Estate of Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797
(App. Div. 1993) (quoting language from Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn.
1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)), appeal dismissed, 624 N.E.2d 696 (N.Y. 1993).
See supra note 242 (discussing Baker and cases denying gays and lesbians the right to
marry). The court also denied the plaintiff's claim under the state constitution, finding that
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Extension of the forced share to gay or lesbian cohabitants
would be anathema to some segments of American society, which
might prefer to abolish the elective share altogether rather than
extend its protection to homosexual couples. Moreover, the individ-
uals comprising an adult gay or lesbian couple currently have
many (though clearly not all) of the same opportunities to protect
themselves from disinheritance as do married heterosexual
individuals.25' If, of course, the current forced share is now un-
necessary even for married couples, 2"2 then the question of ex-
tending the forced share to unmarried lovers need not be long
dwelled upon: total abolition of the forced share would eliminate
the increasingly difficult question of whether for disinheritance pur-
poses a partner or lover is the equivalent of a spouse in the mod-
em family.
As with heterosexual cohabiting relationships, it is the minor
child of gay and lesbian couples who under current law is both
unprovided for and incapable of protecting herself from disinheri-
tance. Gay and lesbian parenting is an increasingly common occur-
rence.53 Estimates indicate that as many as eight to ten million
children have been born into families with a gay or lesbian par-
ent.54 Like other children in this country, the child whose gay or
homosexual activity is not a constitutional right and that there is a sufficient rational basis
to satisfy the equal protection issue. 592 N.Y.S.2d at 799-800 (quoting Baker on the Bib-
lical institution of marriage to procreate and rear children and stating that dismissal of
Baker for lack of a substantial federal question was a holding that the constitutional chal-
lenge was considered and rejected by the Supreme Court).
251. Gays and lesbians, because of their exclusion from the status of marriage with its
inherent benefits, have of necessity become more aware than their heterosexual counter-
parts of the legal alternatives by which they can fashion their relationship. See Rubenstein,
supra note 243, at 92. Closeted homosexual couples may be wary of revealing their rela-
tionship to an attorney who could draft necessary documents for their protection, however.
Moreover, many homosexuals consider having to resort to such measures to be a second-
rate alternative at best.
252. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text (discussing abolition of the forced
share).
253. Gays and lesbians appear to have the same desire as heterosexuals to parent. See
POSNER, supra note 229, at 147, 419 (noting desire of homosexuals to parent and con-
cluding that flat rules against homosexuals adopting or having custody of children is un-
desirable); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood
to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78
GEO. L.J. 459, 461 n.2, 462 n.3 (1990) (presenting statistics on lesbian and gay
parenting).
254. In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 30 (N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J., dis-
senting). Cf Polikoff, supra note 253, at 461 n.2 (citing estimates ranging from six to 10
million). As with most statistics dealing with homosexuality, precise figures are almost
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lesbian cohabiting parent dies has no direct protection from disin-
heritance. 55 Like other children of cohabiting parents, the child
of gay or lesbian parents receives no indirect protection from the
conduit theory, since no elective share is provided to the cohabiting
survivor. 6 These children of unmarried parents deserve protec-
tion from disinheritance.
B. Children
1. Legislative Inertia
When "family" meant two heterosexual, married parents and
their children, unaffected by divorce and remarriage, the elective
share system was more effective and thus more justifiable than it
is now. After all, the surviving parent who received the elective
share was obligated to support the couple's children. Today, how-
ever, large numbers of minor children are denied this indirect
protection from disinheritance because in our multiple marriage
society the surviving spouse often is not the parent of the
testator's minor children. Moreover, large numbers of children in
America now have only one legal parent because of soaring rates
in single motherhood;s 7 the child disinherited in these instances
impossible to obtain.
255. The one exception is the child of a Louisiana testator. See supra notes 115-23 and
accompanying text (discussing the legitime).
256. Although several reported cases have dealt with the effect of death of one homo-
sexual parent upon the surviving partner and the decedent's biological children, most of
these cases involve custody battles between the non-biological, homosexual surviving par-
ent and the biological parent's relatives. See generally Polikoff, supra note 253, at 527-33
(discussing cases involving custody disputes that arose after the death of lesbian biological
parent). If courts permit the non-biological, homosexual parent to adopt the child during
the homosexual relationship, such custody battles presumably will cease. With its opinion
in In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt. 1993), the Vermont Supreme Court became
the first state high court to permit adoption by the biological parent's same-sex partner.
When such adoptions are permitted, the child has two legal mothers or fathers. See also
In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1002 (Sur. Ct. 1992) (holding that lesbian partner of
biological parent was entitled to adopt child and serve as coparent; citing cases holding
same); Jeffrey Gold, N.J. Court Grants Adoption to Lesbian's Partner, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Aug. 11, 1993, at A18 (reporting on the decision of a Newark Superior
Court judge to allow a lesbian to adopt the child of her artificially inseminated partner).
The lover or partner in these cases still has no right to an elective share when the bio-
logical parent/partner dies, of course. The non-biological parent will, however, have a
continuing duty to support the adopted minor child, thus ameliorating the child's plight
somewhat if disinherited by his or her natural mother.
257. See supra note 13 (indicating that almost one in four American women of child-
bearing age has had a child outside of marriage).
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is also denied even the minimal protection provided by the con-
duit theory. The law of decedents' estates has failed to account
for these modem changes in family structures, and consequently
the interests of millions of American children have been
marginalized.
It seems likely that this unfortunate result stems from an
inadvertent omission or unawareness on the part of state legisla-
tures. 5 As previously discussed, the disappearance of the forced
share for English children was itself perhaps a historical acci-
dent. 9 Although dower benefited the widow, it also indirectly
benefited the testator's young children by her.26 As the twenti-
eth-century successor to dower, the conventional elective share
was intended to accomplish dower's purposes more satisfactori-
ly.261 Some legislatures have explicitly included the testator's
minor children among the beneficiaries of the temporary protec-
tion afforded by the family allowance.262 The legislative intent
behind dower, the conventional elective share, and other family
protection provisions recognizes implicitly the moral obligation of
the parent to provide for a minor child beyond the parent's
death.263 Unfortunately, statutes modeled on the once ubiquitous
traditional family no longer address the obligation adequately
because millions of nontraditional families exist in America today.
Thus, while the support obligation remains, it is increasingly
likely to go unfulfilled upon the testator's death. To the extent
that the estate is sufficient to support the minor child, her protec-
tion from disinheritance would serve the interests of the state as
well as those of the child, for a disinherited minor frequently will
become an additional burden on an already overtaxed welfare
system.
Instead of affording indirect protection to minor children in
traditional families only, legislatures could provide direct protec-
258. See infra note 287 (suggesting that legislative and judicial inertia explains the state
of the law of disinheritance, including that of the unprotected child).
259. Supra note 105.
260. Supra note 25.
261. See supra notes 32-34.
262. Many homestead and personal property exemptions also recognize minor children of
the testator as potential recipients upon his death. See supra notes 168, 175-76 (discussing
family allowance, homestead, and personal property exemption).
263. By enacting numerous support statutes, legislatures have recognized explicitly the
moral obligation a parent owes during his lifetime to support his minor children. Cf infra
note 294 (citing statutory criminal penalties imposed for breach of support obligation).
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tion from disinheritance to all minor children.' It is possible to
protect both the surviving spouse and the minor child; millions of
people around the world accept the civil law concepts of commu-
nity property and forced heirship without question. Most American
jurisdictions appear unready to accept community property princi-
ples, however, whether it be from reluctance to accept spousal
equality during the marriage or from fear of the system's per-
ceived complexity. 6 Moreover, the one forced heir provision
which exists in this country has been the source of much contro-
versy. 7 If civil law concepts are unlikely to be adopted in the
United States, the testator's family maintenance provisions of
commonwealth countries are even more unlikely to find accep-
tance here. Most American scholars have rejected testator's family
maintenance, fearing its reliance on judicial discretion and the
corresponding unpredictability of results obtained." 8 American
legislatures also have shown little interest in the approach.
Because the law of disinheritance in America is concerned
foremost with protection of the surviving spouse in common law
states, much of this Article has examined elective share schemes
and questioned whether states should retain them at all. The more
disturbing aspect of disinheritance laws in America, however, is
the conspicuous lack of protection of America's minor children,
who now more than ever appear likely to be disinherited.269
264. Cf infra note 273 (describing surveys indicating that majority of Americans do not
believe a testator should be allowed to disinherit minor child).
265. See supra note 50; see also Bruce, supra note 96 (describing UMPA as a result of
feminist maneuvering).
266. See supra note 50.
267. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 153.
269. Scholars have paid only slightly more attention than legislators to this problem.
The significant works on the topic are sparse indeed. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. MACDONALD.
FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE 35-36, 307-08 (1960) (proposing model act allowing
children under 18 as well as children physically or mentally incapable of maintaining
themselves to apply for maintenance from testator's estate); LEWIS M. SlidES, PUBLIC
POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 24, 29-30 (1955) (concluding that child should be able to
take against parent's will only to extent that child cannot provide his own maintenance
and education); Deborah A. Batts, I Didn't Ask to Be Born: The American Law of Dis-
inheritance and a Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41
HASTINGS LJ. 1197, 1253-69 (1990) (proposing a "protected inheritance" whenever testa-
tor leaves one or more children); Cahn, supra note 5, at 147 (advocating provision for
dependent children based on court determination); Haskell, supra note 27, at 114-16 (ad-
vocating protection for the needy minor at the least); Haskell, supra note 7, at 519-20
(advocating limited forced share for children with possibility of supplement tied to minori-
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Moreover, this problem exists in both common law and communi-
ty property jurisdictions.
Even under the least arbitrary and most progressive of the
current elective share schemes-that of the 1990 UPC-a testator
is free to disinherit his zhildren"' If the surviving spouse is not
the parent of the testator's children (and thus has no legal duty to
support them), or if the testator is not bound by judicial decree or
contractual agreement to provide for his child after his death,"
even the needy minor child may receive nothing from his es-
tate.27  Public policy should require the protection of the
ty or education; amounts would be placed in trust until child reaches 21 or completes
education, whichever occurs later); Laube, supra note 4, at 564-69 (discussing "unnatural"
wills in 19th- and early 20th-century cases of child disinheritance); Rein, supra note 102,
at 44-56 (advocating testator's family maintenance).
270. See supra notes 76-101 (describing 1990 UPC forced share in favor of surviving
spouse only).
271. Because the parental duty of support generally ends at the child's majority or upon
the death of the parent, courts traditionally have been reluctant to extend child support
obligations beyond the death of the obligor parent. For example, in Layton v. Layton, 139
S.E.2d 732 (N.C. 1965), the court noted that the duty to support one's child is not a
property right of the child, but rather a personal duty of the parent which is terminated
by the parent's death. Thus, because the support order in question contained no express or
clearly implied provision that the payments were to continue beyond the obligor's death,
his obligation ended at his death. Id. at 734-35. See also Gardine v. Cottey, 230 S.W.2d
731, 746-50 (Mo. 1950) (en banc) (holding that father's liability for the support of his
children terminated upon his death).
Some jurisdictions, however, have recognized that the obligor may by agreement or
contract obligate himself to extend the duty of support past his death. See, e.g., Herring
v. Moore, 561 S.W.2d 95, 96, 98 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that support obligation
continued past obligor's death because support agreement specified that payments would
continue until the child reached 18 and child was still a minor at obligor's death); In re
North Carolina Inheritance Taxes, 277 S.E.2d 403, 409 (N.C. 1981) (noting that intention
to create continuing obligation must be clearly expressed); Bradshaw v. Smith, 269 S.E.2d
750, 752 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) ("[a]bsent some indication of a contrary intent, where a
valid separation agreement requires the father to make child support payments, states
terminating contingencies, and is silent as to the effect of the father's death, his estate is
bound to provide support payments according to the terms of the agreement"); Wendell v.
Sovran Bank/Central South, 780 S.W.2d 372, 374-75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (extending
obligor's duty to support beyond his death not as a matter of law, but because of lan-
guage in document creating support obligation).
Even in the absence of a contractual extension of the support obligation, some courts
have emphasized the state's concern for the welfare of children as a valid reason for con-
tinuing the support obligation. See, e.g., Hill v. Matthews, 416 P.2d 144, 145 (N.M.
1966) (noting three lines of opinion-termination upon death, no termination upon death,
and intention as indicated in court decree). Nonetheless, as one author has noted, a good
child support agreement will require specifically that support payments will continue be-
yond the death of the obligated parent if there is no "acceptable, alternative protection for
the children such as life insurance or a specific bequest" in the parent's will. JOSEPH I.
LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 61 (1986).
272. There are numerous situations in which a child may not receive the benefit of the
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testator's children until they reach majority.273 This solution
seems particularly appropriate when it is recognized that the
child's current lack of direct protection may be the result of his-
torical accident and that the indirect protection afforded through
the spousal share or community property does not include millions
of children in nontraditional families.274
Although there is a dearth of statistical studies on point, it
seems likely that disinheritance of children occurs with greater
trickle down from the surviving spouse's elective share. A few of them are as follows:
Harry and Wanda divorce and Wanda receives custody of their minor children. Harry
agrees to pay child support, but neither the decree nor the agreement specifies -that the
support payments are to be claims against his estate. Harry marries Wilma and bequeaths
his entire estate to her. In most jurisdictions, Wilma takes everything and the children
receive nothing from his estate (except perhaps some temporary benefits during estate
administration). See supra note 271 (discussing effect of child support agreements or de-
crees).
Harry and Wanda are married and have no children. During his marriage to Wanda,
however, Harry fathers a child born out-of-wedlock to Gloria. Shortly before his death,
Harry executes a will leaving everything to his new girlfriend Polly, specifically disinherit-
ing any child who is or may claim to be his son or daughter. Wanda can elect her
forced share and Polly is likely to receive the remainder. The minor child born out of
wedlock, even if able to prove paternity, will probably not receive anything from Harry's
estate. See supra note 102 (noting problems faced by pretermitted children).
Almost all of the family assets are held in Harry's name. Harry disinherits his wife
Wanda, leaving his entire estate to Jennifer, a new girlfriend. Harry and Wanda die simul-
taneously (or Wanda dies a few days after Harry but without having made an election
against the will in a state where the option of election terminates upon her death).
Jennifer will take under Harry's will in most jurisdictions; the minor children will have
neither direct nor indirect long-term protection.
By holographic will, Harry bequeaths everything to his second wife Wilma, "know-
ing that she will remember" their infant children as well as his minor children from his
first marriage. Upon his death, what Wilma may be inclined to recall is the difference
between her children and those children. The precatory language is probably not binding
upon Wilma, and those children from the first marriage will be left out.
273. See Clavin v. Clavin, 233 S.E.2d 151, 152-53 (Ga. 1977) (noting that even though
public policy strongly favors support of minor children by father's estate, court cannot as
matter of law require estate to provide for child after father's death through support de-
cree). The majority of the American public appears to believe a testator should not be
able to disinherit totally his minor children. See, e.g., SUSSMAN et al., supra note 5, at
210 (citing survey in which 57% of testate and 62% of intestate respondents agreed with
the statement, "When a person makes a will, he or she should be required by law to
leave money or property to his or her minor children"); Dunham, supra note 184, at 256
n.29 (citing 1958 Nebraska study in which 93.4% of respondents indicated disinheritance
should be prohibited if child is under 21; 63.4% indicated disinheritance should be prohib-
ited even if child is over 21). But see Browder, supra note 153, at 1307 (reasoning that
there has been virtually no sentiment for changing the law concerning disinheritance of
children because it is rare and, when it occurs, usually occurs for cause).
274. See supra notes 11-13 (citing statistics on divorce, cohabitation, and single moth-
erhood).
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frequency than does disinheritance of the surviving spouse. '
275. See, e.g., SISSMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 91 (noting that in sample of 28 cases
in which testator had remarried, over 57% bequeathed entire estate to spouse or legatees
from last marriage). See also supra note 186 (discussing statistical information indicating
children are likely to be disinherited in favor of surviving spouse, particularly in tradi-
tional nuclear family).
The reported cases as well as general observation support the hypothesis that the
noncustodial divorced parent is particularly likely to disinherit his child. For instance, in
Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (I11. 1978), the Illinois Supreme Court noted
as follows:
[W]hile it is comparatively rare for a nondivorced parent to leave a spouse and
their children out of a will, it is not so uncommon for a divorced parent to do
so . . . . A divorced parent may establish a new family which may command
primary allegiance in a subsequent will. The well-being of children of a former
marriage may seem more remote to a noncustodial parent than the well-being
of those children over whom that same parent has immediate care and custody.
In addition, the divorced parent may harbor animosity toward a former spouse,
which disposition might obscure the natural tendency to provide in a will for
their mutual children. These are reasonable assumptions for the legislature to
have made and assumptions which courts in other jurisdictions have counte-
nanced.
Id. at 1390-91.
In In re Estate of Brown, 597 P.2d 23 (Idaho 1979), the court cited cases granting
an extension of child support beyond death of the divorced parent "[blecause of the great-
er likelihood of a divorced father leaving a child without financial protection or security."
Id. at 25. The court also noted that "[w]hile it is true that the common law doctrine in
effect permits a parent to disinherit a child, there is no great danger that a parent would
exercise this arbitrary right so long as the family unit remained intact." Id.; see also id.
at 24 (noting that testator's will acknowledged infant from first marriage, but devised
entire estate to second wife with whom he had four children); Herring v. Moore, 561
S.W.2d 95, 96-97 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (noting that testator bequeathed $10 of a $64,000
estate to his infant adopted daughter being reared by his ex-wife); Homung v. Estate of
Lagerquist, 473 P.2d 541, 543 (Mont. 1970) (quoting will in which father bequeathed $1
of $400,000 estate to infant daughter from prior marriage; support obligation extended
beyond father's death); Hill v. Matthews, 416 P.2d 144, 144 (N.M. 1966) (extending
father's support obligation beyond his death because of agreement and specifically noting
that a few weeks after divorce from her mother, father executed will leaving infant
daughter one dollar).
In In re Estate of Fessman, 126 A.2d 676 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956), the testator and his
wife divorced shortly after the birth of their son. He executed a will which bequeathed
one-half of his residuary estate to his parents and the remainder to one Eva Puccinelli.
Later he sent a letter to his ex-wife's attorney, agreeing to pay a fixed amount monthly
for child support in lieu of the earlier court order. There was no termination date stated
in the promise to pay such amount. Finally, the testator asked his ex-wife to remarry
him, but he died before the marriage and before he had changed his will. Eva claimed
the testator's obligation of support ended at his death and thus that she was entitled to
one-half of the residuary estate. The court found that the letter was an ambiguous con-
tract, allowed parol testimony, and held that the testator had in fact contracted to support
his son during the child's minority-thus the obligation was binding upon his estate. Id.
at 677-78. Under the traditional view, if the support contract is silent as to duration, then
the obligation terminates at the obligor's death. See, e.g., Gordon v. Valley Nat'l Bank,
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The intentional disinheritance of a child by a competent testator is
both permissible and unchallengeable.276 Even if disinheritance
of minor children were proven to be less frequent than disinheri-
tance of spouses,277 there remains a crucial distinction between
the positions of the disinherited spouse and the disinherited minor
child: because of her minority, the minor child with few excep-
tions has no ability or opportunity to protect herself from disin-
heritance." The child has no choice concerning her existence
492 P.2d 444, 446-47 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) ("absent a specific or manifestly clear and
unmistakable provision for survival of support paymentsi they will abate upon the death
of a divorced obligoer"); see also supra note 271 (discussing when the obligation to pro-
vide support terminates).
276. In McKamey v. Watkins, 273 N.E.2d 542 (Ind. 1971), the testator was survived by
a child to whom he owed an inter vivos child support obligation pursuant to a divorce
decree. The testator's mother was the sole beneficiary under his will. The Supreme Court
of Indiana noted that the testator's responsibility for his minor child terminated at death.
The court further noted, however, the anomaly created by an Indiana statute that imposed
a posthumous support obligation in favor of a father's child born out of wedlock when
paternity had been established. Nonetheless, the court ruled for the testator's estate, stating
that the child's argument should be addressed to the legislature. Id. at 542-43.
277. Compare Dunham, supra note 184, at 256-57 (concluding in 1963 that the problem
of disinheritance of a minor child "does not really exist in modem society given the
longevity of the average adult together with the early marriage and the early time of
having children") with MACDONALD, supra note 269, at 35 (noting in 1960 that "[tlhere
would appear to be as much if not a greater need for protection of the minor children as
of the surviving spouse"). See generally Rein, supra note 102, at 12-15 (discussing cases
of disinheritance of minors); Laube, supra note 4, at 559-87 (noting numerous 19th- and
early 20th-century cases).
Fathers' lifetime refusal to pay child support for noncustodial children is well-docu-
mented. See, e.g., LIEBERMAN, supra note 271, at ix ("[c]hild support in America is a
national disgrace"; more than half of fathers ordered to pay disobey the orders). A reason-
able extrapolation from these statistics is that these same fathers will feel very little obli-
gation to provide posthumously for their children. See also CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND,
THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1992, 71-121 (listing by state the percentage of
child support collected in 1990, ranging from low of 5.6% in Arizona to high of 32.6%
in Vermont).
278. In 1977, Professor Haskell made the following comment on the "mysterious ab-
sence of protection for children":
There is no explanation for the failure to protect minor children from
disinheritance where there is no surviving parent or where the surviving parent
has inadequate means to support the child, other than that such disinheritance
rarely occurs. This is undoubtedly true, but the same can be said for all kinds
of aberrational conduct which the law prohibits or punishes.
Every moral obligation need not have its legal counterpart. Moral ob-
ligations in the family support area do have legal counterparts in many re-
spects, but the one inexplicable exception is the absence of any legal obligation
to assure support for minor children in some manner after death.
Haskell, supra note 27, at 114-15. With the continuing increase in serial family formation
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and has no choice concerning the parent/child relationship that
follows. Unable to provide for herself or terminate the relation-
ship,279 she is bound to a "family" which she neither created nor
can change. 8 Moreover, the ability to disinherit is not mutual:
because in most states a child under eighteen cannot make a will,
the child cannot disinherit her parent.8 ' Ironically, the effect is
that the parent receives the benefit of forced heirship which is
denied to his child.
2. Protecting the Minor Child from Disinheritance
a. The legitime
There are a variety of ways in which the minor child of a
testator could be protected in the United States. The most direct
method of protecting the testator's child is to provide her with a
legitime 2  The legitime has several characteristics that make it
and childbirth out of wedlock, as well as the well-documented difficulty of collecting inter
vivos child support obligations, the ineluctable conclusion is that child disinheritance un-
fortunately is no longer rare. Thus, Professor Haskell's observations concerning moral/legal
obligations are even more apropos today.
279. Even in the adoption scenario, the infant child unlike the prospective parent typi-
cally has no choice in the adoption arrangement. See also Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So.
2d 780 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that an unemancipated minor child lacks the
capacity to bring a termination of parental rights proceeding in his own right). In
Kingsley, the much-publicized case in which 13-year-old Gregory K. successfully "di-
vorced" his parents, the appellate court subsequently held that the termination proceeding
could only be brought by an attorney or an adult who has knowledge of the facts al-
leged, or is informed of them and believes them to be true. Id. at 784. That Gregory
filed his own petition was deemed harmless error, however, because separate petitions for
termination were also filed by other adults on his behalf. Id. at 785. But cf In re Pima
County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-113432, 872 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1993) (allowing child to be petitioner in action to sever parental rights under Arizona
law).
280. For an unusually eloquent discussion of the parent-child relationship and what it
should mean in the law of disinheritance, see Batts, supra note 269, at 1263-69 (conclud-
ing that "non-choices" experienced by minor child are contributions the child makes to
family assets).
281. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ALL-STATES WILLS AND ESTATE PLANNING
GUIDE (1993). Only a few states deviate from this general age requirement. In California
and Idaho, an emancipated minor can make a will. Id. at 4-31, 4-92. In Georgia, the
minimum age requirement for executing a valid will is 14. Id. at 4-77. In Indiana, a
person under 18 may make a will if a member of the Armed Forces. Id. at 4-105. In
Louisiana, the minimum age requirement is 16. Id. at 4-130. See also SAMUEL M. DAVIS
& MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW 34-36 (1987) (discussing
testamentary transfers of property by minors).
282. Cf. Haskell, supra note 7, at 518-26. Almost 30 years ago, Professor Haskell pro-
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a plausible choice for use in the United States. Because the legi-
time is a fixed portion of the estate, it is easy to administer. As
with the fixed fractional spousal provision, the procedural cost of
the legitime to the estate is minimal. Importantly, in a country
where the qualifications and training of probate judges vary wide-
ly, the legitime involves little or no judicial discretion in applica-
tion. Moreover, because of the Louisiana experience, states have a
model from which to study and learn in adopting and applying
the legitime."3
Unfortunately, the Louisiana experience also demonstrates the
controversy that forced heirship can engender. Some Louisianans
would prefer to have their state join the inheritance approach of
the other forty-nine, rather than have the other states adopt the
legitime. In recent years, reducing the protected class to a
testator's children under twenty-three somewhat appeased oppo-
nents of the legitime. The age reduction was recently declared
unconstitutional, however, and acrimonious debate over the legi-
time between factions of Louisiana residents is likely to contin-
ue. 284
The legitime also is plagued by the same ill-suited response
to need as is the fractional elective share. It is an arbitrary
award285 which cannot take into account the actual need of the
posed a limited forced *share for children of a decedent. Under his proposal, the children
of a decedent would be entitled to one-third of the first $200,000 of the estate after debts
and expenses. Children under 21 (or age 26 if engaged in full-time college or graduate
education) would receive a supplemental forced share equalling the child's basic forced
share. These amounts would be placed in trust to pay income to the child until he or she
reaches age 21 or completes his or her education, whichever occurs later (but never be-
yond the age of 26). Id. at 519. See also infra note 288 (discussing recent proposal for
"protected inheritance").
283. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text (discussing legitime in Louisiana).
284. Efforts to enact a limited legitime--one that distinguishes among children as did
the recently stricken Louisiana provision-may be subject to attack under available state
equal protection provisions. In Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993) (holding
the age reduction unconstitutional), the only justice to address the equal protection claim
was Justice Kimball, in his dissenting opinion. See id. at 1197-200. He noted that the
statute in question had a legitimate purpose-the balancing of freedom of testation and
protection of forced heirship to those most likely to need it. Applying the required level
of review under Louisiana law (similar to intermediate scrutiny under the federal Constitu-
tion), Justice Kimball found that the statute substantially furthered the legitimate state
purpose. Id. at 1198-99. Moreover, he found that limiting the legitime to those children
under 23 or children mentally or physically infirm was not arbitrary or capricious or
unreasonable. Id. at 1199.
285. See supra note 72.
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disinherited child.286 Moreover, the legitime is unquestionably a
significant constraint on testamentary freedom. Perhaps more than
any other civilized people, Americans cling to and zealously
guard this freedom, even while other common law countries have
increasingly recognized a posthumous obligation to support needy
family members.2"7 On the whole, it appears that the civil law
legitime has little chance of gaining widespread acceptance in this
288country.
b. Testator's family maintenance
The modem commonwealth approach to protection from
disinheritance invokes judicial discretion. Because non-spousal
applicants are limited to awards of maintenance, frustration of the
testator's intent can be minimal even when the applicant is suc-
286. But cf infra note 287 (arguing that consanguinity alone is enough to require legi-
time or forced share for children).
287. But see Laufer, supra note 153, at 308 n.165 (stating that legislative inertia ap-
pears largely responsible for failure to remedy plight of minor children); Haskell, supra
note 7, at 500-01 (noting that although the platitude "freedom of alienation" could possi-
bly account for the law of disinheritance, the true explanation is legislative and judicial
inertia). Advocating a limited forced share not tied exclusively to need, Professor Haskell
made the following profound yet simple statement:
I believe that consanguinity may be justification in and of itself for claim to
some portion of the property of the decedent. I would not attempt to offer a
reasoned justification for this position, since it involves considerations which I
do not believe have their roots in reason. I believe, however, that it is a view
widely held, albeit inadequately articulated.
Id. at 525. The view is probably still widely held. More importantly, in the 30 years
since Professor Haskell's article appeared, the need of the disinherited minor child in
America may have become so important that legislators can no longer afford to overlook
her plight, regardless of beliefs about consanguinity.
288. In the most recent and thorough proposal for protecting children from disinheri-
tance in America, Professor Batts suggests a substantially modified form of legitime in
which one-half of the share of the children would be protected for their benefit. Under
the scheme, however, the needs of the minor (and dependent) children of the testator
would be satisfied first. A trust would be established to provide income to meet the
needs of these minor children. If money remained when the last child became emancipat-
ed, then all of the children would share the remainder equally. Batts, supra note 269, at
1255-56. Like Haskell, Batts would interpret "needs" expansively to include higher, full-
time education. Id. at 1255 n.323.
To state legislatures that wish to remedy the plight of the disinherited child, perhaps
the most controversial part of Professor Batts' proposal would be the priority given to
meeting the needs of minor or dependent children over the spousal forced share. See id.
at 1255-58 (presenting an example involving minor children, in which case one-half of
variable portion of surviving spousal share is also placed in trust for benefit of minor
children, whether or not the surviving spouse is biological parent of minor children).
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cessful. To reduce further the impact upon testamentary freedom,
an adopting legislature in America could limit the class of poten-
tial applicants to minor children. Nonetheless, application of the
"minor child" maintenance approach also seems unlikely to gain
widespread acceptance in the United States.29 Substantial costs
and attorney fees would be incurred in the application process. A
vengeful ex-spouse or ex-lover of the testator would be tempted
to expose the testator's dirty laundry in the process of ensuring
that her disinherited child by the testator received a satisfactory
maintenance award. Most importantly, there would be little pre-
dictability or comparability of result, with individual probate judg-
es left to follow their own views of moral obligation under the
nebulous guidelines characteristic of the family maintenance sys-
tem.29
c. Posthumous obligation of child support
In a society where noncustodial parents frequently shirk their
inter vivos child support obligations and are perhaps even more
likely to exclude the children from their wills, jurisdictions could
protect the disinherited child by recognizing the parent's posthu-
mous duty to support the child during minority.29' Statutory rec-
289. But see Rein, supra note 102, at 53-56 (advocating testator's family maintenance
and discussing perceived drawbacks of such a system).
290. One is reminded of the statement of Max Rheinstein regarding judicial discretion in
distributing marital property upon divorce: "We cannot have both individual justice (or
more correctly, the hope of individual justice) and predictable, fast, easy, and inexpensive
disposition of matters of divorce." Rheinstein, supra note 146, at 433. The statement
would also appear to be true of matters of family disinheritance.
291. The continuation of the parental obligation of support beyond death is not a novel
idea. When a child support order or agreement provides that the support obligation will
extend beyond the parent's death, the provision is recognized. See supra note 271 and
accompanying text (discussing cases that have extended the obligation beyond death).
Essentially, the child is treated as a protected creditor when such an order or agreement
exists. See also McKamey v. Watkins, 273 N.E.2d 542, 542-43 (Ind. 1971) (noting irony
of state legislation that recognized continuing support obligation to child born out of wed-
lock but not to legitimate child).
Moreover, in a few states, statutes permit the county to claim support from the
decedent's estate if the parent was chargeable with the support of the child, died leaving
the child chargeable to the county, and had an estate sufficient for the child's support.
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3952 (West Supp. 1994) (effective Jan. 1, 1994); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-6-213 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-12 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 11 (West 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-7-14 (1992). The dearth of
reported cases implies that these statutes are very rarely used, however, for the benefit of
a disinherited minor child. In Jacobs v. Gerecht, 86 Cal. Rptr. 217 (Ct. App. 1970), the
court disallowed a claim by a minor who had been left substantially less than what would
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ognition of the parent's posthumous duty to support the child
would make explicit the obligation implicit in the conduit theory
under dower and the forced share.292 Moreover, the loopholes
currently permitting children in nontraditional families to be disin-
herited would be closed. A well-planned scheme of this sort could
be easily and efficiently administered and would infringe upon
testamentary freedom only to the extent necessary to support the
child until she attains the age of majority.293 The posthumous
obligation is a logical extension of the inter vivos duty of sup-
port, the violation of which can result in both civil and criminal
sanctions."l The following discussion provides a brief overview
of how such a system might work and the principal problems it
would have to address.
Unlike the legitime and testator's family maintenance, the
posthumous award of child support would neither be based on a
constant, fixed fraction nor determined by judicial discretion.
Rather, the amount of the posthumous award of child support
would be determined by support schedules or formulas similar to
those found in child support guidelines used in inter vivos awards
of child support today.295 For example, the age of the disinherit-
be required for her support during minority. The court noted that the statute gave the
privilege to sue only to the county supervisors, and not to the disinherited child herself.
Id. at 218-19.
292. The right of support from the deceased parent's estate would not be limited to
children of divorced parents, but rather would extend to all children. Otherwise, single
parents and parents in a traditional nuclear family could still effectively leave their minor
children unprovided for.
293. Cf. Haskell, supra note 7, at 515 (questioning cut-off of protection when child
reaches 18, since that is the age when advanced study generally begins). Although Profes-
sor Haskell's proposal of a limited forced share with the possibility of an educational
supplement beyond majority is admirable, probably no legislature outside of Louisiana
would seriously consider such an award currently; that step would be too much, too soon,
regardless of its merits. Rather, in view of state legislative failure to provide explicitly for
disinherited children for over two centuries, it seems that only by convincing legislators
that minor children have an urgent, genuine need for protection can one hope to see any
remedial action taken. Once minor children are protected, then legislatures could address
the question of forced inheritance or support awards for advanced education of the child.
294. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3900-3901 (West Supp. 1994) (stating that mother
and father have equal responsibility to support their child until child completes 12th grade
or reaches age 19, whichever occurs first); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.05 (McKinney 1989)
(failing or refusing without excuse to provide support for child younger than 16 is a class
A misdemeanor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-322 (1993) (stating that parent willfully neglect-
ing or refusing to support child adequately is guilty of misdemeanor; first offense pun-
ishable by fine not to exceed $500 or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or
both).
295. See ELIZABETH S. BENINGER ET AL., DETERMINING CHILD & SPOUSAL SUPPORT
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ed child and the adequacy of other sources of support would be
relevant considerations in developing such schedules or formulas.
Significantly, however, the size of the testator's own estate should
not be a factor in determining the award, since the ultimate goal
of the scheme is to ensure that the minimal needs of the testator's
minor children are met-even if this requires exhausting the
testator's entire estate. In such circumstances, the law would ef-
fectively recognize that the testator's obligation to his needy mi-
nor children is more important than his privilege of testamentary
freedom.296 Once the estate administration has been closed, the
award would not be subject to modification.
Under such a system, if the disinherited minor child does not
qualify as "needy" in the applicable support schedules or formu-
las, then she would take nothing from her deceased parent's es-
tate. To prevent the child from coming within the protective stat-
ute, the testator could ensure that the child is not left needy. Life
insurance proceeds, joint tenancies, or inter vivos gifts and trusts
would all be means by which the child could be satisfactorily
provided for outside the will. Alternatively, the will could provide
§§ 430-433.12 (1990 & Supp. 1992) (discussing child support calculation models used in
various states). In 1984, amendments to federal welfare statutes required states to adopt
guidelines for determining child support or lose federal welfare funds. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 667 (1988) (mandating that states establish guidelines for child support awards). The
guidelines may be established by legislative, judicial, or administrative action and must be
reviewed at least once every four years. Id.; see, e.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P, 90.3 (1994)
(defining judicial child support guidelines); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115 (1992) (estab-
lishing statutory child support guidelines); FRIEND OF THE COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
MICHIGAN CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINE MANUAL (1992) (providing administratively devel-
oped child support guidelines). The guidelines vary widely from state to state and are
generally viewed as materials to guide, not bind, the court in its determination of the
appropriate child support award. Thus, unlike the proposed binding support schedule for
posthumous child support awards discussed in the text above, inter vivos child support
guidelines do not severely fetter judicial discretion. See, e.g., Boris v. Blaisdell, 492
N.E.2d 622, 625-27 (II. App. Ct. 1986) (noting that legislative history emphasizes judicial
discretion; guidelines merely provide a place to begin analysis); In re Marriage of Gore,
781 S.W.2d 828, 832 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that guidelines are "simply formulas
or schedules to consider which leave significant room for sound judicial discretion").
Commentators have indeed noted that if the goal of the federal statute was to ensure
uniformity and eliminate or restrict judicial discretion in support awards, the statute is a
failure. See I ALEXANDER LINDEY & Louis I. PARLEY, LINDEY ON SEPARATION AGREE-
MENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS 15.02 (1994) (discussing lack of uniformity, but
nevertheless noting the positive role of guidelines in presenting "objective, mathematically
calculable criteria for the determination of child support orders").
296. The posthumous obligation of support could thus be larger than the traditional
legitime. As the estate value decreases and the number of minor children increases, it be-
comes more likely that the testator's entire estate will be exhausted by such a scheme.
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the child with at least the minimum required under the posthu-
mous child support provisions.
Although courts normally may use discretion to deviate from
child support guidelines in determining inter vivos awards, the
child support schedules or formulas for determining the posthu-
mous obligation would be binding. Varying degrees of flexibility
could be designed into the schedules or formulas themselves;
however, to allow additional judicial discretion would subject the
scheme to the same criticisms leveled at the family maintenance
system. The awards under the support schedules would instead be
based on the perceived needs297 of the "typical" minor child in
the category within which the claimant falls.298
Questions of priority between minor children and other claim-
ants299 against the testator's estate would also require the atten-
297. Commentators have emphasized the importance of advanced education in preparing
a child for entry into the adult world. See supra notes 282, 288 (discussing proposals of
Haskell and Batts). A state legislature could extend the coverage to include children dur-
ing minority and continuing through a certain age if the child were a full-time student.
Because any measure disallowing complete disinheritance would mark a dramatic change
in American law, however, for practical reasons the proposal in this article is more mod-
est: legislatures should start by considering need in its most basic terms. Although few
would argue that a minor child is not entitled to food and shelter, at least some Ameri-
cans might still take issue with the idea of advanced education as a need.
Including advanced education as a criterion for extending the support duty presents
other problems as well. What advanced education programs satisfy the requirement? A
four-year university, a technical school, a conservatory of music? If the award were ex-
tended to cover costs of advanced education, would the child be liable to refund some
part of the award if she did not attend or finish the program of study? It appears that in
these situations, any award to the child would have to be placed in a trust which would
terminate upon her failure to comply with the appropriate conditions.
298. To develop an adequate scheme of protection for children, legislatures would have
to determine those children who may be properly disinherited. Although the proposal in
this article is geared to the protection of needy, minor children, even within this category
some children could be subject to disinheritance. See supra note 121 (discussing Louisiana
disinheritance statute). For example, the needy, minor child who feloniously kills or at-
tempts to kill his parent would be a likely candidate for exclusion from the posthumous
support rules. The exclusion of such a child typically would also comport with state stat-
utes concerning felonious killing and their effect on inheritance. See supra note 60.
299. A potential and very possibly deserving claimant to the posthumous award of child
support is the adult disabled child unable to provide adequately for himself. The needs of
the adult disabled child have not been examined in this article, but in some ways are
analogous to those of the minor child. If her disability is permanent, the adult child's
claim may even seem more compelling than that of minor children. Where the jurisdiction
imposes a continuing obligation of support on the living parent of an adult disabled child,
an extension of the posthumous obligation would appear logical. Most states now require
parents to support their adult disabled children who are unable to support themselves. See
LYNN D. WARDLE E" AL., 4 CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW § 38.05 (1988 & Supp. 1989)
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tion of legislatures willing to recognize a posthumous obligation
of parental support. For example, an important question of priority
would arise if the jurisdiction possessed both an elective share
statute and a posthumous duty of support statute and the testator's
estate were too small to cover both the spouse's elective share
amount and the testator's posthumous obligation of child sup-
port.3"u One solution would be to satisfy the spousal share and
distribute the remainder to the minor children. In light of the
strong preference of twentieth-century legislatures for protecting
the surviving spouse even to the detriment of other heirs, this
initially appears the most likely approach to the priority problem
between a surviving spouse and minor children. Indeed, for most
of the history of this country, duty to spouse seems to have been
considered greater than duty to children."' This alternative also
comports with most modem intestacy approaches, which first
ensure protection of the spouse and only afterwards provide for
the intestate's children.02
(citing statutes and case law from various jurisdictions).
There may, however, be practical reasons for not protecting the adult disabled child
with funds from the parent's estate. The needs of the disabled adult child continue over
an incalculable period potentially extending for several decades. Moreover, those needs
would vary greatly among individual claimants, depending upon the kind and severity of
disability in question. Each disability would require its own support schedule or formula.
At least where needy, minor dependents of the testator also survive, it may be appropriate
not to require the posthumous award on behalf of the adult disabled child. A legislature
choosing to protect both minor children and adult disabled children would face an ex-
tremely difficult choice in setting the priority of claims between these two categories of
children.
300. Note that when a decedent dies intestate leaving no parents, a surviving spouse,
and all of the decedent's descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse (who
has no other descendants), then under the 1990 UPC the surviving spouse takes the entire
intestate estate. 1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(t), 8 U.L.A. 75, 80 (Supp. 1994). If a
state were using the 1990 UPC and a system of posthumous child support obligations for
the testate decedent, disinherited children in such a family would be better off than if
their parent had died intestate.
301. As previously discussed, however, duty to spouse originally was perceived at least
in part as encompassing duty to children. The widow and minor children at that time in
numerous ways suffered similar disabilities. With enfranchisement and the Married
Women's Property Acts, however, women entered the realm of adult personhood and left
childlike disability behind. Today, the adult surviving spouse is in a position vastly supe-
rior to that of the minor child, who is still largely unable to protect herself from either
the world or, when necessary, her own parents.
302. In most states, the surviving spouse of an intestate decedent receives at the least a
child's portion. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-7 (1972) (surviving spouse entitled to
only a child's part if decedent is also survived by issue), and, at most, the entire intestate
estate, see 1990 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102(1), 8 U.L.A. 75, 80 (Supp. 1994) (surviving
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Another approach to priority would be to provide for a pro
rata distribution between the surviving spouse and minor children.
This approach, however, would quite likely prove to be unsatis-
factory to both the surviving spouse and minor children, for per-
sons in either category would be partially disappointed in their
awards. The disparity in positions of the surviving spouse and the
minor child indicates that the best resolution lies in ensuring that
the minor child posthumous support obligation is fulfilled before
any distribution is made pursuant to laws of testate (or, for that
matter, intestate) succession.3 As between general creditors and
disinherited minor children, the testator's support obligation to the
children should also be given priority."
Legislatures also would need to adopt measures to prevent
the testator from making fraudulent transfers shortly before death
to deplete his estate and defeat the posthumous obligation of child
support. The most difficult part of drafting such a preventive stat-
ute would be to minimize the inevitable tension between the sur-
viving spouse and the minor children. If, for example, just before
spouse receives all if decedent is not survived by parents, all of his issue are issue of
surviving spouse, and surviving spouse has no other issue). See generally Martin L. Fried,
The Uniform Probate Code: Intestate Succession and Related Matters, 55 ALB. L. REV.
927, 929-33 (1992) (discussing surviving spouse's share under UPC intestacy scheme).
303. Although this article does not specifically address intestacy and the needy minor
child, it should be noted that a "minor children first" approach could rectify unfortunate
circumstances that some children experience under current intestacy laws. For example, if
an intestate decedent left an estate of $12,000, a wife, and two young children from a
former marriage, in many states currently the three would each receive $4000, regardless
of need. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-104 (1984) (specifying that a surviving
spouse is entitled to "either one-third (1/3) or a child's share of the entire intestate estate
whichever is greater"). A minor children first approach would determine the needs of the
two minor children according to applicable guidelines, satisfy those amounts from the
estate, and then allow the surviving spouse to take the remainder, if any. The rationales
supporting such an approach in intestacy would be the same as those traced in this arti-
cle, including the inability of the children to protect themselves; the permanence of the
parent-child relationship compared to the terminable marriage contract; and the presumed
equality of spouses entering into a modem marriage. If the child's intestate share exceed-
ed the support obligation under the applicable guidelines, then the child would take the
intestate share rather than the child support amount.
304. This priority determination seems uncontroversial if the importance of the posthu-
mous obligation of support is analogized to the inter vivos obligation of support imposed
in the divorce or separation scenario. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988) (providing that
child support obligation is nondischargeable debt when imposed in connection with separa-
tion agreement, divorce decree, or other order of a court of record or property settlement
agreement). See generally 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 523.15 (Lawrence P. King ed.,
1993) (noting that bankruptcy will not discharge a maintenance or support debt to a child
of the debtor).
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death the terminally ill testator places his principal assets in joint
tenancies or tenancies by the entirety with his second wife, should
the minor child from the first marriage be allowed to include
some or all of those properties in the estate from which the
child's needs are to be satisfied? 5
Where the child is an infant and the award is substantial, a
support trust appears to be a viable solution to the problem of
custody and management of the award. At least in some instanc-
es, however, an outright award to the guardian of the child might
be appropriate. Examples would include where the award is small
or where there is no indication of antipathy between either the
surviving parent/guardian and child or between the surviving par-
ent/guardian and testator. 6 By making the posthumous award of
305. If the continuing obligation of support were recognized, the applicability of pre-
termitted child or heir statutes to minor children would also be called into question. A
statutory scheme recognizing a posthumous obligation of support would include not only
minor children intentionally disinherited, but also those inadvertently disinherited. An argu-
able impropriety that would result from enacting a continuing obligation of support
scheme while at the same time retaining a pretermitted child statute is that the inadver-
tently disinherited minor child conceivably could elect between the two approaches, based
on which statute provided the greater benefits. If the testator inadvertently disinherited his
minor child and the child's needs are less than the child's intestate share (the typical
award under pretermitted child statutes), the child would naturally choose to take under
the pretermitted child statute. The opportunity to elect between the two systems may not
be perceived as improper by everyone: a valid argument can be made that where the
child can show he was inadvertently (not intentionally) disinherited, he should be able to
take the maximum share allowed to him by law. Moreover, in many instances the reason
for the disinheritance will be ambiguous and the child will not be assured of taking under
the pretermitted statute. In any event, legislatures concerned with the problems of inadver-
tent disinheritance of adult children or heirs other than minor children might wish to
retain the pretermitted statutes for those categories of claimants.
Some commentators have questioned the value of current pretermitted child or heir
statutes, because cases of inadvertent disinheritance are a truly rare problem. See supra
note 102 (discussing views of Rein).
306. Probably in most instances in which the guardian of the minor child is the sur-
viving spouse of the testator there should be little concern that the parent will misappro-
priate the funds or that her management of them would be contrary to the testator's wish-
es. A more difficult question arises when the minor child is not the child of the surviv-
ing spouse. The simplest solution is to award the money to the surviving parent as the
child's natural guardian. In at least some cases, however, it will be apparent that the
surviving parent cannot or will not be an adequate fiduciary to the child. In the absence
of a mandatory trust in such a case, upon the request of an interested party the court
should have the power to place the award in trust for the benefit of the child.
For those who espouse so-called traditional family values, this continuing obligation
of support should be appealing. The minor children in the traditional family would receive
the amounts representing the testator's obligation to them while the surviving spouse
would still be eligible for her forced share should the legislature decide to retain the
provision. (Note that, alternatively, the scheme could be structured so that the continuing
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the child support in a lump sum,30 7 the process of estate admin-
istration should take no longer than it does currently. Moreover,
the difficulties of collection experienced under inter vivos child
support orders would be substantially reduced in collecting from
the decedent's estate.
The problems involved in devising a workable scheme upon
which to ground the posthumous obligation of support are formi-
dable but not insurmountable. Regrettably, to the extent such a
system can be developed, it will probably have to be engrafted
onto the existing (and often creaky) framework of protective pro-
visions. Although a nationally uniform system of child protection
is desirable in our highly mobile society," 8 it will be difficult to
achieve in light of the maze of current inter vivos child support
and probate laws. Nonetheless, even support schemes developed
and enacted state by state are better than none at all.
IV. CONCLUSION
If marriage is viewed as an economic partnership, then the
community property system is preferable to the common law sys-
tem. Because the community property system recognizes the con-
tributions of each spouse during the marriage itself, no special
provisions are required to protect a spouse from disinheritance.
Nonetheless, most jurisdictions in the United States apply com-
mon law principles to ownership of marital assets and are unlike-
duty of support would apply only to those situations in which the testator left minor
children by others than his surviving spouse. Such an approach, while perhaps practical,
would fail to recognize explicitly the testator's obligation to all of his children and would
also appear to marginalize the value of the excluded children.).
307. A posthumous obligation of child support payable in a lump sum has antecedents
in the inter vivos obligation of child support. Although child support awards are seldom
made payable in lump sums, such awards do occur in some contexts. See, e.g., UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 15(d), 9B U.L.A. 287, 324 (1987) ("[un the best interest of the child,
a lump sum payment . . . may be ordered in lieu of periodic payments of support");
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.13(D) (Anderson 1992 Supp.) (same); Cross v. Goodridge,
No. C-920113, 1993 WL 231714 at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (noting availability of
lump sum award pursuant to Ohio statute).
308. Compare John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of
Gratuitous Transfers: The New Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 871, 878-79
(1992) (noting that local variation among states enacting uniform laws results in loss of
uniformity that is large part of their value) with Fellows et al., supra note 7, at 361
(questioning propriety of uniform intestate succession statute after 1977 survey indicated
that respondents in various regions of the country had differing views on proper distribu-
tion at death).
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ly to convert to community property principles. The forced share
or dower exists in almost all common law states and recognizes
to some degree the contributions of the survivor of the marriage.
Unfortunately, this recognition is belated: it vests only upon the
death of the first spouse. The forced share or dower, however,
does prevent complete spousal disinheritance.
Because common law states refuse to fully acknowledge mar-
riage as an economic partnership, the forced share will continue
to exist well into the twenty-first century. The forced share, as
even its leading proponents acknowledge, is a makeshift provision
that cannot completely eliminate the flaws of common law own-
ership applied to marital assets. Where the share is retained, how-
ever, its conventional form should be replaced with the fairer
1990 UPC provisions.
For unmarried cohabitants, there are no statutory protections
from disinheritance similar to community property or the forced
share. Heterosexual cohabitants may take advantage of the spousal
protections by marrying. Homosexual cohabitants, however, do not
have this option. As our definition of family evolves, the dispa-
rate treatment of homosexual cohabitants becomes increasingly
difficult to justify, particularly when minor children are in the
home.
Spouses and cohabitants may protect themselves from disin-
heritance in a variety of ways without state intervention. If mar-
riage or cohabitation is viewed merely as a contractual relation-
ship of equals able to protect their own interests, a plausible
argument for the abolition of statutory protection arises. Yet Geor-
gia alone of the common law states affords a surviving spouse no
dower or forced share, and there is little indication that this ap-
proach will be adopted elsewhere.
Most civilized countries around the world explicitly recognize
the testator's obligation to his children beyond his death. In the
United States, only Louisiana does so. When children were reared
in traditional families by parents who remained married until
death, the American laws protecting the surviving spouse from
disinheritance implicitly protected the couple's minor children
because of the surviving spouse's parental duty of support. Today,
however, millions of American children are reared outside the
traditional family. If there is a surviving spouse of the testator,
she frequently is not the parent of his disinherited minor children.
In many nontraditional families,, the disinherited minor child there-
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fore will not receive the indirect protection afforded by dower, the
elective share, or community property principles. Some children in
nontraditional families can be protected from disinheritance
through child support decrees or express contractual obligations.
For others, however, these protective options do not exist.
In this society of fractured families, it appears that disinheri-
tance of minor children is more common than spousal disinheri-
tance. Yet in the absence of statistical evidence that disinheritance
of minor children is a substantial problem, legislatures are hesitant
to address the issue. That such statistical evidence may be well-
nigh impossible to obtain is hardly a satisfactory reason for deny-
ing minor children protection from disinheritance: spousal disin-
heritance has long been the subject of protective statutes even
though there is little evidence that spousal disinheritance is a
problem. The difference in protection afforded spouses and minor
children is particularly ironic when one compares their positions.
Spouses have the opportunity and ability to protect themselves
from disinheritance; minor children do not.
Neither the civil law legitime nor testator's family mainte-
nance, however, is likely to find widespread acceptance in Ameri-
ca. The former is highly arbitrary and the latter is highly discre-
tionary. Both may apply to benefit children of all ages. The pro-
posal suggested in this Article is more modest: states should
recognize explicitly that the parental obligation of support is one
that extends posthumously until the child attains majority. The
child inadequately provided for should have a claim against her
parent's estate that receives first priority. The amount of the claim
could be determined from binding tables or formulas developed in
a manner similar to that used for inter vivos child support guide-
lines.
In a time of rapidly evolving marital and cohabitating rela-
tionships, legislatures are understandably reluctant to change exist-
ing provisions for adult survivors. Long before this evolution
began, however, American society failed to ensure that its minor
children were not the victims of parental disinheritance. We can
no longer plausibly assert the benefits flowing from the traditional
family model in mitigation of this failure, for such benefits apply
to increasingly few children. We can no longer stubbornly cling
to the world of our ancestors, for family structures they never
envisioned are with us here and now. Minor children did not
create the modem family, nor should they be suffer for being
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born into it. In fairness to these children and to society at large,
we must ensure their protection from parental disinheritance.

